IRAQ/TURKEY: TURKEY MULLING IRAN DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006764 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ IR SA SUBJECT: IRAQ/TURKEY: TURKEY MULLING IRAN DIALOGUE REF: A. ANKARA 6729 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. ANKARA 6674 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Turkey is considering options for regional dialogue with the Iranians about Iraq, with the goal of establishing stability and reconciliation, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol told the DCM on Dec. 27. Such a dialogue can take place without U.S. participation, he said, but the U.S. should push the GOI to cooperate with the initiative. Celikkol wants to spell out these ideas further during his January consultations in Washington. Celikkol claimed the Iraqi Kurds were working against Iraqi unity by further expanding their territory below the green line. In an earlier meeting, U/S Apakan stressed the need for intensive U.S.-Turkey cooperation and consultations on Iraq. End summary. ¶2. (C) DCM met with new MFA Undersecretary (D-equivalent) Ertugrul Apakan on Dec. 27 at his request, followed by a longer session with GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol. Apakan called for intensive U.S.-Turkey cooperation and dialogue on Iraq, noting FonMin Gul's request to meet the Secretary in February (ref b) and Celikkol's plans to visit SIPDIS Washington in January. Apakan summarized Turkey's consistent policy views on Iraq: The need for Iraq's political unity and territorial integrity, stability and law and order, and provision of basic services. He called for an equitable balance and "meaningful" power sharing among the different Iraqi communities. Apakan asserted that the Iraqi Kurds have had a disproportionately large role in Iraqi politics, and that regional federalism is working against the establishment of an Iraqi identity. Turkey supports a solution to the Kirkuk issue through Iraqi national consensus, restriction of further territorial expansion of the KRG, protection of Iraq's Turkoman population, and an end to the PKK's presence in northern Iraq. Apakan emphasized that Turkey's immediate priority is to help Iraq establish law and order. DCM responded that we share Turkey's concerns about stability and civil order, appreciate the GOT's efforts to support the Iraqi government, and said that we will continue to consult closely at all levels. ¶3. (C) In their subsequent meeting, Celikkol informed the DCM that Turkey continues to consult with Iraq's neighbors. After visiting Washington (tentatively scheduled for Jan. 21-23),Celikkol will visit Riyadh Jan. 28 and Tehran in February. The GOT is considering options for discussions with the Iranians on Iraq matters, preferably on a regional basis. Celikkol will ask for USG views on such a dialogue during his visit to Washington. He reported that he had recently met twice with the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, who told him that Iran wanted to cooperate with the GOT on Iraq. The Iranian was vague on specifics, however. Celikkol asserted that Turkey has only discussed Iraq issues with the Iranians in very general terms and at senior (generally ministerial) levels. His trip to Tehran will be the first in-depth consultations on this issue between Turkey and Iran for years. ¶4. (C) Celikkol believed that regional (and U.S.) pressure could persuade Tehran to "force" radical Iraqi Shias to accept reconciliation with the Sunni Arabs. He emphasized that Turkey's main role is to "push groups in Iraq together" in hopes of improving the security situation and creating an atmosphere for reconciliation, and that Turkey has tried to push those over whom it may have influence (i.e., the Sunni Arabs) toward dialogue. ¶5. (C) DCM noted previous unsuccessful attempts to solicit a more constructive Iranian role. Celikkol underscored that the U.S. need not be involved, but should weigh in with the Iraqi government to gain its support for this nascent initiative. Turkey can act as a "clearinghouse" to pass Tehran's views to Washington. Celikkol admitted that this dialogue with Iran may fail, but the stakes are too high not to try. DCM advised Celikkol to raise this in Washington, ANKARA 00006764 002 OF 002 but cautioned that Iran's actions have not raised our confidence level. Additionally, Iran's provision of money and weapons to Iraqi Shia militias seems to demonstrate that Iran may prefer chaos in Iraq, not stability. ¶6. (C) Celikkol expressed appreciation for the Secretary's Dec. 21 remarks which differentiated between Turkey's helpful role in Iraq and the unhelpful role of other neighbors. He added that he has been surprised at how many Sunni Arab groups in Iraq have reached out to Turkey, and how many tell him that the U.S. is cooperating with Iran to create a Shia-dominated state. He said he does not believe this, and recommends to Sunnis that they reach out to us and seek reconciliation with the Shia. ¶7. (C) Celikkol complained that the Iraqi Kurds are endangering Iraqi stability and unity by seeking to expand not only into Kirkuk but also Ninewah province, including Mosul city. He asserted that many Kurds who the KDP and PUK had sent to live in Mosul have been forced by a violent Arab reaction to return home. Arab anger over this "expansionism" could endanger the peace the Kurds enjoy in the three northern provinces. ¶8. (C) Celikkol reported that he met Dec. 23 with leaders of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, who had come to Turkey directly from contacts in Tehran. According to Celikkol, the KIU representatives asked that the U.S. treat them on a par with the major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK). KIU leaders are planning a trip to Washington (NFI). Celikkol said they claimed that their followers are increasing in number, and that they seek non-violent change in the north. ¶9. (C) Comment: Turkey is casting about for a meaningful regional role to deal with the sectarian violence and what it views as increasing instability in Iraq. The GOT is increasingly concerned about Iran's growing influence, and is anxious that Tehran not be allowed to take the lead in Iraq. Turkey's overarching priorities for Iraq and the immediate region are the same as ours. Thus it is all the more important that we seriously engage on both an operational and strategic level with the Turks on Iraq. Celikkol's visit to Washington next month is the most immediate opportunity to do so. The February visits of FonMin Gul and CHOD Buyukanit will allow us to continue this dialogue at senior levels. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON