SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 7-8 VISIT OF EUCOM DCDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006163 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 7-8 VISIT OF EUCOM DCDR GENERAL WARD Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey continues to demonstrate its commitment to GWOT in Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Balkans, but is feeling the pinch of resources stretched both internationally and in the southeast, where it is battling a significant up-tick in PKK terrorist activity. The appointment of Gen (Ret) Ralston as US Special Envoy to counter the PKK was welcomed with cautious optimism, but the GOT remains poised for unilateral action in the absence of results. Following the appointment of GEN Yasar Buyukanit as new Chief of the General Staff (CHOD),and with the lack of a political solution to the PKK problem; continued stumbling on the path to EU accession; and the government's increased outreach to the Middle East; the tenor of the civil-military dialogue has become more public and tense. It is too early to say whether the public statements will translate into increased military engagement on the full range of security issues, including the moribund defense procurement relationship. Your visit comes during a phase of active high-level engagement between Turkey and the US. On Oct. 2, Prime Minister Erdogan met with President Bush and on Oct. 30, Defense Minister Gonul met with Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington. Army Chief of Staff GEN Schoomaker conducted a counterpart visit on Oct. 28 and Commander of US Army Europe GEN McKeiernan will visit later this month. Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff GEN Ergin Saygun will conduct a counterpart visit to EUCOM and to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December. Lastly, the annual meeting of the High Level Defense Group will convene in Ankara on December 12-13. END SUMMARY. A PARTNER IN GWOT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Iraq: Turkey,s agreement to allow the use of its territory as a logistical hub has been a combat multiplier for our Iraq operations. Normally, two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments (3 million gallons per day) for the Iraqi people and 25% of sustainment fuel for the coalition crosses into Iraq through the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Border Gate. Lack of payment from the Iraqi side for humanitarian fuel has on occasion slowed movement of this commodity. Since May 2005 when Turkey approved the use of Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub to support coalition operations in Iraq, over 152 million pounds of equipment has been shipped to US troops. This year, 58% of all air cargo into Iraq has transited the Incirlik cargo hub. Six C-17 aircraft now deliver from Incirlik the amount of supplies it originally took 9-10 planes to deliver from Germany, saving over $160 million per year in transportation costs. Up to ten KC-135 tanker aircraft (currently 4 assigned) have been based at Incirlik since 2003 to support refueling operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, running over 2800 refueling sorties and delivered over 192 million pounds of fuel. Turkey has four personnel assigned to NTM-I in Iraq and has trained 57 Iraqi military officers in Turkey. Iraqis have pledged to send officers to at least seven additional courses this year. You should express our sincere appreciation for the use of Incirlik to support on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) PKK: The number one security threat to Turkey and the single largest obstacle in our bilateral relationship is the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist organization. For over 22 years, the PKK has waged a war against the Turkish government in pursuit of an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey which has resulted in the deaths of about 37,000 Turks. Since the May 2004 end of its self-imposed five-year cease-fire, the PKK has conducted attacks against Turkey from its stronghold in northern Iraq, killing over 600 Turkish civilians and military and foreigners in 2006 alone. The increased violence prompted the government and military to warn of possible cross-border operations into Iraq. The US has strongly discouraged this, citing Iraqi sovereignty and the risk of increased instability. The US has been Turkey,s No. 1 ally against the PKK, securing EU agreement to place the PKK on its list of terrorist organizations; spear-heading a Europe-wide effort to close PKK financial, logistical, and media support outlets there; providing significant intelligence and leading a trilateral (US/TU/IZ) process to stop the threat emanating from northern Iraq. On August 28, the US appointed Gen (ret) Joseph Ralston as US Special Envoy to Counter the PKK to head-up a renewed trilateral process. ¶4. (C) Following Ralston,s initial trip to Ankara, he has twice traveled to Iraq to meet with senior government officials. Shortly after these meetings, Iraqi PM al Maliki declared that terrorists, including the PKK, have no place in Iraq and the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire on Oct. 1. Turkish officials have dismissed the cease-fire and called on the PKK to permanently lay down its arms, renounce violence and surrender to Turkish authorities. Despite the PKK,s declaration, there have been further IED attacks and clashes with Turkish security forces. As a result, Turks remain highly skeptical of Iraq's latest steps to contain/counter the PKK and equally skeptical of the PKK's announcement of a unilateral cease-fire. Turkey is willing to give Gen Ralston a chance to achieve tangible results but ultimately it expects the US to take kinetic action against the PKK presence in northern Iraq -- or for the Iraqis to take significant action to degrade PKK capabilities -- and has made clear that Turkey will act if the US and Iraq do not. ¶5. (SBU) Afghanistan: Turkey has twice successfully led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most recently from February to August 2005. On August 6, 2006 it initiated a two-year joint command of ISAF-Central in Kabul with Italy and France, and, on November 9, 2006, will open its first PRT in the neighboring province of Wardak. PM Erdogan visited Afghanistan in spring 2005 and subsequently