A Street Wisdom Primer on Corruption in

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 000716 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EPET ECON EFIN ENRG TX PGOV INV SOCI ZK SUBJECT: A Street Wisdom Primer on Corruption in Turkmenistan Ref A: Ashgabat 564 Ref B: 05 Ashgabat 1266 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Rampant corruption in Turkmenistan pervades all levels of society. Its root causes include high unemployment, a general lack of civic pride, an unresponsive and incompetent bureaucracy and long-standing societal acceptance of bribery as a way to get better service or advance personally. The system is used by President Niyazov as a means of personal control over government officials at all levels. The way corruption operates in the oil and gas, health and education, construction and law enforcement spheres differs, but all of these major economic sectors are heavily affected. Official statistics on corruption are unavailable, and most of this primer is taken from the direct experiences of embassy employees and contacts, as well as the conventional wisdom on the street. End Summary. State-Sponsored Corruption: Pervasive by Design -------------- --- ¶2. (SBU) The pervasiveness of corruption in Turkmenistan is an indication that rule of law does not effectively function. The Government of Turkmenistan routinely engages in corruption, largely as a measure of control. Although Niyazov regularly fires officials for corrupt practices, given the enormous quantities of loot he accuses his officials of stealing, we must assume that he is aware of the widespread practice, and he turns a blind eye in order to extract loyalty from his subordinates. The widespread corruption also gives him a ready-made hook to purge anyone in his way. Since August of 2005, of the thirteen high- level (ministerial and welayat hakim) positions purged, the majority were fired for corruption, based on official press reports. Though these high-level government officials were officially sacked and prosecuted for taking bribes, the real reasons were political, and should not be seen as a sign of the regime's seriousness about fighting corruption. Corruption's Roots -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Although corruption originally became widespread in Central Asia during the Soviet period, particularly under Brezhnev where the communist party famously transmogrified into a mafia-style tribute system, it became more diffused under Gorbachev's "perestroika" era -- less hierarchical and arguably more pervasive. Continued in the current culture of fear and repression in Turkmenistan under Niyazov's rule, rampant corruption has helped to destroy any sense of civic responsibility forcing citizens to survive by any means necessary. There is no social inhibition against "greasing palms" with bribes in order to get ahead of a neighbor or colleague -- whether this means getting a child into university, obtaining a good position or getting certain business permits ahead of competitors. To Bribe, or Not to Bribe? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While corruption is pervasive, not all government services in Turkmenistan require a bribe. Often, a citizen who wants a routine government service has a connection who will intervene to ensure that everything is done in the proper timeframe, obviating the need for a bribe. If a public official judges an applicant unable to make the requisite payment, rather than press for the bribe, he/she simply lets that person's application fall to the bottom of the pile, to be acted upon after those who are paying for the "premium service." ¶5. (SBU) Turkmenistan's high unemployment rate caused by a diminished public sector, including massive layoffs in the public health and education sectors (Note: In 2001 the government laid off 11,000 health and 10,000 education workers, and in 2004 an additional 15,000 healthcare workers. End Note.),and chronic non-payment of wages, also contribute to corruption. As the main employer in the ASHGABAT 00000716 002 OF 006 country, the government's lack of transparency in the public sector hiring process leads to further corruption. Government officials who have access to decision-making in personnel issues enrich themselves by receiving bribes for providing these jobs. In order to obtain the lucrative government positions where it is possible to collect such bribes requires an initial bribe, as well as yearly -- or sometimes monthly -- cash maintenance fees. This creates a never-ending cycle of corruption: Corrupt officials "hire" others for a cash payment or other consideration and these employees then use their positions to make this money back through the taking of bribes-for-services. ¶6. (SBU) The amount of a bribe depends on the position offered. A PolEcon Asst's son was asked to pay $300 for a communication technician position in the public telephone company. An Ashgabat resident told a PolEcon Asst that for $1,000 he could get a traffic police officer position. Another