Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA6666
2006-12-15 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU EUN CY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006666 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND
MR. HYDE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006666 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN CY SUBJECT: TURKEY: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: DR. BAYKAL AND MR. HYDE Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an unexpected charm offensive, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal hosted the Ambassador for almost two hours on December 6, offering his views on the coming election year, the EU, and Cyprus. He agreed that CHP and the Embassy should have more open channels of communication in the coming year. There was no sign of the Baykal who practices opposition for opposition's sake and who swipes at US policy at every opportunity. According to press afterwards, Baykal was similarly circumspect in his readout, describing the meeting as "useful" and "natural." END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Election Year 2007: Hoping to Gain from AKP's Shortcomings -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Baykal said Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan will no doubt stand for the May presidential election, but for fear of reaction will not announce his candidacy until the very last opportunity. Baykal opposes Erdogan's candidacy because the PM "doesn't believe in the very basics of our order." As an example, Erdogan proposed examining the constitution's article on secularity, one of its immutable provisions. In addition, the PM's appointments and advisors further illustrate how he is working to undermine the republic, according to Baykal. Although Erdogan tries to act without provoking suspicion, "if you could see inside him, you'd know." ¶3. (C) Baykal expressed doubts about the legitimacy of the timing of the presidential vote; he pointed out that this is the first time a government is electing the president at the end of its five year term. Misuse of presidential authority is a great concern to CHP, Baykal explained, because the president appoints the chief of the TGS and the Higher Education Council (which in turn appoints rectors, deans, professors). Religious organizations are hiding just behind the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP),looking for opportunities, he alleged. ¶4. (C) Baykal admitted he didn't know whether an Erdogan presidency would help CHP or not, although he speculated that the sentiment that the subsequent parliamentary election was the "last chance" for secular forces might play an important role. Soon, AKP will hold the parliament, the prime ministry, th
e speakership, and the presidency: "We aren't ready to hand over the keys to the castle," Baykal stated. May to November 2007 will be a period of "re-establishment," in which groups waiting for the post-Erdogan period will test their strength, he predicted. ¶5. (C) Baykal evaluated the performance and public standing of AKP. He claimed that Turkey's economic stability is "borrowed from very unstable conditions." He argued that although AKP does have great legitimacy among Turks because of its religious nature, that characteristic doesn't erase AKP's flaws. Unemployment continues at high levels, corruption persists, the situation in Iraq is worsening, the PKK continues to be a serious security threat, and problems with the EU continue to drag Turkey down. He claimed that AKP would receive less than 30% of votes and CHP would get more than 20%. -------------- Turkey's European Union Process -------------- ¶6. (C) Bringing Turkey into the European Union has inherent difficulties, Baykal said. CHP did not expect a formal period of "renunciation" by the European Commission, and the "tiresome" process will continue. Baykal predicted that the process will continue more easily after June 2009, the date of the European parliamentary elections; there is no meaningful difference between the EP and national elections, Baykal said. By the end of 2008, depending on the complexion on the Turkish parliament and changes in European national governments, Turkey should reach a modus vivendi with the EU. Then the Europeans will have an opportunity to alleviate tensions by taking steps on Cyprus. ¶7. (C) Turkey needs to be convinced that at the end of the day, it will be accepted as a full member, Baykal said. ANKARA 00006666 002 OF 002 Because Brussels has applied different rules to Turkey and different standards pertaining to free movement of labor, agricultural supports, the regional fund, and the "open-ended process," the Turks have begun to doubt Brussels' sincerity. He cited universal suffrage in Turkey as evidence of Turkey's decision to become modern and western. Although there have been three military interventions, no one doubted that democracy would return; those who intervened were forced out again when Turkey decided to be a free and democratic society. "We are ready to do whatever is required of us -- to pay what Poland or Bulgaria pays," for instance, Baykal said. CHP is the most sincere supporter of the European cause, he claimed, but even Ataturk, Turkey's most pro-western leader, had a strained relationship with Europe. Turkey can only continue down the European path if it sees more convincing engagement from Europe. -------------- Cyprus -------------- ¶8. (C) Baykal said that it is not rational to have Greek Cypriots at the negotiating table because the dream of giving Turkish Cypriots equal rights was lost with the 2004 Annan Plan referendum that the Greek Cypriots rejected. What we can do, he said, is legalize, step by step, Turkish Cyprus. Ambassador pointed out US efforts to facilitate openings to the north while reiterating that US policy acknowledges only one Cyprus. Baykal observed that the only way to pressure Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos was to ignore his demands, which inappropriately link the Cyprus issue and Turkey's EU accession process. When the Ambassador pointed out that Turkey will not get into the EU without a Cyprus solution, Baykal interrupted to say that Cyprus could not be solved until Turkey entered the EU. Baykal also suggested pressuring the Greek Cypriots by threatening partition. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Baykal's graciousness in this meeting was unexpected. CHP has been notoriously unconstructive on virtually all topics under the AKP administration and relations with the U.S. have been no exception. This time, Baykal had not even a notetaker in the room, but his subsequent readout to the press was a mild as the meeting itself. This tracks with recent efforts by other CHP members to call for improved relations with the US. Unsurprisingly, Baykal's plan for the election year appears to involve exploiting AKP failings more than promoting an affirmative social democratic agenda, which CHP appears to have abandoned under Baykal in favor of a more nationalist stance. Baykal's comments indicate that on both Cyprus and the EU, CHP plans to continue its obstructionist behavior, subjecting this government to accusations of selling out Turkish nationa interests at any hint of progress. END COMMET. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON

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