Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ASMARA317
2006-04-05 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000317 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET
SUBJECT: UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against
Restructuring That Undercuts Demarcation

CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000317 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MARR ER ET SUBJECT: UNMEE Force Commander Cautions Against Restructuring That Undercuts Demarcation CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 3 meeting with DAS Don Yamamoto, UNMEE Force Commander Major General Rajender Singh offered a clear and comprehensive technical strategy for the demarcation process. Operating on the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", Singh also argued that there was a critical need for political discussions to occur in conjunction with demarcation. Singh also voiced his serious concerns that UNMEE restructuring not be approached so hastily that the resulting entity would lack the resources to perform its most important task; supporting demarcation. If that happened, any cost savings in the short term would be likely be lost in the long-run. We found a number of Singh's arguments to be well-considered and hope that his concerns will be carefully considered as we consider UNMEE's reconfiguration. END SUMMARY. DEMARCATION: THE FIVE STAGES -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto and Ambassador, joined by AF/E's Bill Schofield, Poloff and DATT, called on soon to be departing UNMEE Force Commander General Rajender Singh April 3. Focusing on the key issue of demarcation, Singh suggested to DAS Yamamoto, a five stage process and a possible, but very tentative, time frame. First, reconnaissance and surveying must occur along the border before a single pillar is placed in the ground. UNMEE must know exactly the location of each pillar before the process begins. Second, during the actual pillar placement, Singh recommended having a minimum of two task forces supported by a reserve company and the deminers in order to "sanitize" the border. Singh believes that the border could be demarcated at two places simultaneously either in the same sector or in different sectors, yet the border must be constantly assessed for landmines. Over nine months, these task forces would engage in the surveying, demining, and pillar installation. ¶3. (C) Turning to his third point, Singh said that once the pillars are in the ground, the change of control and population shifts will need to be closely monitored for approximately three months with the support of both the Eritrean and Ethiopi
an military forces. Fourth, consolidation supported by UNMEE to ensure that populations are safe and have come to terms with their new realities would need to occur for five to six months. And finally, the former-temporary security zone would be returned to the full control of Eritrea, Eritrean Defense Forces would be reintroduced and most likely the Ethiopian troops would return to areas adjacent to the border as well. Only after this is complete would UNMEE completely withdraw. UNMEE'S IMPORTANCE DURING DEMARCATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Acknowledging the upcoming UNSC consideration of UNMEE's mandate and possible reconfiguration, Singh strongly advised against any changes to the current structure, forcefully promoting UNMEE's importance to ensuring security for the demarcation process. According to Singh, in some areas a public outcry is anticipated, particularly in the Irob, Badme and Tserona. In these areas Singh expects the population may agitate or engage in demonstrations. Others, miscreants and those opposed to the GSE or GOE, may engage in surreptitiously increasing mining or in attacking the deminers and demarcators. Also, after demarcation some may be resistant to the handover or re-occupation and may try to remove or deface the pillars or undermine the border. ¶5. (C) In Singh's view, a reduction in UNMEE presence in the TSZ at this key time could have disastrous consequences. Reconfiguring UNMEE as an observer mission would significantly decrease troop levels and, despite a small increase in the number of observers, it would reduce the total eyes and ears in the TSZ and the resources available. The troops here know the terrain and the people, to remove them and ask the observers to move forward with only the protection of the blue UN flag may be foolhardy. They would have neither the numbers, nor the show of strength that Singh believes will be needed. While saving money, the observer mission option would not, in his view, provide the necessary security for demarcation. Cautioning against drawing down if we think that ultimately we would have to reintroduce forces to assist with demarcation, Singh noted, "it takes four months to deinduct troops and six months to induct." Singh urged that any decision on reconfiguration be put off until the future of the demarcation effort was clearer. At a minimum, Singh recommended a minimum of 2500 infantry troops, with 1 reserve company, 1 engineering company, 2 demining companies, a helicopter team and medical staff to support the demarcation process. POLITICAL ISSUES WILL ARISE DURING DEMARCATION -------------- - ¶6. (C) While the EEBC and UNMEE can between them manage the technical aspects of demarcation, Singh reiterated that political issues will also inevitably arise during the process. A means for addressing issues such as access to the sea, trade and normalized relations must be in place before proceeding. While the issues themselves need not be completely addressed before the pillars are placed, both parties must be participating in political talks while demarcation occurs. He argued that both sides would need to consent to political talks and to the specifics of border demarcation, stating "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) We believe Singh raised a number of thought provoking points about what the demarcation process could/should look like. We also think that Singh is on target when he urges that any decisions regarding UNMEE's reconfiguration be carefully assessed to ensure that the resulting entity is capable of performing its most important job - demarcation. END COMMENT. DeLisi

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