EASTERN SUDAN AGREEMENT: TWO DOWN, ONE TO GO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000802

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
STATE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN SUDAN AGREEMENT: TWO DOWN, ONE TO GO

REF: A. A. STATE 164613


B. B. ASMARA 787

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Over the past week, the Eastern
Front and Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU)
have agreed in principle to the wealth sharing and
security arrangement components of an agreement on
the future of eastern Sudan. The parties are
finalizing power sharing arrangements, the final
component of the agreement, and hope to have all
three drafts initialed by the end of the week.
Current plans call for signing the agreement in mid-
October with the Eastern Front holding a conference
to explain the agreement to its constituencies in
Tesseney, Eritrea in early November. All parties
seem happy with the agreement's draft elements thus
far. While not meeting all of their initial goals,
the Eastern Front members believe the agreement is a
stepping stone towards strengthening the Eastern
Front as a political party and achieving future
development in eastern Sudan. Barring any surprises
in the final version, Post believes the Department
should support the agreement as a step towards
stability in the region and should consider carefully
providing funding for training and capacity-building
programs. End Summary.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
--------------


2. (C) On September 28, the Eastern Front and the
Government of National Unity (GNU) initialed the
agreement's security arrangement document. Dr. Amna
Dirar, vice chairman of the Eastern Front, told
Emboff that the Eastern Front was pleased with the
outcome and provided details of the security
arrangements. The document outlines the integration
of the majority of the Eastern Front troops -
estimated at just over 5,000 - into the national army
and police forces. It stipulates that there will be
three main units in the east. Each of these units
will draw at least 33 percent of its members from the
Beja and Rashaida tribes. These individuals will be
required to serve in units in eastern Sudan for a
minimum of five years, after which, they may possibly
be moved to other areas of the country.


3. (C) The Eastern Front believes that approximately
one quarter of the Eastern Front troops will choose
to be demobilized prior to integration. A program to
reintegrate these individuals back into society is in
the planning stages. Dirar believes the process for
integration and demobilization will take six to eight
months in total. She also explained that a side
agreement was reached, not included in the security
arrangement document, which would provide the Eastern
Front with 250 seats in the military and police
academies in Khartoum over the next three years.

WEALTH SHARING
--------------


4. (C) The draft for the wealth sharing agreement was
finalized and initialed on October 1. Many of the
details of the agreement were made available in the
Khartoum daily, al-Sahafa. (Note: Article was sent to
AF/SPG and Embassy Khartoum. End Note.) The wealth
sharing draft appears to focus solely on the
development fund, excluding initial Eastern Front
requests for percentages of revenues.

5. (C) Dr. Taisir Ali of the Peacebuilding Center in
the Horn of Africa (PCHA) told Emboff that the GNU,
under the terms of the draft agreement, will provide
600 million USD into the Development Fund for Eastern
Sudan over the next five years. This amount falls
significantly below the Eastern Front's request for 1
billion USD, but above the GNU's initial offer of 300
million USD spread over seven years. The draft
agreement states that Federal Minister of Finance Al-
Zubeir Ahmed al-Hassan will administer the fund, with
oversight by a committee responsible for approving
expenditures and programs. The nine-person committee
will include: three individuals appointed by the
Eastern Front, the three governors (Walis) of eastern
Sudan, and three individuals from eastern Sudan
appointed by President Bashir. The day-to-day
running of the fund will be handled by an expert
economist from eastern Sudan, although no specifics
were given on who this individual will be.


6. (C) The arrangement does not include any of the
Eastern Front's initial demands for a percentage of
revenues from the gold mines, oil or Port Sudan
income. Taisir pointed out that while the wealth
sharing agreement failed to address the issue of
revenue sharing, there was a memorandum of
understanding on affirmative action regarding
industries in eastern Sudan witnessed by the
mediator. He said that the GNU also committed to
providing employment opportunities for all national
projects in eastern Sudan, specifically in the gold
mines, oil industry and Port Sudan; however, no
specifics on numbers are included in the draft
memorandum of understanding.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON POWER SHARING
--------------


7. (C) Since the outset of negotiations, the issue of
creating one region from the three states of eastern
Sudan has been the biggest obstacle to an agreement.
All along, the GNU has clearly indicated that it was
unlikely to concede to such a demand. The Eastern
Front has offered two compromise proposals to the
GNU. Dirar told Emboff that both the Eastern Front
and GNU had agreed in principle to create a
coordinating body for eastern Sudan, which would link
the three states together. The coordinating body
would include the governors (Walis) from each state
and would be headed up by an additional, currently
unidentified individual.