increased Turkey's pledged assistance ten-fold to $100M. This is being allocated in $16M increments for five years to build schools, hospitals, medical clinics, and drinking water wells throughout the country. Four hospitals have already been constructed. The GOT provides counter-narcotics training in Turkey to Afghan security forces and will initiate such training in Afghanistan this year under the auspices of the Wardak PRT. ¶6. (C) Lebanon: Turkey immediately responded to the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon in July by opening its sea and airports to foreign evacuees from Lebanon, including over 1,700 Americans who were evacuated through Incirlik Air Base. The GOT's support for the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon with over 900 troops, while consistent with its traditional willingness to support peace operations, was not without political contention in the Parliament and was not popular with the Turkish General Staff (TGS). Already burdened by operational demands from its campaign against the PKK in southeastern Turkey, the TAF has a limited pool of qualified personnel within this conscript army from which it can support its other overseas peace support missions. (The TAF provides a Battalion Task Force to both SFOR and KFOR and provides the same to its third ISAF Command in Afghanistan. The Wardak PRT will be primarily comprised of military troops. This strain on the military was visible in TGS' September public refusal to support SACEUR's request for more troops in Afghanistan. Note: TGS is, however, weighing the option of offering a number of 155MM howitzers and training to Afghan security forces. ¶7. (SBU) Turkey is providing one Frigate and two Corvettes, a Personnel Transport Ship, and a Tank Landing Craft to UNIFIL. It has opened the Mersin, Iskendurun seaports and Aksaz naval base for logistic support, maintenance and repair assets and capabilities and Istanbul airport for the transit of UNIFIL forces to/from Lebanon. It has also offered C-130 air transport and sea transport and escort to friendly and allied countries on a case-by-case basis from Turkey. It will send 2-3 military officers to the UNIFIL headquarters and is providing an engineering support company to UNIFIL. ¶8. (SBU) Black Sea Security: Turkey is gradually beginning to warm up to the idea of U.S. involvement in the Black Sea and has expressed interest in the potential participation of U.S. Naval assets in Black Sea operations. COMNAVEUR has expressed his satisfaction in the openness of the Turkish Navy during recent visits. During your visit, you could emphasize that the U.S. stands ready to assist/participate/observe in Black Sea exercises/operations and that you think this regional cooperation is important for the relationship in order to help counter WMD proliferation and human/narcotics trafficking. Additionally, you could again emphasize that the U.S. firmly believes Turkey plays a vital leadership role with regard to the Black Sea littorals. Other: ¶9. (SBU) In addition to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey continues to contribute forces to NATO Baltic Air Operations, peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and provides training to Georgian security forces, including for pipeline security. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -------------- ¶10. (C) GEN Yasar Buyukanit, who took over from GEN Hilmi Ozkok as CHOD on August 30, has lived up to expectations that he would be more open and direct in dealing with the government than his predecessor, who handled disagreements behind closed doors. On issues ranging from the prohibition against head scarves in public buildings to the admission of graduates from Imam-Hatip religious schools into the mainstream university system, to changes in Turkey,s national security strategy, Ozkok kept tight-lipped publicly but worked behind the scenes to push back the pro-Islam Justice and Development (AKP) government when he believed it approached too closely the military's secular redlines. Buyukanit, in contrast, has made two public speeches in under two months, most recently on 2 Oct. when both PM Erdogan and FM Gul were out of the country. In each, he reminded his domestic and foreign audience of the continued charge of the military to protect Turkey,s secular, democratic and unified state against fundamental and separatist extremists. His words were echoed by Land Forces Commander GEN Basbug, Air Forces Commander Gen Comert and Naval Forces Commander Karahanoglu, who publicly outlined the continued importance of the military in the face of increasing terrorist attacks and despite EU criticism. Public statements aside, however, the military leadership has not suggested any wavering of its support for Turkey,s EU accession process or continued reforms. DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Defense industry cooperation (specifically direct commercial sales (DCS)),once a significant aspect of our military-to-military relationship, has been in decline for the past several years. Until Sikorsky finalized a sale of a second lot of 17 Seahawk helicopters on 9 October, no US firm had won a direct commercial sale since Boeing received contract for an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2002. In 2004, three tenders (UAVs, main battle tanks, and attack helicopters) were canceled. Two US firms, Boeing and Bell, were interested in a second attack helicopter tender, but declined to participate due to onerous liability and technology transfer requirements. Raytheon, who produces the T-6, was not able to submit a bid for an aircraft trainer tender due to unacceptable terms and conditions (T&C). Sikorsky submitted a non-compliant bid in a tender for 52 utility helicopters that had the same unacceptable T&C. ¶12. (C) Both in Ankara and in Washington, US firms and the USG have raised the technology transfer and liability concerns with Turkey's Ministry of Defense and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM). Despite both Turkish military and government insistence that it wants US competition in these tenders, SSM has not altered the standard contract to attract US competition. Comment: Closure of the Sikorsky Seahawk deal, which had been negotiated for two years, may signal a shift in either in GOT thinking or the influence of the military over major procurements. Under