ABDULWAHID DETHRONED?

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID DETHRONED?

REF: ASMARA 00624

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

This is an action cable. Please see para 5.


1. (C) Summary: While no one has publicly denounced
the claim made by Ahmed Abdel Shafi in his
"Impeachment of President of SLM/A AbdulWahid Mohamed
Ahmed Nur," issued on July 28, AbdulWahid and his
close advisors seem unwilling to accept their fate.
AbdulWahid in a meeting with PolOff on August 2
disputed Shafi's claims of support on the ground.
AbdulWahid continues to assert that he enjoys a
majority of the support from Darfur. Most Sudanese
and diplomatic contacts in Asmara are skeptical about
how much longer AbdulWahid can hold on and believe
his final days as leader of the SLM/A are drawing
near. Nonetheless, AbdulWahid requests a visit to
the U.S. to meet with Department and Administration
officials regarding next steps on moving the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) forward. End Summary.


2. (C) Following the announcement of SLM/A Commander
Ahmed Abdel Shafi and thirty-one other SLM/A
commanders calling for the impeachment of AbdulWahid,
PolOff was called on by AbdulWahid to discuss the
recent developments, explain his own proposal for
Darfur, and to make a request to visit the U.S. In
their meeting on August 2, AbdulWahid explained that
this split was really no different from the creation
of the National Redemption Front (NRF) just two
months ago and blames both splits on growing
frustration from the field with the DPA and the lack
of a response from the international community to
address "the obvious shortcomings" of the agreement.
When asked whether he viewed the statement issued by
Shafi on July 28 as a threat to him or the viability
of the SLM/A, he answered with an emphatic "no."


3. (C) The other reason for the meeting, AbdulWahid
explained was to provide the USG with the "SLM/A
Proposal to Solve the Darfur Conflict" (Note: the
proposal has been sent to Embassy Khartoum and
AF/SPG. End Note). The proposal highlights some of
the same concerns that the NRF highlighted just two
weeks ago. It mainly focuses on the need to
establish a security arrangement that calls for the
immediate disarmament of the janjaweed and militias
and provides security for the return of IDPs. It
also calls for the establishment of an autonomous
Darfur region and the equitable representation of
Darfurians at all levels of government. The proposal
pushes for - and AbdulWahid was adamant about - a
Darfur-Darfur dialogue, which he explained would
focus on the creation of a regional government, a
"Darfur United Government." Lastly, he emphasized
the need for the deployment of a UN (not/not AU)
force on the ground in Darfur to provide security for
returning refugees and IDPs as well as "expedite the
delivery of a comprehensive peace accord."


4. (C) Lastly, AbdulWahid asked whether Embassy
Asmara would arrange a visit to Washington for
himself and a small delegation of about six to eight
to meet with Department and Administration officials
to discuss the SLM/A proposal and other options to
move forward on finding a lasting settlement to the
Darfur crisis. AbdulWahid opined that the DPA could
only offer a band-aid approach to the problems of
insecurity that still exist because the political
issues have not been addressed. He continued, that
it's "not for U.S. leaders to argue if the issues
have or have not been addressed. The problems are
still there and need to be dealt with."


5. (C) Action Request: Post requests Department
guidance on AbdulWahid's request to visit the U.S.
and meet with USG officials over the DPA. Post
informed AbdulWahid that we would provide him an
answer on whether the Department thought such
meetings were appropriate/feasible in the immediate
future.


6. (C) Comment: Post is skeptical of the amount of
support AbdulWahid and the SLM/A still enjoy in
Darfur. AbdulWahid has been completely discredited
among Sudanese and diplomatic contacts resident in
Asmara. The majority of our Sudanese contacts
support Shafi and the commanders' abandonment of
AbdulWahid and they expect Shafi and the commanders
to align themselves with the NRF in coming weeks.
Based on what we hear in Asmara, post questions the
utility of Washington meetings for AbdulWahid at this
point and notes such meetings could possibly alienate
Shafi and others to whom we may want to build
bridges. Shafi departed Asmara o/a July 29, but is
due back into Asmara in the coming week. End
Comment.

DELISI