PKK DECLARES CEASEFIRE: NOW WHAT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005738 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2021 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: PKK DECLARES CEASEFIRE: NOW WHAT? Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The PKK leadership in Iraq declared a ceasefire as of Oct. 1, following Ocalan's Sept. 27 call from his Turkish jail cell. PM Erdogan took a measured stand, repeating the GOT position (and ours, as outlined by Gen. Ralston in his Sept. 27 press conference) that as a terrorist organization -- as opposed to a nation-state -- the PKK's only real option is to lay down its arms. However, Erdogan also implied that if the PKK indeed halts attacks the military will not initiate violence. Thoughtful opinion makers here are still calling for concrete steps against the PKK in Iraq, but also view the ceasefire as an opportunity to move forward on the Kurdish issue at home. The two are linked, but sequential progress in slowing down PKK terrorism will create the necessary political space for domestic reform. End summary. It's Official -------------- ¶2. (C) Through his lawyers, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for a unilateral ceasefire on September 27. The PKK leadership in northern Iraq quickly followed suit on September 30, ordering that the ceasefire commence Oct. 1. We have seen no confirmed reports of PKK-initiated violence as of Oct. 1. A small bomb exploded in the southeastern port city of Mersin, but it is not confirmed that the PKK was responsible. Turkish leaders and officials responded much as expected: The PKK is a terrorist organization, not a state, and the term "ceasefire" applies to nations at war. For Turkey, the only acceptable step by the PKK is to lay down its arms and permanently renounce violence. Furthermore, as the press heavily reported this weekend, the PKK has declared ceasefires before, only to use the lull to regroup and renew violent attacks in Turkey. The most recent example was the 2000-2003 ceasefire. By 2000 the Turkish military had significantly degraded the PKK's capability, and Ocalan had been captured the year before. But by 2003 the PKK -- using its safehaven in northern Iraq -- had rearmed and recruited new terrorists for its war on Turkey. ¶3. (SBU) PM Erdogan himself took a measured line toward the announcement, telling the press on his plane bound for an Oct. 2 meeting with President Bush in Washington that the PKK must lay down its arms. However, he added that Turkey is waiting to see if indeed the PKK does cease attacks, adding "if the terrorist organization keeps its word, there is no reason why security forces would carry out operations." At the same time, Erdogan emphasized that he would tell the President that the U.S. must work to implement steps against the PKK in Iraq. The new CHOD, GEN Buyukanit, accused the PKK in an Oct. 2 speech of having manipulated ceasefires in the past to bargain with past governments. While he vowed to fight on against terrorism, he stopped short of calling for draconian measures. A Chance to Move Forward? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While many editorials limited themselves to denying that the ceasefire has any real meaning, some more thoughtful (and connected) columnists went beyond this. Mehmet Ali Birand wrote that the PKK's move is part of a longer chess game that the GOT must play wisely, adding that a ceasefire will mean fewer deaths in Turkey and could/could lead to a solution without dividing the country. Two Washington-based correspondents noted that U.S. officials are already raising the need for Turkey to consider amnesty (or "reintegration") for PKK terrorists, but only after real action is taken to deal with the PKK's safehaven in Iraq. ¶5. (C) The Turkish press also reported on Iraqi President Talabani's October 1 comment to the Greek press that the PKK is finished and has no future. Talabani reportedly said that the PKK had caused problems between Iraq and Turkey, but that ANKARA 00005738 002 OF 002 "from now on, there will be no such problem." He added, however (according to press),that the solution to the PKK problem rested with Turkey, not Iraq, and that Turkey must induce terrorists to return home with an amnesty. Given Turkish anger over Talabani's recent accusation that Turkey is interfering in Iraq's internal affairs -- and his implied threat to use the PKK against Turkey -- we do not expect Turks to see Talabani's words as a olive branch. Comment: Keep the Pressure On Both Sides -------------- ¶6. (C) A PKK ceasefire -- even if the organization follows through -- does not solve the problem. Indeed, with winter approaching the pace of PKK activity in the southeast is due to decrease anyway. This in turn would ease the pressure for Turkey to undertake a cross-border operation into northern Iraq to attack PKK camps there. And as President Talabani himself has implied (by placing the burden for a solution solely on Turkey's shoulders),a ceasefire could be used by the GOI to renege on commitments it has made to combat the PKK. ¶7. (C) The key for Turkey will remain the concrete steps the GOI takes in Iraq. By declaring a ceasefire, the PKK is in part seeking to buy time and live to fight another day. A ceasefire is not the same as the real solution: laying down arms and renouncing violence, which would pave the way for long overdue political and social reforms in Turkey. ¶8. (C) If the PKK keeps its word (always a dangerous assumption),casualties in Turkey will decrease. This may give us the breathing room necessary to undertake a quiet, sustained dialogue with Turkey on steps that it must eventually take if it ever wants true peace in the southeast. We are heartened that some prominent opinion-makers are already giving this some attention. But, without a real push to deal with the PKK in Iraq first, there is little chance of addressing the fundamental problems of Turkey's Kurdish population. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ MCELDOWNEY