CHOD Ozkok, the military deferred to SSM for all major procurement decisions. We have heard, however, that CHOD Buyukanit is not pleased with SSM,s approach, which has kept out US bidders and left Turkey with the choice of a South African or Italian company for the purchase of up to 91 attack helicopters. His Deputy, GEN Saygun, has inquired about the possibility of an FMS purchase of US attack helicopters in the event that the tender is canceled. It remains to be seen whether this, and the Sikorsky deal, represent a real change or just a temporary blip in a competition between the government and the military for control over military procurement. End Comment. ¶13. (U) In November 2005, USG and GOT signed a cooperative Space Agreement. The Agreement provides a framework for mil-mil training and cooperative research and development (R D) efforts. The R D opportunities for defense cooperation are potentially great. However, the process is stopped because the Turkish Air Force Command's (TAFC) has not yet provided its white paper suggesting potential joint research opportunities. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES -------------- ¶14. (U) Due in large part to a Turkish Air Force decision to upgrade its F-16 fleet, FY05 was the largest dollar-figure year ever for foreign military sales. The Apr. 2005 signing of the $1.1B Peace Onyx III (PO-III) F-16 modernization letter of agreement (LOA) pushed the total Turkish Air Force figure to just over $5B of active cases. Additionally, an option in the PO-III agreement was just activated by TAFC in June bringing another $600M into the project so that now all 216 active Turkish F-16s will be upgraded. The upgrades (scheduled to be complete in about six-years) will significantly improve the Turkish Air Force's combat capability and ability to be inter-operable with NATO/coalition forces. ¶15. (C) In September 2006, the Turkish Air Force Command (TAFC) submitted a Letter of Request for 30 new F-16 Block 50 aircraft. In making the request, the Air Force stated that it wanted the "fastest delivery and cheapest price." This was the first instance in several years in which the military initiated a procurement request. However, responsibility for the contract has been transferred from TAFC to SSM, which has historically focused on local production and price over delivery date. In fact, following an initial discussion between SSM, the Air Force, and LM, SSM Aviation Department Head Sedat Guldogan privately counseled LM that local production is key to the sale and that the TAFC price and timing requirements were secondary to the requirement for local production of the aircraft at Tusas Aerospace Industries (TAI). Guldogan's decision to make this point outside of the formal meeting in which TAFC officials participated, however, could suggest that SSM is attempting to work around TAFC. If Lockheed Martin (LM) can negotiate offset (local production) requirements and secure signature of a Letter of Agreement (LOA) by January, it can deliver the aircraft in 2010. SSM's recent history of multiple-year haggling over contract terms suggests this may be hard. This sale will provide a litmus test for the military's willingness to stand against SSM to ensure that its armament needs are met. ¶16. (U) The $191M HAWK program has almost completed delivery. TAFC secured eight HAWK Assault Firing Units. All assets have arrived except the missiles. The missiles are scheduled for shipment later this year. ¶17. (U) Turkey has numerous FMS weapons procurement and integration cases valued in excess of $152M. Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW),Stand-Off Land Attack Missile-Expanded Range (SLAM-ER),AIM-9X Sidewinder Missile, AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM),Wind Corrected Munitions Device (WCMD),and the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) are a few of the major F-16 weapon systems Turkey requested to support the PO-III Modernization. ¶18. (U) In 2002, Turkey became the largest Level-3 partner in the JSF with a $175M investment. Turkey expects to procure 100-120 JSF aircraft starting in 2013. SSM threatened to pull out of the program if it does not receive significant work-share--$6B over the life of the program. Work-share is allocation that is based on the number of aircraft purchased and Turkey has already received over $180M in work-share, exceeding its initial investment. With additional opportunities to compete for contracts not yet let, Turkey has a chance to net over $6B in business. INTERNATIONAL TRAINING -------------- ¶19. (U) Turkey receives the most International Military Education and Training (IMET) dollars worldwide. In 2006, Turkey received nearly $3M which will provide about 345 US courses to over 230 Turkish students. The Turkish General Staff generally allocates approximately 23% of its IMET budget to the Turkish Air Force. In 2006, this equated to $685,400 which was used to send students to Air War College, Air Command and Staff College among other schools. TAFC is closely looking at its' NCO training and for the first time they sent a student to the Senior NCO academy. For next year, they have already secured six seats. OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES OF INTEREST -------------- ¶20. (U) The Anatolian Eagle (AE) exercise is TAFC's flagship event. Initially billed as Red Flag East, USAFE helped TAFC create the exercise as we know it today. Some international participants have included Israel, Belgium, Pakistan, France, Jordan, Italy, Germany and NATO. It is currently the single largest mil-to-mil training event the US participates in with Turkey and continued participation is highly encouraged by EUCOM. The 22FS from Spangdahlem will participate this coming November with 12 F-16s on the heels of a successful deployment by the 510FS from Aviano in June. As the largest mil-to-mil activity the US conducts with Turkey, you might emphasis your appreciation and continued support for conducting this training. ¶21. (U) The Turkish Air Force is standing up a new Weapons School for their F-16 and F-4 pilots, Air Battle Managers, Intelligence Officers and F-4 Weapon Systems Officers. As part of a good-will gesture, USAF approved a one-week visit to Nellis AFB in July in an effort to help prepare the Turkish Air Forces to open this school. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON