ABDULWAHID DETHRONED?

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000636 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID DETHRONED? REF: ASMARA 00624 CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This is an action cable. Please see para 5. ¶1. (C) Summary: While no one has publicly denounced the claim made by Ahmed Abdel Shafi in his "Impeachment of President of SLM/A AbdulWahid Mohamed Ahmed Nur," issued on July 28, AbdulWahid and his close advisors seem unwilling to accept their fate. AbdulWahid in a meeting with PolOff on August 2 disputed Shafi's claims of support on the ground. AbdulWahid continues to assert that he enjoys a majority of the support from Darfur. Most Sudanese and diplomatic contacts in Asmara are skeptical about how much longer AbdulWahid can hold on and believe his final days as leader of the SLM/A are drawing near. Nonetheless, AbdulWahid requests a visit to the U.S. to meet with Department and Administration officials regarding next steps on moving the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) forward. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following the announcement of SLM/A Commander Ahmed Abdel Shafi and thirty-one other SLM/A commanders calling for the impeachment of AbdulWahid, PolOff was called on by AbdulWahid to discuss the recent developments, explain his own proposal for Darfur, and to make a request to visit the U.S. In their meeting on August 2, AbdulWahid explained that this split was really no different from the creation of the National Redemption Front (NRF) just two months ago and blames both splits on growing frustration from the field with the DPA and the lack of a response from the international community to address "the obvious shortcomings" of the agreement. When asked whether he viewed the statement issued by Shafi on July 28 as a threat to him or the viability of the SLM/A, he answered with an emphatic "no." ¶3. (C) The other reason for the meeting, AbdulWahid explained was to provide the USG with the "SLM/A Proposal to Solve the Darfur Conflict" (Note: the proposal has been sent to Embassy Khartoum and AF/SPG. End Note). The proposal highlights some of the same concerns that the NRF highlighted just two weeks ago. It mainly focuses on the need to establish a security arrangement that calls for the immediate disarmament of the janjaweed and militias and provides security for the return of IDPs. It also calls for the establishment of an autonomous Darfur region and the equitable representation of Darfurians at all levels of government. The proposal pushes for - and AbdulWahid was adamant about - a Darfur-Darfur dialogue, which he explained would focus on the creation of a regional government, a "Darfur United Government." Lastly, he emphasized the need for the deployment of a UN (not/not AU) force on the ground in Darfur to provide security for returning refugees and IDPs as well as "expedite the delivery of a comprehensive peace accord." ¶4. (C) Lastly, AbdulWahid asked whether Embassy Asmara would arrange a visit to Washington for himself and a small delegation of about six to eight to meet with Department and Administration officials to discuss the SLM/A proposal and other options to move forward on finding a lasting settlement to the Darfur crisis. AbdulWahid opined that the DPA could only offer a band-aid approach to the problems of insecurity that still exist because the political issues have not been addressed. He continued, that it's "not for U.S. leaders to argue if the issues have or have not been addressed. The problems are still there and need to be dealt with." ¶5. (C) Action Request: Post requests Department guidance on AbdulWahid's request to visit the U.S. and meet with USG officials over the DPA. Post informed AbdulWahid that we would provide him an answer on whether the Department thought such meetings were appropriate/feasible in the immediate future. ¶6. (C) Comment: Post is skeptical of the amount of support AbdulWahid and the SLM/A still enjoy in Darfur. AbdulWahid has been completely discredited among Sudanese and diplomatic contacts resident in Asmara. The majority of our Sudanese contacts support Shafi and the commanders' abandonment of AbdulWahid and they expect Shafi and the commanders to align themselves with the NRF in coming weeks. Based on what we hear in Asmara, post questions the utility of Washington meetings for AbdulWahid at this point and notes such meetings could possibly alienate Shafi and others to whom we may want to build bridges. Shafi departed Asmara o/a July 29, but is due back into Asmara in the coming week. End Comment. DELISI