TURKEY/IRAQ: URGING TURKEY TO DO MORE FOR IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000066 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016 TAGS: PREL IZ TU SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAQ: URGING TURKEY TO DO MORE FOR IRAQ REF: A. 05 ANKARA 7214 ¶B. 05 ANKARA 7674 ¶C. 05 ANKARA 6096 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES NANCY MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) . -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting with MFA Iraq Coordinator Oguz Celikkol, Charge encouraged Turkey to support the new Iraqi government and legitimize it early on through reciprocal high-level visits. She stressed to Celikkol that Turkey should consider concrete measures it can take to support Iraq in the political, security, and economic areas. Celikkol responded that Turkey fully shares our aim of a free, democratic Iraq. Turkey is prepared to offer increased security training, is moving forward to establish a consulate in Mosul, and will consider high level visits once a representative government is in place. Turkey is also ready to move forward on expanded economic cooperation and is willing to consider measures to relieve Habur Gate congestion. Turkey's two major concerns remain the PKK presence in northern Iraq, which Turkey sees the Iraqi Kurds doing nothing to counter, and Kurdish machinations in Kirkuk, which threaten both Turkmen and Sunni interests there. Charge encouraged Celikkol to broaden MFA thinking and look at ways Turkey can deepen its relations with Iraqi Kurds as well as other parts of the new government. Celikkol said Turkey is ready to be of further assistance in Iraq and remains open to our ideas. End Summary. -------------- Looking for Representative Iraq Government -------------- ¶2. (C) During a January 4 meeting at the MFA, Charge congratulated Celikkol on being designated to replace Osman Koruturk as MFA Special Representative for Iraq and asked about his short and mid-term goals for the Turkey-Iraq relationship in the post election period. Celikkol said the GOT shared our hope that a broad-based, representative government would emerge in Baghdad that would reflect the December 15 election results while including the main political forces in Iraq. He noted that many Iraqi Sunnis were disappointed in the results and angered over reports of election irregularities. Turkey felt particularly vulnerable to Sunni criticism in light of GOT efforts to encourage Sunni participation in the political process. Therefore, Celikkol asserted, it is particularly important Sunnis be appropriately represented in the new government. -------------- High-Level Visits and Mosul Consulate -------------- ¶3. (C) Charge strongly encouraged Celikkol to find ways to legitimize the new Iraqi government at an early stage, and urged him to consider high-level visits of Turkish officials to Baghdad and invitations for new Iraqi government officials to visit Turkey. Celikkol said FM Gul would consider a visit to Baghdad, followed at some point by Prime Minister Erdogan, once the GOT has a chance to evaluate the new Iraqi government and address security concerns. Celikkol confirmed that, despite security concerns, including the January 2 attack on the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad, the GOT is moving forward to set up a Consulate General in Mosul to be headed by former MFA Middle East Department Head Huseyin Avni Botsali. Botsali plans to go to Mosul after January 16 to look at facilities and the MFA hopes to have the consulate up and running by February or early March. He repeated earlier requests for U.S. and Coalition support, primarily with security, for Botsali and his team (ref b). -------------- More Security Training, Interest in PRTs -------------- ¶4. (C) Celikkol put particular emphasis on getting the Iraqi Defense and Inteior Ministries "right," given their poor trac record during the interim government. He ANKARA 00000066 002 OF 002 confirmed that Turkey is willing to provide more training to Iraqi security forces, but the GOT's earlier offers received no response from those ministries. Celikkol also said Turkey is interested in U.S. plans to establish PRTs in Iraq. Celikkol cautioned that there had been no internal MFA or inter-agency discussion of Turkish participation in PRTs, but interest remained and Celikkol hoped to learn more about U.S. plans during his January 17-19 visit to Washington. He noted that Ambassador Cevikoz had recently discussed this with Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad. -------------- Economic Cooperation -- More Can be Done -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting that both official and unofficial trade between Turkey and Iraq is growing rapidly, Celikkol acknowledged the need to find ways to provide Iraq more electricity and said the GOT is working on removing remaining obstacles to this (see ref a). Remarking that congestion at the single Turkey-Iraq border crossing at Habur Gate is a major obstacle to increased trade as well as provision of sustainment fuel to Coalition Forces in Iraq, the Charge asked if Turkey had made any progress toward resolving the issue. Celikkol replied that he had discussed it at a recent meeting with visiting Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) international relations chief Safeen Dizayee. He had urged Dizayee to consider the economic benefits of additional border crossings. Celikkol said he had discussed the issue with Interim Government Planning Minister Barham Salih earlier in September and had proposed a "package deal" involving opening of a new crossing sought by the Kurds near the Habur Gate in exchange for the opening of additional crossings in areas preferred by the GOT over a period of time (ref c). Since then, the GOT had heard no further expression of interest from the Kurdish side. The GOT is also considering a rail link. Charge encouraged Celikkol to renew efforts to find a workable solution to the border crossing problem. -------------- Shadow of PKK and Kirkuk Looms Large -------------- ¶6. (C) Celikkol made clear the GOT remains concerned by the PKK presence in northern Iraq and the failure of both Iraqi Kurds and Coalition Forces to do anything about it. Charge reviewed U.S. activities with regard to the PKK in both northern Iraq and Europe and noted these were having an effect. She agreed that U.S. and Turkish goals for Iraq could not be fully accomplished until the PKK presence is dealt with and that the Iraqis need to demonstrate greater resolve in confronting this issue. Turkey, however, must also demonstrate flexibility and give all Iraqis, including the Kurds, reason to believe that Turkey is their best partner in the region. She also suggested the GOT seriously consider ways to permit the repatriation/reintegration of Turks currently in Iraq. ¶7. (C) Celikkol noted reports of extensive voting irregularities in Kirkuk and warned that the Kurds are making a mistake by imposing changes in that area so aggressively. Both Turkmen and Arab residents of Kirkuk are being antagonized and it is hard to see how the 2007 referendum on Kirkuk's status anticipated by the constitution could be seen as legitimate under these circumstances. Celikkol stressed the need for a consensus solution for Kirkuk over time; pressing for an early resolution will be counter-productive. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) While cautious and still conceptually hamstrung, Celikkol made clear the GOT is prepared to consider ways to increase its current assistance to Iraq, support the new Iraqi government, and overcome obstacles to cross-border trade. He will be receptive to our ideas for areas of further cooperation on Iraq. His upcoming January 17-19 visit to Washington is an ideal opportunity to further brief him. End Comment. MCELDOWNEY