PARAGUAY'S INTERIOR MINISTER ON ELECTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000218 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USAID LAC/AA NSC FOR SUE CRONIN SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD BARBARA MOORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR ASEC MARR SNAR CVIS KCRM KICC, PA SUBJECT: PARAGUAY'S INTERIOR MINISTER ON ELECTION, SECURITY, POLICE, CABRAL REF: A. ASUNCION 210 AND PRECEDING ¶B. ASUNCION 208 ¶C. ASUNCION 200 ¶D. 05 STATE 223607 AND PRECEDING ¶E. 05 ASUNCION 630 ¶F. 05 ASUNCION 593 ¶G. 05 ASUNCION 269 Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: On 2/27 Interior Minister Rogelio Benitez told Ambassador President Duarte's recent election victory was an historic opportunity to cleanse the Colorado Party (ANR) and pursue Duarte's reform agenda. He highlighted differences between perceptions of insecurity and the reality. He discussed his efforts to clean up the corrupt and ineffective Paraguayan National Police (PNP) and create a new metropolitan police force as a "fresh start" alternative. He sidestepped the Ambassador's direct question about the possible promotion of corrupt police official Aristides Cabral. He characterized a group of Patria Libre Party (PPL) militants as "remnants" but acknowledged the difficulty of finding and eliminating them. The Ambassador and Benitez discussed a number of areas where the USG might provide the GOP additional security cooperation and assistance. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On 2/27 the Ambassador called on Interior Minister Rogelio Benitez. (Note: The Ambassador and Benitez met the preceding weekend during the Ambassador's trip to Encarnacion, which is Benitez's hometown. Benitez met the Ambassador in Encarnacion at President Duarte's request, and hosted the Ambassador at his residence for an informal meeting the evening of 2/24. The 2/27 office call was their first formal meeting, and lasted roughly two hours. End Note.) -------------- An Historic Election Victory -------------- ¶3. (U) Benitez described President Duarte's recent primary election victory (refs B and C) as historic. He acknowledged that decades of uninterrupted power had corrupted many within the Colorado Party, but asserted that Duarte represented a break from tradition. He blamed much of the corruption on the need for "electorally important" Colorados who could win national elections to broker deals with "politically important" Colorados who controlled much of the party's political machinery. He opined that Duarte was capable of overcoming that dichotomy by uniting political power with electability. He alluded to a possible purge of corrupt Colorados in the 2008 elections, but noted that it would be a difficult task. ¶4. (U) Benitez posited that Duarte's victory would enable him to more vigorously pursue his reform agenda. He emphasized that Duarte took office in 2003 with two primary reform objectives: to formalize the economy and to address the country's persistent social problems. He asserted that Duarte's challenger in the primaries, Osvaldo Dominguez Dibb, would have represented a return to an economy built on corruption and contraband. The Ambassador stressed the importance of getting anti-money laundering legislation through Congress as a key indicator of Duarte's commitment to formalizing the economy and combating corruption. Benitez highlighted a three-point reduction in poverty since Duarte took office (from 43 percent to 40 percent) and the USD 30 million in Itaipu hydroelectric dam royalties Duarte has spent on social programs as evidence of his commitment to the second objective. -------------- Insecurity: Perceptions vs. Reality -------------- ¶5. (U) Benitez noted that his primary focus as Interior Minister was security, but highlighted differences between perceptions of insecurity in Paraguay and the reality of the current situation. He cited four reasons for recent increases in perceptions of insecurity in Paraguay: an increase in the incidence of violent crime, sensationalized press reports about such crime, revelations that security personnel charged with combating crime are involved in it, and a general lack of faith in the country's criminal justice system due to widespread impunity. In contrast to popular perceptions, however, Benitez noted that the incidence of kidnappings, murders, and other violent crimes in Paraguay was average or below average for Latin America and on par with Eastern Europe in many respects. Benitez also noted that reductions in poverty levels typically lead to reduced incidence of crime. -------------- Efforts at Police Reform -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Benitez acknowledged that the PNP is a generally corrupt and ineffective institution, but explained that he had to proceed with measured determination in cleaning it up. He noted that corrupt PNP officials could bring down a heavy-handed Interior Minister by taking measures to increase perceptions of insecurity, such as orchestrating a series of bank robberies. He said he is therefore ferreting out and firing the worst of the worst, but choosing his battles so as to avoid a major backlash from the PNP's uniformed ranks. He highlighted the difficulty of taking on police officials with upwards of 30 years of service and powerful political backers, versus the relative ease of taking on corrupt prosecutors, for example, who tend to be younger, newer in