TURKEY/EU/CYPRUS: HELSINKI MEETINGS NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006512 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2021 TAGS: PREL EUN TU CY SUBJECT: TURKEY/EU/CYPRUS: HELSINKI MEETINGS NOT ENCOURAGING REF: A. STATE 189542 ¶B. WILSON/FRIED E-MAIL OF 11/27/06 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Apakan used his November 21-22 consultations in Helsinki on Turkey/EU/Cyprus to tease out details related to the Finnish package on Cyprus ports and trade issues. In a readout given to Ambassador November 25, Apakan said he took a hard line on Varosha, citing concerns about being asked every six months for some Cyprus-related concession that would prejudge the UN settlement process; Turkey is determined not to let that happen. Following FM Gul's meeting in Helsinki November 27 with Finnish FM Tuomioja and EC Enlargement Commissioner Rehn, other opportunities for Turkey to work its EU issues include visits to Ankara by Carl Bildt December 4-5 and an Italian deputy foreign minister December 6, and Gul's visit to Greece December 7-8. Ambassador stressed US support for the Finnish efforts, urged maximum Turkish flexibility, and suggested that Turkey moderate its response to the EU's decisions in December so as to prevent any further undermining of public support for EU accession and Turkey's longstanding orientation to the West. He also urged action by the government on Article 301, Greek minority concerns, and other issues identified in the EC progress report on Turkey. As reported ref B, Finland called off its efforts to negotiate a solution to Turkey's Cyprus/ports/trade issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Apakan said he had stressed in Helsinki the strategic stakes for Turkey, the EU and the West as a whole of avoiding a rupture in Turkey-EU relations. Ankara wants to see that the EU door remains open for Turkey; it hopes that short-term issues do not undermine long-term prospects ) recognizing that Turkey is not getting into the EU now and that this step is at least 10 years off, if not more. Not everything has to be resolved right now. ¶3. (C) On specifics, Apakan apparently had an exhaustive (and exhausting for the Finns) review of legal and political details related to the Finnish package. One line of conversation dealt with the details of the trade regulation for Turkish Cyprus. Would TC goods be exempt from the EU tariff? Would decisions on the trade regulation be taken by majority vote or under EU procedures that would give Cyprus a large say, and would the decision be a technical (EC) one or a political one (European Council)? Another issue was Turkish ports. Earlier EU decisions referred to Turkish seaports and airspace, but some more recent EU documents have referred to airports, which Turkey does not believe are covered by Customs Union-related decisions to which it agreed. What would be the status of Turkish goods moving through Famagusta ) e.g., to Cyprus? ¶4. (C) In Helsinki, Apakan also talked about Ercan airport and Varosha, reiterating that Turkish public opinion and institutions (e.g., the military) believe trading the latter is inappropriate outside the context of an overall settlement. Turkey is concerned that every six months in the EU process it will be asked to make a Cyprus-related concession. It wants to head this off and especially not begin with Varosha. However, Apakan also made clear that excluding Varosha is a not a completely fixed Turkish requirement and suggested that it might be doable if the price is right (and high). ¶5. (C) Ambassador reiterated strong US support for Turkey's accession efforts with the EU. He noted high-level efforts and approaches by our embassies in Europe over the last couple of weeks. We believe a strategic choice is going to be made by Turkey and the EU, and we very much want to see both sides making the right decision ) one that allows the process to move forward. Ambassador urged maximum Turkish flexibility in working with the Finns. He also observed that if, at the end of the day, something emerges from the GAERC or European Council that keeps at least some of the process going forward, the government should declare victory and move on, rather than allow itself to wallow in EU bashing that would further undermine public opinion here and in Europe. He also urged action by the government on Criminal Code Article 301 (relating to freedom of expression),issues related to the Greek Orthodox Church, and other matters referred to in the November 8 EC progress report. Such actions would be extremely useful ammunition for Turkey's friends in the EU process and undercut at least some of those working against it. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ ANKARA 00006512 002 OF 002 WILSON