ABDULWAHID PLANS DEPARTURE FROM ASMARA AND ASKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ER SU SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID PLANS DEPARTURE FROM ASMARA AND ASKS FOR USG ASSISTANCE Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: AbdulWahid al-Nur recently has told Emboff he plans to depart Asmara on November 8 for Europe and then Darfur, to meet with his supporters. He proposed tacking on travel to the U.S., requesting USG visa and financial assistance for the trip. AbdulWahid expressed support for the upcoming SLM military commanders meetings in Darfur, -- so long as the political leadership did not participate. He asserted the G-19 have returned to the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and now support him. Finally, he claimed to have spoken with Nigerian President Obasanjo about Nigeria playing a role in a future Darfur Peace Agreement-plus mediation, noting his concerns about any mediation being conducted in Asmara, whether led by the GSE or not. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In meetings this week with Emboff, AbdulWahid al-Nur stated he intends to depart Asmara on November 8 for Europe, where he would spend a few days consulting in the Netherlands and France with officials and the Darfur diaspora. He said he plans to continue on to Darfur by the end of November. AbdulWahid said his November 8 departure date would be contingent on his ability to obtain a new Schengen visa. He confirmed that the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) has released his passport and given him an exit visa. Abdulwahid proposed a trip to the United States and requested USG assistance in procuring plane tickets and other financial assistance for himself and six of his supporters. (Comment: Post sees little purpose in AbdulWahid's proposed visit to the U.S. at this time. Rather than offering a clear vision for achieving consensus on the DPA, he seems more concerned with using a visit to strengthen his image vis-(-vis other Darfurian leaders. Until the SLM's internal leadership issues are sorted out, we would not encourage an AbdulWahid visit to Washington. End Comment) ¶3. (C) AbdulWahid said the purpose of his travel to Darfur was to consult with his supporters and move forward an SLM mediation with the Government of National Unity (GNU). He commented that he does not support an SLM leadership conference in Darfur at this time, as such a conference would put many of his supporters at risk given the security concerns on the ground. While AbdulWahid supports the upcoming military commanders' meeting, he noted attendance should be limited to the military leaders and not include the SLM political leadership. If AbdulWahid had his way, the meeting would result in the military leaders renaming him as Chairman of the SLM, reinstating Khamis as Vice- Chairman of the SLM and affirming SLM support for renewed mediation, building on the DPA. ¶4. (C) AbdulWahid opined that other Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, such as Khamis Abdalia Abakr, Ahmed Abdul Shaffi and Sharif Harir, should only be permitted to participate in a future DPA-plus mediation if they first rejoin the SLM under his leadership. He saw little value in having Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige involved at all in a mediation, and confided to Emboff that he believes that Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was working out a separate secret agreement with the National Congress Party (NCP). ¶5. (C) AbdulWahid emphasized that the international community must play a key role in any future discussions and noted that while he supports the idea of a GSE-led mediaton, he remained somewhat cautious about holding the mediation in Eritrea where international observers might not be included as fully as he would like. When Emboff asked his views on suggestions that Chad play a larger role in a mediation, or possibly even co-mediate, he stated that Chad was an integral player to achieving peace in Darfur and should be involved. That said, he did not seem insistent on Chad playing a co-mediating role. AbdulWahid noted that he had spoken with Nigerian President Obasanjo by telephone two weeks ago about Nigeria playing a role in a future mediation. During this call, Obasanjo had invited him to Nigeria to discuss the idea further. He had tried to call again on November 7, but Obasanjo was in China. AbdulWahid commented to Emboff that since the mediation process began in Abuja, it should return there. However, he viewed the Nigerian role as only providing the venue with the Eritreans in a mediating role. ¶6. (C) AbdulWahid, with passport and exit visa in hand, appears intent on departing Eritrea as soon as possible; finances may be the only obstacle holding him back. Post is not certain, however, that AbdulWahid will actually proceed to Darfur following his meetings in Europe, especially given his past history of cancellation of trips to the region. At least one Sudanese source here argues that AbdulWahid does not have the on-ground support of the commanders -- and knows it --and he would not risk appearing in Darfur where this fact would become obvious to outside observers. No matter what AbdulWahid choose to do, however, other Asmara-located Darfurians do appear to be heading home. Emboff was told by Abdul Shaffi that he too has his passport and a green light from the GSE to leave Asmara and will confirm his travel plans on November 8. Sharif and Khamis are reportedly already in Darfur consulting with the military commanders in the field in advance of the November 15 meeting. ¶7. (C) Comment: The GSE has never publicly acknowledged that it at times limits the travel of the various Sudanese parties who accept its "hospitality" in Asmara. Its decision to allow AbdulWahid and others to travel freely for now, however, may reflect their appreciation of the need for the non-signatories to consult with the field and come to a common ground prior to the GSE launching a mediation effort. Senior GSE officials, Yemane Ghebreab and Abdalla Jabir, met with NCP officials in Khartoum last week, and these meetings may have also led the GSE to believe the time was right to allow the non-signatories some latitude. Ambassador will be meeting with Ghebreab upon his return to Asmara for an update on Eritrean thinking and strategy. End Comment. DELISI