Ashgabat resident said that a lawyer's position at the Ministry of Justice can be bought for $10,000. During a September 27 cabinet meeting, President Niyazov dismissed several regional governors for embezzlement and corruption, and accused the Governor of Ahal Welayat Myrat Atagarryev of receiving bribes ranging in amount from $10,000 to $100,000 for hiring regional managers. ¶7. (SBU) Almost all services require bribes, for example: -- Education Ministry: accepting students to universities; -- Hospitals: providing "better" medical services; -- City government: access to the new marble high-rise "Elitka" housing. -- Motor Vehicles: a driver's license can be obtained through the normal procedure by taking the test and paying the standard $3, or to avoid the test, one can pay anywhere from $70 to $150, depending upon the type of license. ¶7. (SBU) In an office or ministry where corruption is rampant, honest employees or those who do not generally insist on taking bribes, are mistrusted by those above them who do, and are often quickly replaced or supplanted by those who "play the game." High Turnover Creates "Shopping Spree" Mentality -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The infamous "revolving door" of top-level officials in Turkmenistan fuels the fires for corruption in Turkmenistan and accelerates its timetable. In what amounts to an accelerated kleptocratic model of governance, when a minister, deputy minister or office head is replaced, the new official then replaces many of the officials below them, and this is a prime opportunity for graft, corruption and nepotism. Currently employed officials -- many of whom paid for the position in the first place -- must again pay to stay in place or face replacement by the new minister's friends, relatives, fellow tribesmen, or more likely, job- seekers who are willing to pay top dollar for the chance to profit from a new high position. Additionally, the short tenure of the top-level officials -- all are appointed for a six-month probationary period -- motivates them to take full advantage of their position, grabbing as much financial benefit as possible before they are inevitably demoted, banished or imprisoned. The Myth of Cheap Living in Turkmenistan -------------- ¶9. (SBU) As long as officials at every level benefit from the practice, the Government of Turkmenistan is unlikely to fight corruption in any meaningful way. While Niyazov makes a public show for both domestic and international audiences about providing free education, medical care, new modern housing, inexpensive gasoline, one dollar airline tickets and many other benefits, the true cost of living in Turkmenistan requires making additional, off-the-books payments in order to get the allegedly "free" or "low-cost" items or services. For example, even though a citizen of Turkmenistan can book a domestic flight on Turkmenistan ASHGABAT 00000716 003 OF 006 Airways for just $2.40, in reality, these flights are often "sold out" but for the additional fee of $20 to the right official you can book a place, depending upon the destination, according to a PolEcon Asst, who regularly pays this extra fee for airline tickets. In rural areas in Turkmenistan, if someone from a well-to-do family is getting married, the family usually pays a pre-emptive bribe of a few bottles of vodka or other liquor to the municipal power authority in order to avoid having the electricity cut during the wedding reception. A further example is paying $2,000 - $3,000 to one or more prison officials to ensure that your relative is included in the annual amnesty list of prisoners. Oil & Gas -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Corruption in the petroleum sector is characterized by two main factors: Lack of transparency, and lack of market mechanisms. The entire industry is structured in order to mask a huge portion of government revenue by accumulating it in off-shore, off-budgetary funds. This then provides ample opportunities to hide the real amount and flow of the budget funds. For instance, on May 20, 2005, former Deputy Chairman for Oil and Gas Yolly Gurbanmuradov was accused of using Petroleum Fund resources without authorization. He allegedly misappropriated $48 million earmarked for the State Petroleum Fund, "re- allocating" this money without following the appropriate procedures. Furthermore, Turkmenistan practices unfair procurement processes, especially in the oil and gas sectors. Through pre-arranged tenders with foreign companies of questionable pedigree, government officials regularly overprice various services and supply contracts and then split the illegal mark-ups with tender "winners." ¶11. (SBU) Another example of the lack of market mechanisms causing corrupt practices in the oil and gas sector is the long-standing barter deal with Ukraine for natural gas supplies. Government of Turkmenistan officials reportedly receive bribes from Ukrainian companies for overpricing the cost of goods supplied to Turkmenistan as payment for gas deliveries. In a recent meeting with PolOff, a Ukrainian diplomat admitted that the barter arrangement between the two countries provided "many opportunities for corrupt practices." In June 2005, Ilyas Chariyev, the former Turkmennebitgaz Trade Corporation Chairman was accused of applying the so-called "coefficients" of goods supplied from Ukraine, using the false numbers to skim profits from the monetary difference in the actual price of the barter goods. The investigation revealed that Chariyev almost tripled the prices of the barter merchandise received. Additionally, state-subsidized consumer oil products -- such as gasoline and kerosene -- are smuggled to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan where their price is considerably higher, providing high profits for smugglers. Border officials who permit this illicit trade also benefit from the arrangement via bribes and payoffs. ¶12. (SBU) The state controls the salaries of all employees, paying them considerably less than foreign companies pay their local staff doing similar jobs in Turkmenistan. This leads to a sense of entitlement to "make up the difference" through bribery and other corrupt activities. A common practice among local officials in the industry is to boost their income -- and thus, that of foreign firms with production sharing agreements (PSAs) -- by increasing the amount of oil extracted, over the agreed-upon quota, in return for a bribe. The foreign firms can then sell the extra oil on the open market for increased profits. Health and Education -------------- ¶13. (SBU) There is widely-recognized corruption in the public sector health, education and employment industries, due in large part to low salaries. Bribes are both expected and required to provide an adequate standard of living for people in these professions and their families. For example, most doctors require that patients pay "off-the- record" fees in addition to the actual fee for their ASHGABAT 00000716 004 OF 006 services. There are informal rates for every type of service. For example, an embassy employee recently paid her doctor an additional $10 off-the record fee for a tonsillectomy (surgery),while the actual fee was $16. Expecting mothers are a reliable target for this kind of extortion. A local embassy employee recently paid a bribe of $100 to have her baby delivered, even though the normal fee is just $40. Another local employee, whose daughter needed hernia surgery, paid roughly $200 to doctors and caregivers in order to ensure better care. (Note: the average monthly salary in Turkmenistan is $62. End Note.). ¶14. (SBU) In the education sector, a steep decline in the quality of secondary school education and the reduction of admission slots in Turkmenistan's universities has increased corruption dramatically. Reportedly, headmasters of Ashgabat's elite schools require a $200 - $500 bribe to place a child. Admission to a Turkmen university can be secured for anywhere between $5,000 and $7,000 which is equal to the official tuition in the country's only private university. Construction -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Construction is one of the few fields where foreign companies are allowed to widely operate in Turkmenistan. However, in order to acquire one of these lucrative construction contracts from the government it takes more than just good personal relations with Turkmenistan's government agencies. The Trade Counselor at the Turkish Embassy told PolOff that the Turkish construction companies win their projects through open tenders, but rumors about Turkish firms bribing the Government of Turkmenistan officials abound. Former Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Yolly Gurbanmuradov was charged with accepting over $1 million in bribes from Ilham Ipekci, the head of the Turkish construction company ERKU, for example. According to his conviction, in return for the money, Gurbanmuradov allowed ERKU projects to pass unimpeded through Construction Ministry inspections. In another example, the former Head of the Presidential Apparatus Rejep Saparov was charged with bribery that included accepting almost $1.4 million from the "Mensel" construction company, another Turkish firm (Reftel A). Law Enforcement -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Although the Government of Turkmenistan rarely acknowledges corruption in law enforcement ministries, the recent fall from grace of former Prosecutor-General Gurbanbibi Atajanova provided ample evidence of corrupt practices. In addition to her dismissal for various crimes, not least of which was corruption, 14 other procurators were also relived of their responsibilities for similar misdeeds. There are several other examples of high-ranking law enforcement officials involved in corruption. For example, in June 2002 the Supreme Court of Turkmenistan sentenced Committee of National Security Chief Muhammed Nazarov, Deputy Khayit Kakayev and Department Chief Allamurad Allakuliyev to 20 years of imprisonment for accepting bribes, exceeding their authority, involvement in illegal drug trade and other crimes. Also on November 18, 2005 the president issued a decree firing the Head of the Serkhetabat border detachment Major Kakajan Kakyshovich Tajibayev due to the involvement of border guards in narco- trafficking. Reftel B also outlines how police involved in criminal investigations often exploit the system for their personal gain, with little to no regard for putting criminals behind bars. ¶17. (SBU) When criminal charges are put forward, law enforcement officials will take bribes at every step of the case's passage through the justice system. EmbOff's domestic employee's spouse was apprehended on a criminal charge and the investigator immediately started asking for money to help "fix" the case. A small sum was requested and paid, but the case did not disappear. Prior to the trial, prison officials extorted sums of money in order to allow visitation rights as well as deliveries of food and medicine ASHGABAT 00000716 005 OF 006 (much of which was never actually delivered). A forensic psychologist requested a payoff through the police investigator in order to render a favorable characterization of the suspect's state of mind. ¶18. (SBU) Turkmenistan's traffic police are notoriously corrupt. Their modus operandi is to stop drivers for alleged traffic infractions and then shake down the drivers for a dollar or two as an alternative for getting a ticket or larger fine. Most of the time the fine is paid as a convenient alternative to going through the bureaucratic hassle of paying the fine for the violation in person, and the amount of the bribe is always less than the fine itself. For example, failure to yield is a 25,000 manat ($0.90) ticket, but a bribe of just 20,000 manat saves a trip to the traffic police. In August 2002, Niyazov tried to fight corruption in law enforcement by transferring the Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MIA) Traffic Police departments to the newly created Ministry of Defense State Traffic Control Service. The idea was that the new agency would employ young conscripts with "clean minds" who were not yet involved in the previous agency's corrupt practices. However, the practice of accepting bribes continues, and these young people readily accept bribes, due to two factors: their wages are so meager and they are often forced to do so by their supervisors -- many of whom were simply old MIA officers who obtained positions similar to their old ones in the new agency. Small Businesses ¶19. (SBU) A large number of small enterprises exist in Ashgabat, from family-owned stores selling basic food products, to wholesale beverage suppliers, to bars and restaurants. According to anecdotal evidence, no small enterprise can succeed without a "krisha," or roof -- someone in a "power" ministry (Ministries of National Security and Internal Affairs, or the General Prosecutor's office) who can intercede when government officials are causing problems. Some restaurants and bars, for example, pay bribes in order to avoid having to close down right at 11:00 p.m., as mandated by local law. The expat manager of a new bar/disco, when asked how much he had to pay to stay open until 04:00 a.m., simply answered "a lot." Another common source of harassment for small business owners are the myriad local authorities adept at finding "infractions" within their purview. Unless the business owner has a high- ranking "krisha," he is forced to settle with every minor passing official who is looking for a handout. The friend of one embassy staff member was shopping for a new "krisha," but finally decided that the cost of doing business outweighed the benefits and closed his small food stall. Comment -------------- ¶20. (SBU) While Turkmenistan's corruption problem has existed since Soviet times and before, it has shown no sign of diminishing over the last fifteen years and in many instances has become much worse. Furthermore, President Niyazov benefits directly from the established system, both personally and politically -- either making token efforts to "clean up" government in order to increase his cult of personality, or by using it as a weapon when he needs to clean house and fire ministers whom he has deemed too powerful or a threat to his rule, so as to consolidate his power. ¶21. (SBU) It should be noted that, unlike many states in the post-Soviet sphere (and elsewhere),Turkmenistan has little or no organized crime independent of the government. Elsewhere, organized crime bosses have key government officials in their pockets; here, the capos and dons are the officials themselves and their subordinates are the foot soldiers. ¶21. (SBU) In addition to its political utility to Niyazov, corruption also in a way solves the gross inefficiencies of Turkmenistan's economy. With prices kept artificially low to perpetuate the myth of Turkmenistan's "Golden Century," the black market price of goods and services ends up being a ASHGABAT 00000716 006 OF 006 truer reflection of economic reality. END COMMENT JACOBSON