EU AMBASSADORS ON TURKEY ACCESSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006573 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016 TAGS: PREL EUN TU SUBJECT: EU AMBASSADORS ON TURKEY ACCESSION Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassadors of Finland, Germany and the US, plus the UK DCM, met December 4 to review Turkey's efforts with the EU and compare notes on recent talks with the Turks. All agreed that the key next step is an apparent proposal or package being readied by the GOT. Among ideal elements would be policy statements by the Turkish government that it will submit the Ankara Protocol for parliamentary approval; calling for parliamentary revision or repeal of Article 301; opening a Turkish port for direct trade with Cyprus; and appealing for the UN to re-launch formal Cyprus settlement negotiations. UK FCO Director for Europe is in Ankara December 4, and Swedish FM Bildt holds talks here December 5. End Summary. ¶2. (c) According to the Finnish ambassador, FM Gul used a lunch December 1 with the EU ambassadors here to unload on the "unacceptability" of the EC recommendations and call for their change. He complained that the Finnish PM, earlier this month, called off efforts to find a formula on ports and trade before Turkey "even had a chance" to present its new ideas. PM Erdogan and Finnish PM Vanhanen also met December 1 for 90 minutes alone, and the Finn got more of the same, plus complaints that the EU does not understand the situation in Turkey or the Cyprus problem, the EC's recommendations are unacceptable, and the EU Presidency should show leadership. Vanhanen, according to the Finnish ambassador, defended the EC recommendation as a solid basis for discussion in the Council and a compromise between widely divergent opinions with the EU, but Erdogan would have none of it. The Finnish ambassador commented that the Turks have no idea how bad opinion is in European capitals. ¶3. (c) The Europeans all remarked that they see little prospect of reducing the number of frozen/suspended chapters below eight, and they thought it at least as likely that the number will rise. They agreed that a key issue for Turkey will be whether a clear signal is given on opening some chapters. Three or four are apparently more or less ready to open and don't have unmet benchmarks. They concern routine issues such as statistics and financial controls. The Europeans noted that a couple of Turkish journalists have declared that unless there is an EU decision to open at least four chapters (regardless of what else is in the EU decision),they will accuse the government of failing on the EU front. ¶4. (c) Ambassador noted our concerns about holding up too many chapters, unencumbering the opening of other chapters, avoiding ultimatums, and not compromising Cyprus settlement issues. He described his conversations with Turkish leaders (septel),which largely track with what the Europeans have heard, with obvious adjustment that Ankara wants our help in paring back EU demands/conditions that it deems unacceptable. ¶5. (c) The European diplomats had heard the same talk we have about a possible new Turkish proposal that could include a port opening and perhaps some other actions. They believed that the key thing for Europe is that any steps Turkey take be without precondition, though they realized this is unlikely. Turkish proposals conditioned on the EC agreeing on no, or at least fewer, suspensions of chapters seem more likely. Among elements that appeared to be possibly feasible and/or on the table already are: -- a GOT statement of commitment to implement the Ankara Protocol and to submit it for parliamentary approval; -- a similar GOT statement calling on parliament to eliminate or change Article 301 to more closely conform to EU standards; -- a GOT declaration identifying a port for direct Cypriot trade/access to Turkey; and -- a government call for the UN to re-launch Cyprus settlement negotiations (which would put Papadopoulos on the defensive). ¶6. (c) The Turks might also include in this a provision on at least temporary direct Turkish Cypriot trade with the EU, but the Europeans thought it would be more effective as a call for such trade rather than listed as a condition for a port opening. All agreed that Turkey is likely again to raise Ercan and that this is a non-starter. ¶7. (c) All the participants agreed that a key next ingredient is more pressure on Cyprus and perhaps Greece. They noted, as Gul did to the Ambassador earlier in the day, that Secretary Rice had a critical influence at the eleventh hour SIPDIS with Papadopoulos in October 2005. Something similar at the right moment now could be very helpful. The German wondered whether there could be some gestures toward the Turkish Cypriots, such as charter flight to Ercan or a high level visit, but disclaimed Germany's ability or willingness to take such a step. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON