TURKEY: HIGH LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP MEETING AN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006581 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR ASD PETER RODMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PTER TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: HIGH LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP MEETING AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK BEYOND IRAQ Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Relations with Turkey are trending positive but Iraq and PKK terrorism cast a long shadow; a Congressional Armenian Genocide resolution would do further damage. Continued clashes between the military and the PKK, despite the terrorist group's October 1 cease-fire declaration, have renewed TGS calls for U.S. kinetic action. The government fears a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq that will precipitate dissolution and chaos there. Turkish officials are anxious for information on our future strategy on Iraq and what we expect of Turkey. Our cooperation in GWOT remains strong. Turkey opened an Afghan PRT; is participating in a shared command of ISAF Central; contributed troops and ships to UNIFIL; continues to allow the use of Incirlik as a logistics hub to support OIF and OEF; and supports a halt in Iran's nuclear weapons program. U.S. defense sales, moribund for two years, may be on the upswing. Turkey's support will be critical to our efforts throughout the region. We should include Turkey in our consultations on these issues and look for ways to strengthen our cooperation at all levels of the military. END SUMMARY. DOING THEIR PART IN IRAQ -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Turkey shares the U.S. goal of a unified, democratic Iraq that is secure within its borders. The government is contributing to measures to strengthen the democratic process in Iraq and ensure the success of the country, but remains concerned by Kurdish aspirations and the PKK presence in northern Iraq. The GOT vocally supported the participation of all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq elections and referendum; hosted a conference for Iraqi constitution drafters; encouraged a dialogue of hard-line Sunni leaders with US Ambassador Khalilzad and hosted a meeting of tribal leaders from Talafar in a bid to stop the violence there. It has trained over 300 Iraqi diplomats and political party members and spear-headed a "Neighbors of Iraq" process that has fostered communication between Iraqi leaders and their regional counterparts. ¶3. (SBU) The government's approval to use Incirlik Air Base as a logistics hub serving Iraq and Afghanistan has allowed 6 planes to deliver the supplies it previously took 9-10 planes to move from Germany, delivering over 152 million pounds of supplies and equipment since May 2005, or almost 60 percent of the air cargo destined for Coalition forces. Additionally ten KC-135 tanker aircraft based at Incirlik since 2003 have run 2800 refueling sorties, delivering 192 million pounds of fuel in support of OEF and OIF. Two-thirds of fuel shipments (3 million gallons/day) for the Iraqi people and 25 percent of Coalition fuel cross the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Gate. Turkey recently approved a request to retrograde equipment from Iraq to U.S. military facilities in the U.S. and Europe through Turkey. These arrangements are saving us hundreds of millions of dollars annually. ¶4. (C) Turkey remains deeply troubled by the continued violence in Iraq, the increasing regional influence of Iran and the growing assertiveness of the Kurdish Regional Government. The GOT worries that the shift in U.S. Congressional leadership will lead to a premature US withdrawal that could result in the dissolution of the country and the establishment of a Kurdish state. Government and TGS officials tell us that "As goes Kirkuk, so goes Diyarbakir." They genuinely fear that an independent Kurdish state will attempt to extend its territory into southeast Turkey, perhaps using the PKK as a guerrilla force towards this objective. PKK - PATIENCE WEARING THIN -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkey views the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) terrorist organization as its most immediate security threat. The PKK uses its safehaven in northern Iraq to supply and organize terrorist infiltration into Turkey. Since the PKK ended its 1999 cease-fire in May 2004, the number of attacks against Turkish security forces and tourist areas has risen steadily. In 2006, PKK violence has claimed over 600 civilian and military lives, including foreign tourists. The GOT is skeptical about the PKK announcement of a temporary cease-fire that began October 1 (and is slated to end in May 2007); security forces have continued operations against the group in southeastern Turkey. ¶6. (C) The government welcomed the appointment of Gen (ret) Ralston as the U.S. Envoy to Counter the PKK and gave its support to his efforts to further the trilateral dialogue. But impatience with the lack of visible results is high. This feeds the perception here that the trilateral process is a stalling tactic to keep Turkey from conducting a cross-border operation and has led to renewed calls for the U.S. to take kinetic action such as bombing PKK terrorist training camps and arresting of PKK leadership. It appears that TGS has moved back some of the 200,000-plus troops it had near the border this summer in preparation for the winter. However, other forces have relocated to regional headquarters or winterized compounds, and we have seen little movement of equipment out of the area. REGIONAL COMMITMENT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Given its shared historical, cultural and religious ties with countries in the region, as well as its geographic location bridging east and west, Turkey feels both a right and a responsibility to engage countries of concern on issues of importance to the international community. Turkey has worked hard in recent years to re-establish relations with Iran and Syria, both to bolster its fight against the PKK, which has a presence in those countries, and to increase trade. It has supported the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA) through co-sponsorship of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue. The GOT believes that, as the only Muslim country that has good relations with both Israel and the Palestinians, it can play a special role in the peace process. In this role, the government has made missteps. Despite Western disapproval, FM Gul welcomed a Hamas delegation to Ankara in early 2006, and the PM and FM continue to engage the Iranian and Syrian governments. PM Erdogan visited Tehran on December 3 and plans to visit Damascus and Beirut in coming days. The Turks say this diplomacy is aimed at supporting the Siniora government and cautioning Iran on provoking Shia-Sunni conflict, but details are sparse. ¶8. (SBU) LEBANON: Echoing widespread public sentiment, the GOT was highly critical of Israel's responses in June and July to Palestinian and Hizbollah attacks. However, the GOT immediately responded to the resulting humanitarian crisis, opening its ports for the transit of some 15,000 foreign evacuees and helping over 1,700 Americans return to the U.S. via Incirlik Air Base. Following the UN decision to expand UNIFIL, PM Erdogan rammed through parliament a measure authorizing forces for UNIFIL - despite vociferous political opposition and a cool attitude from the TGS. Turkey has deployed over 900 personnel to UNIFIL, including an engineering company, a frigate and a personnel transport ship. ¶9. (C) IRAN: The MFA, TGS and many in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) view a nuclear Iran as a threat to Turkey, but for different reasons and to varying degrees. While the military has consistently characterized a nuclear Iran as a threat, the government's public statements on the issue -- which we are told match what they say in private -- significantly strengthened following Iran's resumed uranium enrichment. TGS desires, and the government has agreed to finance, a ballistic missile defense system. A tender should be issued before the end of the year. In the event that Iran achieves a nuclear weapon, Turkey, we are told, would look to NATO for protection. Few in either the military of the government consider Turkey to be the direct target of an Iranian attack. We want to use the HLDG to start a dialogue about the defense and security implications of a nuclear-armed and missile-equipped Iran and what that may mean for U.S. - Turkey cooperation. ¶10. (C) The greater threat, Turks say, is that a nuclear Iran, with a strengthened presence in Iraq, would change the balance of power in the region and threaten Turkey's leadership position. Given Turkey's stable border with Iran (unchanged since 1639); the countries' intelligence-sharing on the PKK; Turkey's interest in strengthening its business ties to Iran; extensive Turkish commercial transit through Iran territory on the way to Central Asia -- 35,000 trucks/year and 90% of eastbound Turkish Airlines flights; the more than 1 million Iranian tourist that visit each year; and concerns about the consequences for Turkey of another crisis on its borders, the government wants a peaceful resolution to the stand-off that minimizes the negative economic impact. Turkey considers diplomacy the only road to a solution and urges direct U.S. engagement with Iran. The GOT does not want sanctions but has committed to support a UN decision on sanctions. Treasury U/S Levey visited Ankara December 5 for initial talks on targeted measures against Iranian entities involved in proliferation and terrorism, and Iranian leaders. COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶11. (C) Turkey has contributed significantly to the re-establishment of stability in Afghanistan. It commanded ISAF II in 2003 and ISAF VII in 2005 and, on August 6, 2006 began a two-year joint rotational command of ISAF Central in the Kabul region together with France and Italy. It will assume command from France on April 2007 and will, we understand, significantly increase its troop presence (currently 800) at that time. Turkey opened its first PRT in Wardak province on November 9 and has had already completed several community projects in the area. Turkey has conducted counter-narcotics training for Afghan police and security forces in Turkey and will initiate local training in Wardak. The GOT contributed $100M in assistance to Afghanistan, to be disbursed over a five year period. To date, the funds have been used to reconstruct schools and hospitals and to establish the PRT. ¶12. (C) TGS has rejected the NATO request to send additional troops to Afghanistan to be deployed against the Taliban in the south, stating that ISAF is a peacekeeping force, not a combat force. It has also resisted the removal of caveats on its troops in Afghanistan, which would require parliamentary approval in any case. The General Staff has suggested the possibility that some additional troops could be deployed to ISAF Central in order to free up other countries' troops to engage in combat. DCHOD Saygun has also offered to send up to two battalions of U.S.-origin howitzers to the Afghan security forces and requested assistance to expedite the U.S. export control process. Both the State Department and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency are aware of this offer and prepared to take every measure to expedite the process as soon as the formal request is received. ¶13. (SBU) On other NATO issues, Turkey will assume the NRF command for six months in 2007 and has indicated that it will respond positively to the NRF troop request. DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The defense industry relationship, which has been stagnant for the past several years, may be improving. Under the leadership of Murad Bayar, SSM (Undersecretariat for Defense Industries),which controls all major defense equipment purchases, has turned increasingly away from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) buys and towards Direct Commercial Sales where it could better dictate the terms and require the incorporation of Turkish components. Until Sikorsky finalized a sale of 17 Seahawk helicopters (after 18 months of negotiation) this fall, no U.S. firm had won a direct commercial sale since Boeing signed a contract in 2002 for Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. Lockheed Martin did, however, win a $1.3B FMS contract to upgrade Turkey's F-16 fleet. Lockheed is currently negotiating an FMS sale of 30 F-16s worth up to USD 2.9 billion. ¶15. (C) The liability, work share, technology transfer and upfront USG approval requirements in SSM's standard contract kept US firms from bidding on tenders for an attack helicopter and an airplane trainer but Sikorsky did submit a non-compliant bid for 52 utility helicopters for the Armed Forces and Forestry Service. The lack of U.S. participation in similar tenders has left SSM with purchase options that the military considers inadequate. Under GEN Ozkok's leadership, TGS deferred to SSM on procurement decisions. However, following GEN Buyukanit's August appointment as CHOD, TGS has been more willing to challenge SSM' decisions. Bids on the attack helicopter were submitted in September 2005 but more than one year later no winner has been selected. According to the press, at the upcoming December 12 Executive Defense Committee (PM, CHOD, DefMin),a decision will be made to cancel the attack helo tender in favor of an FMS purchase of a Boeing Apache or Bell Cobra. DCHOD Saygun, while Turkish Land Forces Chief of Staff, did have several conversations with U.S. military personnel about the requirements and benefits of the FMS program but we have received no formal request. ¶16. (SBU) SSM is now encouraging Raytheon to submit a late bid for its T-6 airplane trainer and has engaged Sikorsky on the idea of producing or assembling the International Black Hawk in Turkey. In the past, SSM spoke of its relationship with defense firms only in relation to contract terms and conditions. During the October visit of an American-Turkish Council delegation led by Lt Gen (ret) Scowcroft, Bayar talked about the need to think in terms of strategic partnerships. It is too early to tell whether there is meaning behind the words. ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION-POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE -------------- -------------- ¶17. (C) In spring 2000, the possibility of a U.S. Congressional resolution recognizing a 1915 Armenian Genocide was real. According to Turkish officials assigned to Washington then, the Turkish Ambassador expected to leave the country promptly if the House voted yes on the resolution and Turkey was also prepared to suspend U.S. use of Incirlik Air Base. Congressional approval of such a resolution in spring 2007, Turks say, would have a devastating impact on the bilateral relationship. ¶18. (SBU) Following the French Assembly's October vote in favor of a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide, Land Forces Commander GEN Basbug announced the suspension of bilateral military relations with France. Invitations for France to participate in Turkey's 2007 International Defense Equipment Fair (IDEF) and the annual Air Force exercise Anatolian Eagle were withdrawn and several visits were canceled. Defense tenders with French participation underwent a review. Cooperation with the French in NATO, Afghanistan, etc. will reportedly not be affected. CFE FLANK ENTITLEMENTS - LOOKING FOR ACVs -------------- ¶19. (C) Turkey responded positively to our initial request for Treaty Limited Equipment Entitlements of 63 battle tanks, 31 artillery pieces and 166 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) from CFE flank countries to facilitate the establishment of joint training programs in Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey agreed to fulfill the requirement for 63 battle tanks in its entirety. Norway covered the artillery requirement in full. Greece initially offered 40 ACV entitlements but later increased that number to 91. In light of the more forthcoming Greek offer, we have asked Turkey to consider an additional contribution of 75 ACV entitlements to cover the ACV shortfall. The issue was also raised by EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Ward during his November 7 visit with TGS and MFA officials in Ankara. While stating that the GOT will consider our new request, MFA officials warned that the government will review it in light of its initial offer and that Turkey's battle tank contribution might be negatively affected. They emphasized that such a review will take time and will cause the U.S. to miss its December 30, 2006 goal of finalizing the entitlement issue. Your visit provides an opportunity to thank Turkey for its initial offer and urge a positive response to our request for additional ACV entitlements. MIL-MIL COOPERATION -------------- ¶20. (C) Visits by EUCOM D/COM GEN Ward in October and Army Chief of Staff GEN Schoomaker and USAREUR Commander GEN McKiernan in November provided an opportunity to pursue the prospect of increased mil-mil exchanges. GEN Buyukanit and others in TGS welcomed the idea but defer to the U.S. on the way forward. Special Forces exchanges stopped following the July 4, 2003 incident in Sulemaniya, Iraq, during which Turkish Special Forces officers were hand-cuffed and hooded by their U.S. counterparts. An SF JCET planned for 2005 had to be significantly scaled down to a 4-man exercise but a future JCET is being considered for 2008. A Colonels' Exchange Program raised during the 2005 HLDG has been expanded into an Officers Exchange Program to allow participation by officers at the 04, 05 and 06 ranks. The first exchange will be hosted by EUCOM in early 2007. GEN McKiernan raised the possibility of USAREUR-sponsored counter-IED training. All of these programs offer welcome opportunities for greater interaction and exchange at the action officer level. We need to continue to look for additional ways to increase our mil-mil interaction. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON