TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006391 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY SUBJECT: TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER, NON-VAROSHA PACKAGE Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Apakan told Ambassador that while Turkey will continue to work with the Finns to find an acceptable Cyprus package that allows Turkey to meet its legal obligations to the EU, including Varosha will be next to impossible. The Turks would be more comfortable with a smaller package that looks more legalistically at its preexisting Customs Union obligations. They realize time is short. The Turks would also like the USG to push in New York to get the Gambari process off the ground. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with MFA Deputy U/S Ertugrul Apakan November 8 to underscore USG understanding that the EU mood on Turkey is dark and frustration high after the proximity talks that never happened. The Turks have a large mountain to climb in the next five weeks. It will be crucial not to aggravate already substantial doubt that some in the EU harbor as to whether Turkey really wants to work this out. Ambassador stressed that the GOT needs to do all it can to reinforce Turkish interest in finding a solution. ¶3. (C) The USG is urging the Finns to re-engage, through shuttle diplomacy or via inviting a series of senior people for individual discussions. The Finns may be prepared to invite experts to Helsinki as early as next week. When that happens, Turkey should be ready with concrete proposals. The Finns will also be looking to flesh out their initiative, perhaps by putting it down in writing. Turkey can further help itself by taking steps on other key issues, such as Article 301, which the PM raised recently with NGOs. Other possibilities could include taking action on Greek minority issues, Halki, etc. Ambassador pointed to the recent Greek parliament decision to fund construction of a mosque in Athens. What Turkish officials say publicly on EU accession and the Finnish effort would also be extremely important. ¶4. (C) Apakan responded that the GOT would continue its "positive approach" to the EU and Cyprus. The official response to the EU progress report would be low-key and constructive. On Cyprus, they would maintain contact with the Finns. FM Gul had spoken with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and they were in contact on the diplomatic level. ¶5. (C) On process, Apakan said the GOT had advised the Finns from the outset to hold four party talks. Turkey's reasons were at least two-fold: Greece is a guarantor power and its political assurances are needed on any Cyprus-related agreement. Without them, the Turks cannot agree with Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos. And for implementation, Greece must give its "open blessing". Apakan enumerated the openings already offered to the Greek Cypriots (GCs): they can come to Turkey without a visa and purchase one at the airport. Word had been given quietly to Turkish customs to allow GC goods to enter. They are coming in via Athens to the tune of $7-8 million. Turkish Cypriot (TC) vessels. he noted, cannot take their goods to Greece. ¶6. (C) Apakan said the Turks would speak privately to the Finns on what he termed the "political geometry" of Cyprus, his shorthand for stating how difficult it is for Ankara to mix a final settlement issue - Varosha - with either confidence building measures or Customs Union (CU) issues. Under the Luxembourg presidency, the TCs and GCs had discussed a basket of issues; then Varosha was inserted. The package failed. Varosha does not fall under any Turkish obligation to the EU; it appears in no EU document and, for the GOT, it is too hard. Speaking confidentially to the US and not to the EU, Apakan said that Turkey's obligation to the EU is to fulfill the additional protocol. The purpose of that document is to extend the CU to all new EU members, including the ROC. In fact, the CU only applies to industrial and specified processed agricultural goods, not to services, and it says nothing about ports, airports or airspace. ¶7. (C) To move in the right direction, Apakan continued, shuttle diplomacy is needed. The Turkish position is to find a way to work within the scope of the CU. For example, a small package that pairs the opening of Turkish ports and the lifting of the isolation of the TCs would be both meaningful and digestible in Turkey. The GOT would be criticized at home, but it would be politically defensible. With respect to airports, since there is nothing in the CU on either airspace or airports, how can Turkey open airports if no consideration is given to opening Ercan? The smaller the equation, the easier it will be to deal with, he stated. ¶8. (C) As a last resort, Apakan added, Turkey could consider arbitration. He acknowledged that it might be riskier for ANKARA 00006391 002 OF 002 Turkey than for others. This would be, however, for a later stage. In the meantime, the Turks would talk to the Finns and other EU partners. ¶9. (C) One other important element would be to get the Gambari process moving. The letters have not reached Talat and Papadopoulos because the GCs had asked that they be delayed. Apakan asked for USG intervention to get this moving; the parties would adjust accordingly. ¶10. (C) Ambassador responded that the point of the Finnish package was to allow Turkey to meet its legal requirements to the EU while ensuring that Cyprus does not pose an undue barrier to Turkey's ongoing accession negotiations. The trick is to find a formula that is politically doable both in Ankara and in Nicosia; no small feat. The USG is concerned and wants to be helpful. Turkey needs to be active and energetic in working with the Finns and trying to find a solution. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON