FORMER TURKISH PM ECEVIT'S FUNERAL: BURYING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006370 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2021 TAGS: PGOV TU SUBJECT: FORMER TURKISH PM ECEVIT'S FUNERAL: BURYING THE PAST, WARY OF THE FUTURE Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who died Sunday at the age of 81, was a man of symbols, personal and public. Much of what he symbolized dies with him. His state funeral this Saturday will be a set-piece on Turkey's ongoing transformation: the so-called secularist elite, epitomized by the military and President Sezer who seek to preserve the Kemalist status quo, juxtaposed against PM Erdogan's government that represents large chunks of Islamist Anatolia. End summary. ¶2. (C) Poet, journalist and translator, Ecevit led four governments and was caretaker for another. With Ecevit's personal symbols -- compact build, black hair, large mustache, cap, white shirt and a dove -- he cut a Chaplin-esque self-caricature. His personal values were embodied in his devotion to his life-partner, his widow Rahsan (he said he did not fear death; only separation from Rahsan) and his modest lifestyle. He was a great symbol; a lesser statesman. ¶3. (SBU) Ecevit was capable of very modern statements. His personal values dictated that he stand up for what he believed, even when it meant -- post-1980 coup -- being jailed for three months for writing an anti-military article. If people were unwilling to stand up for what they believed, he said at the time, we would still be saying the world was flat. His fierce partnership with his wife formed the core of their political force, at once leftist and nationalist, Kemalist and exclusive. ¶4. (SBU) He took over Ataturk's old party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) from Ataturk-compatriot Ismet Inonu in 1972, turned his back on Europe in the 1970s when the EU reached out to Turkey; was head of government when Turkish forces invaded northern Cyprus in 1974, fearing the Greek junta's coup in the south; and reaped the fruits of PKK leader Ocalan's capture in 1999. It was when Ecevit started to move toward the center-right, finally embracing Europe and the need for economic reforms in the aftermath of the 2001 economic collapse that the political ground slid out from underneath him. ¶5. (C) Ecevit's state funeral on Saturday will reflect the changes that face Turkey today, as well as for the forces that both promote and oppose them. It will be heavy with �0A;symbolism. Rahsan Ecevit insisted that the funeral be held Saturday, nearly a week after his death (an unseemly long period according to Muslim tradition),so that working Turks could attend. She looks to honor her husband with a repeat of the enormous pro-secular crowds that turned out last May for the funeral of slain Council of State judge Ozbilgin. Ozbilgin died at the hand of an assassin who supposedly disagreed with the court's decision to further limit the public sphere in which Muslim headscarves may not be worn. ¶6. (C) The May ceremonies for Ozbilgin were remarkable for their visual statements: the entire TGS leadership, including then- and current CHODs, lined up in front of Ozbilgin's coffin; a woman whacked Deputy PM/FM Gul over the head with her handbag; and others lobbed stones and epithets at government ministers who came. President Sezer was unusually outspoken on the secularist cause. The Ozbilgin funeral marked the beginning of the elite/old guard's campaign to preserve their prerogatives, keep intact their version of Kemalism and secularism and put the brakes on changes that they believe threaten the country's future. The symbol of that future is an office Ecevit never ascended to: the presidency. The object of their fear is PM Erdogan and his headscarved wife, Emine; AKP possesses the votes in parliament to elect Erdogan to the presidency in May 2007. Building on Ozbilgin's death, the Ecevit funeral may amount to another public salvo in the campaign against Erdogan. ¶7. (C) PM Erdogan's government is bending over backwards to honor Ecevit -- the man and the symbol. It has rolled out a state funeral, changed existing law to allow for Ecevit's burial in the cemetery until now reserved for presidents, heroes of the war of independence and ministers of state, and acceded to Rahsan's wish that the funeral be held November ¶11. Coincidentally, it is also the date of AKP's previously ANKARA 00006370 002 OF 002 scheduled 2nd national party congress. The congress will take place, its agenda re-adjusted to allow for ministers and MPs to attend the funeral. ¶8. (C) The flood of foreign dignitaries, the government hopes, will tamp down attempts at unseemly demonstrations and give GOT officials an opportunity to show they are as pro-Turkey and pro-secular as the next. For the TGS and the secular elite -- judges, university rectors and professors, lawyers, civil servants -- it will be an occasion to pay homage to the past and show strength in numbers. It will be a command performance for all who believe they matter in Turkish society. ¶9. (C) This is not the Turkey of Ecevit's political heyday. It is a Turkey which, though poised for a possible train wreck in its EU accession negotiations, has made considerable forward progress in its legal structure, in the development of a vibrant civil society, in freedom of expression and political discourse. It is both more urban as people stream into the cities from the countryside, and more Anatolian in its (often Islamist) conservatism. It is more democratic, with the military's room for maneuver modestly but consistently constrained. It is a work in progress, which causes the status quo forces great anxiety. In many ways, Ecevit was a simple man who represents the past. His funeral is one marker along Turkey's road to whatever future it chooses. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON