ONE MONTH AFTER PKK DECLARES CEASE-FIRE, RELATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006419 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL TU IZ SUBJECT: ONE MONTH AFTER PKK DECLARES CEASE-FIRE, RELATIVE CALM IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY Classified By: POL/C Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Ankara/Consulate Adana message. ¶2. (C) Summary: PKK violence has largely -- but not entirely -- subsided since the terrorist organization's unilateral cease-fire started Oct. 1. Many here hope the lower level of violence will give the GOT room to address the root causes of Kurdish extremism, but the long electoral politics season which has already started in Turkey makes this even more difficult. The PKK appears to be trying to leverage the threat of lifting the cease-fire next spring to pressure the government to move fast on reforms. End summary. ¶3. (C) The level of PKK violence in southeast Turkey appears to have reduced dramatically since the terrorist organization's unilateral cease-fire commenced Oct. 1. Our canvass of open sources indicate significantly fewer casualties among civilians and Turkish security forces. Some clashes continue; Turkish sources generally claim that these are PKK-instigated, but this is difficult to confirm. Rojbin Tugan (protect) from the far southeastern province of Hakkari told us that the large Turkish military presence there makes the area feel as tense as it did before the cease-fire. However, another NGO contact told us that that the security forces' posture in and around Diyarbakir is more relaxed and less confrontational, which has had a positive effect on the local population. This and other contacts noted that the GOT has thus far refused to recognize the cease-fire. ¶4. (C) Bar Association representatives in the Diyarbakir region blamed the continued clashes in the region on the security forces, saying that the PKK is not initiating any attacks on government forces and is only fighting "when cornered." However, Adana's provincial security director dismissed the PKK cease-fire as meaningless, saying it does not represent a shift in strategy. He said there was no change in the orders given to the security forces following the cease-fire declaration. ¶5. (SBU) The press has reported that jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan has declared that the cease-fire will end May 16 unless Turkey takes significant steps to help the Kurds in the southeast. May 16 is both the 80th anniversary of a Kurdish uprising in the early days of the Turkish Republic and the day after the new President of Turkey must be selected by Parliament. It is also when the winter snows should be melted and the PKK will be free to move within the southeast and infiltrate from northern Iraq. Traditionally, PKK activity in the winter months in Turkey is low. ¶6. (C) Kurdish political sources (some of whom are sympathetic to the PKK) believe the cease-fire may open some political space for the GOT to address some of the root causes of Kurdish extremism: poverty and lack of hope in the southeast. But both they and more nationalist Turkish contacts believe the long political season (presidential selection in May, parliamentary elections Nov. 4, 2007) will make this difficult. One nationalist think-tanker predicted that should PM Erdogan become president, he will seek to "fill in" promises he made as prime minister, addressing what Erdogan himself admitted was Turkey's "Kurdish problem." Kurdish contacts hope that U.S. Special Envoy Ralston can persuade the GOT to accept amnesty and rights for the Kurds as elements necessary to solve the PKK issue. ¶7. (C) NGO contacts in the southeast told us they are encouraged by the cease-fire's first month, but cautioned that the government needs to follow up with some gestures towards the Kurdish population in order to maintain momentum in the process. Nurcan Baysal of the NGO GIDEM (an apolitical entrepreneurial organization associated with the GAP Project) was pessimistic about the government undertaking any reciprocal measures because it wants to burnish its nationalist image prior to next year's election. Abdulmenaf Kiran, deputy chairman of the Kurdish intellectual NGO HAKPAR in Van, seconded this analysis and noted that pressure from ANKARA 00006419 002 OF 002 the Turkish General Staff will prevent the government from engaging in a political process on the Kurdish issue. This skepticism of the GOT's intentions is tempered by hope that, because the Kurdish issue is becoming more "internationalized," with input from the U.S. and the EU, this cease-fire may start a more serious process. ¶8. (C) Kerem Ugur, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) leader in Adana, claimed that in fact the government has already started an unofficial dialogue with the PKK. Baysal said that many in Diyarbakir also suspect that PKK-GOT contacts have been made and that DYP leader Mehmet Agar's call for an amnesty for PKK fighters was a part of a deliberate choreography to advance this process. NGO leaders said that, given their push for the cease-fire, they are also feeling pressure from the population for some gesture from the government. Baysal said that such a gesture should be in the political or cultural realm; people no longer believe government promises of economic investment. ¶9. (C) Comment: While the cease-fire does lower the level of violence in the southeast, it does not solve the PKK problem. GOT gestures toward the Kurds can ameliorate Kurdish extremism, but the issue of how to deal with the hardcore terrorist problem remains. The PKK's apparent deadline of May 16 is likely designed to try to pressure the GOT to take (unspecified) steps to help Turkey's Kurds, yet this sort of pressure may produce the opposite result. Moreover, Turkish electoral politics cannot help but get in the way of any such gestures toward Kurds. This leaves the Kurds to invest their hopes in the nascent discussions of amnesty, a continuation of EU-related liberalization, the Ralston initiative, and whatever back-channel winks and nods which may (or may not) be being exchanged between the GOT on the one hand and the DTP and PKK leadership on the other. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ MCELDOWNEY