INTER-ISLAND TENSION THREATENS COMOROS' UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 001307 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID KISL CN SUBJECT: INTER-ISLAND TENSION THREATENS COMOROS' UNITY Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES D. MCGEE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Officials of the Government of the Union of the Comoros (GOC) expressed anxiety to the Ambassador, during his November 2006 visit, that the tension between the Union and Anjouan Island Governments could split the fragile union. Efforts by the forward-looking Sambi government to promote Comoros' development are being hampered by a pervasive lack of resources, adding fuel to the internal criticism of the GOC. High-level GOC officials suggested French government involvement in Comoros' internal affairs was targeted to destabilize the Sambi government before the next elections. The Ambassador stressed to his GOC counterparts the importance of maintaining the union and working together for the betterment of the Comoran people, a point that will bear repeating in the first meeting of the U.S.-Comoros Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. END SUMMARY. TROUBLE IN PARADISE - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On a visit to the Union of the Comoros November 13 to 15, Ambassador McGee, Political Officer, Public Affairs Officer, and Defense Attache met with Union President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, Union Government Ministers, Island Presidents Fazul (of Moheli) and Mohamed Bacar (of Anjouan),and Regional Commanders of the Army. Having successfully elected Sambi as Union President in May 2006, the next elections will choose the three separate Island Presidents; one purpose of the visit was to assess the political environment for these March 2007 elections. The tension between the Union and Island Governments, particularly that of Anjouan, was a theme underlying most of the Ambassador's discussions. Island leaders had a number of criticisms for the Union Government, ranging from a general lack of communication, to differences in educational standards, to the perception that island governments are not getting their share of national revenues. Anjouan Island President Bacar alleged (without proof) that Sambi has received USD 2 million from Iran and USD 10 million from Saudi Arabia, none of which is accounted for in the national treasury. This claim sounds exaggerated; however, in their effort to pull Comoros out of poverty and to maintain the integrity of the union, GOC officials are openly building relationships and seeking assistance from a wide range of international partners. In doing so, the Minister of External Relations promised Ambassador McGee that Comoros will not accept funds that come with questionable strings attached, saying "We prefer to rest in our misery than to create a new misery with no end." ¶3. (C) The focal point of the tension lies between Union President Sambi (now based in Grand Comores) and Anjouan Island President Bacar, although both come from the island of Anjouan. Union Government officials in Grand Comores depicted a power-hungry Island President Bacar -- widely known for his separatist ideas -- intent on making trouble in the coming election. GOC officials claim that bringing the historically rebellious Anjouan back into the fold prior to the island presidential elections in March 2007 is a major priority, not to undermine island autonomy, but to consolidate a sense of national unity. It would also guarantee the stability needed to attract foreign investment, reassure the Comoran people and build the country's credibility. President Sambi requested U.S. assistance in establishing a central government presence throughout the country by establishing Union offices and residences and assisting in the formation and training of national army branches on the islands (read: Anjouan) in the months preceding the March elections (septel). President Sambi wants this "Army of National Development" to include hygiene, infrastructure development, electricity, agriculture and medical services as part of its mission, but the more immediate objective is clearly to keep Anjouan in line. ¶4. (C) A number of high-level GOC officials, including the Minister of External Relations, alluded to the involvement of the French government in Comoros' internal affairs -- namely in financially supporting President Bacar in Anjouan and an anti-Sambi coalition on Grand Comores -- with the ultimate goal of destabilizing the Sambi government in the March 2007 elections. Post was not able to extract a convincing rationale for such French involvement. Unlikely explanations ranged from France's desire to control (as yet undiscovered) deep-sea oil deposits to its need to prevent Comoros' ability to reclaim the fourth, French-administered, Comoran island of Mayotte. It was difficult to determine whether such warnings were genuine or designed to raise alarm in, and elicit funding from, the U.S. ¶5. (C) The meeting with Island President Bacar painted a more nuanced picture, suggesting there are elements of truth on both sides. Bacar criticized Sambi for dragging his feet in implementing legislative measures guaranteeing island autonomy and for failing to deliver on his campaign promises, pointing out that teacher salary payments remained well past due. President Bacar warned that if Sambi continues to run ANTANANARI 00001307 002 OF 002 the country like this, there will be "some sort of incident after the upcoming election." However, he acknowledged the three islands of Comoros need to stay unified to move forward, "we do not want to go back in history." Bacar insisted his goal is simply greater autonomy for the islands within that union. His criticism of Sambi's efforts to date is not uncommonly heard throughout the islands, but Post believes it is a lack of resources -- and not a lack of willingness -- that hampers the performance of the Union Government. TOO MANY ELECTIONS? - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (U) While preparations for the March island presidential elections have not yet begun, much of the infrastructure from the May 2006 presidential elections -- such as ballot boxes and voter registration lists -- remains largely in place. Ambassador McGee raised the possibility of grouping elections in the future to avoid donor fatigue. GOC officials are aware of the problem but are unclear how or when to move forward without opening themselves to criticism for cutting the tenure of a particular elected group. COMMENT - - - - ¶7. (C) After decades of instability, Comoros' newfound democracy is in a fragile state. GOC officials are concerned as they find it difficult to establish control over the three-island union. The paranoia over French intervention in Comoros' internal politics seems exaggerated, but there is a historical precedent with French involvement in at least five coups in the Comoros in the past. Throughout his meetings, the Ambassador emphasized that U.S. cooperation with Comoros can only move forward with a peaceful and unified government. Post urges that this message be reconfirmed in the First Quarter of 2007 when the first meeting of the U.S.-Comoros Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation is scheduled to take place. END COMMENT. McGEE