8. (C) The second proposal is for the GNU to hold a
national conference on the issue of regionalism in
Sudan in the next year. The conference would discuss
returning to a model from Sudan's past, which would
create, among other things, distinct regions in the
east and Darfur and a more decentralized national
government. A national referendum on the issue would
be held before the next election. (Comment: This
approach could, according to some observers including
Taisir, backfire on the Eastern Front and Darfurians,
as the NCP holds a majority in many regions outside
of southern Sudan. End Comment.)


9. (C) On political representation, Dirar said the
Eastern Front and GNU have agreed in principle to one
central minister, one state minister, five MPs in the
GNU and 10 MPs in each of the regional governments.
The parties are still discussing whether the Eastern
Front will be given an assistant or advisor position
to the president similar to the one created for
Darfur.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


10. (C) The eastern Sudan negotiations are expected
to conclude with the initialing of a final draft on
power sharing by the end of this week. Post has
heard that President Bashir will travel to Asmara to
sign the agreement; the timing of the signing will
depend on his schedule but is expected to occur
within the upcoming week. The Eastern Front is
already discussing a conference to be held in early
November in Tesseney, Eritrea, to legitimize the
process and work on completing the structures of the
Eastern Front before heading to Khartoum and back to
the field to garner support for the agreement.

EASTERN FRONT INTERNAL DYNAMICS
--------------


11. (C) Post notes that the lack of cohesion within
the Eastern Front over the last year has arisen
primarily as the result of a personality clash
between Musa Muhammed Ahmed, Chairman of the Eastern
Front and Dr. Amna Dirar, and not due to inter-clan
divisions between the Rashiada and Beja. In fact,
both Musa and Amna are members of the Beja tribe,
although from different sub-clans. Their
disagreements stem more from differences in
backgrounds, experience and world views than from
tribal or clan allegiances.


12. (C) While nuances of clan affiliations and
tensions need to be taken into account during the
implementation phase, most of post's Sudan contacts
believe an agreement will help to unify the Eastern
Front as an organization. As for the current Eastern
Front team, Musa Muhammed Ahmed, Abdallah Kuna and
Ali Safi have all been given general officer postings
in the army. The agreement stipulates that any
individual holding a post in the army cannot hold a
post in the political party. As a result, their
future move to the army will mean that the current
divisions are unlikely to factor as prominently in
future Eastern Front party politics.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND SUPPORT
--------------


13. (C) The international community has been meeting
regularly to discuss the agreement and the challenges
facing the Eastern Front. While no one believes the
agreement is perfect or without flaw, the diplomatic
community does believe the agreement is a step in the
right direction and should be supported. Post is
focusing with our EU colleagues on ways to enhance
the capabilities of the Eastern Front as a political
party, ways to educate the populations of Eastern
Sudan on the agreement and the need for greater
involvement of the Eastern population in future
elections.


14. (C) The Eastern Front has asked for the
international community to witness the agreement and
for specific assistance on oversight and
implementation of the development fund as well as
assistance in sponsoring the upcoming conference in
Tesseney. Most observers in the diplomatic community
have expressed hesitation toward witnessing an
agreement which they have not helped create, but all
agree on the need to support the agreement and its
future implementation.
CONCLUSION
--------------


15. (C) Post agrees with the international community
that the agreement, while not perfect, is a step in
the right direction. While the Eastern Front has not
been able to achieve all the goals that were set
forth at the outset, they can build on this
agreement. Achieving their goals in the future will
require the international community's assistance.
Post shares the general reluctance to formally
witnessing the agreement and notes that we have not,
in any event, been requested to do so formally by the
mediator. Nor is it clear that the GNU would agree
to international signatories to this agreement in any
capacity. We urge, however, that the Department
consider supporting the agreement and its
implementation through capacity building assistance
for the Eastern Front among other options.
DELISI