PARAGUAY: INFORMATION ON LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE

S E C R E T ASUNCION 000148

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR INR/I
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD BARBARA MOORE
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
NAIROBI FOR MICHAEL FITZPATRICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PINR PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY: INFORMATION ON LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE
MINISTERS (C-AL5-01594)

REF: A. 05 STATE 232384

B. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0038 04

Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reason 1.4 (d).


1. (U) The information that follows responds to INR/I Request
for Information C-AL5-01594. Answers are keyed to ref A
questions.


A. (C) The principal impediment to making the Defense
Minister more responsible for oversight of the military is
the fact that the Defense Minister is not in the operational
chain of command. The Military Forces Commander reports to
the President as Commander in Chief. The Ministry of Defense
is an ancillary political institution with responsibility for
policy formulation, a variety of administrative support
activities, and liaison with Congress, other Ministries, and
foreign embassies. This lack of operational command
authority over the military is the most important issue with
which the Defense Minister currently is grappling. In 2004,
the Minister of Defense and the Military Forces Commander
developed a reorganization plan that would include the
Defense Minister in the chain of command (ref B),but the
plan has not cleared the lower house of Congress.


B. (C) The Defense Minister serves as a reasonably effective
intermediary between the military and civilian spheres. The
military no longer plays an overt role in politics, and
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control
over the security forces. The Defense Minister's lack of
operational command authority over the military (see
sub-paragraph A, above) limits his/her effectiveness vis a
vis the military, as does the fact that Defense Ministers
typically lack previous military experience or other
significant defense or national security experience.
Conversely, lack of pervious military experience likely
increases the Defense Minister's effectiveness as an
intermediary vis a vis the civilian sphere, in light of
Paraguay's history of military dictatorships and coups in the
not too distant past. Other factors, such as the Defense
Minister's individual political and professional acumen or
his/her relationship with the President and other power
brokers (see sub-paragraphs C and D, below),likely have a
greater impact on his/her effectiveness as an intermediary
between the two spheres.


C. (S/NF) The Defense Minister is extremely vulnerable to
corruption. Paraguay's Executive operates as a political
machine controlled by the ruling party, and political favors
and spoils go to those who are closest to the party's power
brokers. Corruption also pervades the ranks of the military.
To make up for inadequate resources, but also primarily for
personal enrichment, commanders engage in corrupt activities.
They exaggerate manning figures to secure more funding from
the military budget, and use conscripts as a source of labor
for non-government work in order to generate revenue. The
military's inability to secure a budget that allows for
operational capabilities sustainment leaves most units barely
able to meet their budgetary requirements for infrastructure,
utilities, and pay, leaving no money for fuel and munitions
with which to train. As a result, bribery is often
considered normal, acceptable behavior. Since commanders
depend on the Defense Minister to provide administrative
support and to lobby Congress, the President, and other
Ministries on their behalf, the Defense Minister has a
certain degree of leverage to extract a portion of
commander's ill-gotten gains.


D. (C) The Defense Minister's effectiveness is largely
dependent on his/her relationship with the President, as is
the case with the heads of all GOP Ministries. Paraguay's
Executive operates as a political machine controlled by the
ruling party, and political favors and spoils go to those who
are closest to the party's power brokers, including the
President. Within such as system, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to be effective without the backing and
confidence of the President. The current Defense Minister,
Roberto Gonzalez, is a personal friend of the President and
served as his campaign manager in the 2002-2003 primary and
general elections.


E. (C) The Defense Minister position has not, in recent

years, been a significant stepping stone to other political
positions, including the Presidency. A series of "soldier
Presidents" ruled Paraguay from 1939 to 1993, including
General Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 to 1989, and his
immediate successor, General Andres Rodriguez, from 1989 to

1993. However, none of the four Presidents since Rodriguez
(Juan Carlos Wasmosy, Raul Cubas, Luis Gonzalez Macchi, or
Nicanor Duarte Frutos) were career military or had
significant defense or national security experience. The
current Defense Minister, Roberto Gonzalez, recently
acknowledged his interest in running for president of the
ruling Colorado Party, which is a potential stepping stone to
becoming President of the Republic; but presently he is not
considered a serious contender for either post. (Note: Prior
to becoming Defense Minister, Gonzalez briefly served as
Duarte's Interior Minister, but left office in the wake of a
scandal involving the smuggling of blank compact disks. He
returned as Defense Minister four months later, most likely
as a way to cleanse his political reputation and resume.
When Duarte reportedly asked Gonzalez and other aspiring
party presidents to resign from their posts so they could
dedicate themselves to their respective campaigns, Gonzalez
chose instead to give up or delay his aspirations. Since
then, Duarte revealed that he intends to seek re-election as
party president, and re-election as President of the Republic
if the Constitution is amended to permit it. End Note.)


F. (C) The Defense Minister is not a particularly important
interlocutor for the United States. The Embassy deals with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or directly with the
Military Forces on routine matters. Vice President Luis
Castiglioni has become our principal interlocutor on
high-priority national security and defense issues.


2. (U) POCs at Post are PolOff Mark Stamilio
(StamilioMA2@state.sgov.gov) and DATT LTC Dennis Fiemeyer
(difiedd@notes.dawn.dia.smil.mil).
CASON