their jobs, and less powerful politically. (Comment: It is not clear which corrupt PNP officials Benitez was referring to when he said he was ferreting out and firing the worst. There has been no purge of police leadership since Benitez first took office (ref G),nor any high-profile firings of corrupt senior PNP officials. Post will follow up with the Vice Minister for Security to clarify. End Comment.) ¶7. (U) Benitez said the new metropolitan police force he is creating would serve as a "fresh start" alternative to the PNP. The new force is to be composed of recent high school graduates with relatively solid academic credentials and no prior police service. Benitez lamented that the inaugural recruiting drive only netted 130 qualified recruits, and that the Ministry only received 750 applications. He blamed the low number of applications on the stigma corrupt PNP officials have created for the law enforcement profession as a whole. On the other hand, Benitez noted that requiring metropolitan police recruits to meet more rigorous selection criteria (a tougher entrance examination, for example) would produce a higher quality police force. Whereas some 80 percent of applicants typically qualify for entrance to the PNP, fewer than 20 percent of applicants qualified for the metropolitan police. ¶8. (C) Comment: Benitez posits support for the metropolitan police force as his way of pursuing police reform. He publicly characterizes the metropolitan police as "less corrupt than the PNP," and has military personnel, rather than PNP, training recruits. An optimistic take on this would be that Benitez realizes the PNP is a lost cause and prefers to build a new police force from the ground up. However, a force of 400 recent high school graduates with no arrest powers cannot replace the PNP. Others more cynically suggest that Benitez sees the metropolitan police program as a way to gain favor (and votes) for the Duarte administration among Asuncion residents. Some sources advise that Benitez and other Duarte administration officials are using the metropolitan police program, as well as fictitious vehicle purchases and other Ministry programs, to rob money from the state. Some see the new metropolitan police force as undercutting the police budget for a cosmetic fix, while others say improvements require such shock therapy. End Comment. -------------- Cabral -------------- ¶9. (C) Benitez sidestepped the Ambassador's direct question about the possible future promotion of corrupt police official Aristides Cabral (ref D). The Ambassador stressed the fact that the USG would find it extremely difficult to work with any part of the PNP if it were headed by Cabral, who we knew to have ties to narcotics traffickers. Benitez acknowledged that rumors abounded about Cabral's nefarious activities, but he did not go so far as to say Cabral would not be promoted. Rather, he noted that Cabral enjoyed the support of powerful political backers, and that Cabral had a reputation for being tough on crime. The Ambassador countered that Cabral might be tough on some criminals, but not on those he protected or with whom he did business. (Comment: Although Benitez did not make any commitments, he clearly got the message. End Comment.) -------------- Remnants of Patria Libre -------------- ¶10. (C) Benitez characterized a group of Patria Libre Party (PPL) militants in the Paraguayan countryside (ref A) as "remnants" of a movement the GOP had dismantled. However, he acknowledged the difficulty of finding and eliminating those who remain, since they were trained in guerrilla tactics and hiding in a region that was difficult to access and unfamiliar to police and military personnel. He also noted that the GOP lacked the USG's technical capabilities, and asked whether the Embassy might provide technical assistance (e.g., FLIR technology to determine the location of two columns of militants who remain at large). The Ambassador said he would look into the possibility of providing technical assistance, and noted that two GOP helicopters being repaired with DEA funds soon would be back in service. (Comment: Our information suggests the militants in the countryside are active and receiving training and funding from outside. End Comment.) -------------- USG Security Cooperation and Assistance -------------- ¶11. (U) Benitez cited anti-kidnapping, anti-terrorism, and anti-money laundering training the USG recently provided to GOP personnel as invaluable. In addition to imparting valuable knowledge, he noted that the training served to establish essential contacts between USG and GOP personnel. Benitez thanked the Ambassador for the training, the aforementioned helicopter repairs, and any technical assistance the USG might be able to provide. The Ambassador noted that the USG would provide Paraguay over USD 55 million in assistance this year, including USD 35 million in Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program funds. He added that administration of justice was an important aspect of the Threshold Program proposal, as was strengthening oversight of the Interior Ministry's personal identification registry. The Ambassador further noted that the USG could provide much more in terms of military assistance if Paraguay would sign an Article 98 agreement, and that visa revocations could be used as an effective tool against corrupt individuals. Benitez agreed that visa revocations could have a significant impact. CASON