TURKEY/KOSOVO: LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO FINAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005475 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TU YS SUBJECT: TURKEY/KOSOVO: LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO FINAL STATUS REF: A. STATE 135734 ¶B. ANKARA 1651 ¶C. STATE 59894 Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. We detect little real concern in Turkey over Kosovo final status, with Turkish officials prepared for an independence outcome. MFA Eastern European Department Head Hasan Asan concurred with USG views regarding Kosovo final status negotiations, sharing the concerns expressed by a number of regional states regarding the potential for radicalization of Serbian politics, but nonetheless supporting steady forward progress toward a final settlement. Despite the Balkans' Ottoman heritage and Turkey's past interest in Balkan conflicts, Kosovo talks draw little public discussion here as most attention is focused on Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East. Russian statements citing Kosovo as a precedent for South Caucasus conflicts worry Turkish officials somewhat. End Summary. ¶2. (C) A variety of Turkish officials have told us that Turkey will accept any decision on Kosovo's final status to which all parties agree, but fully expect an independence outcome. MFA Eastern European Department Head Hasan Asan told us GOT views concur with those of the U.S. with regard to Kosovo across the board. He reiterated the stand conveyed last spring by MFA Deputy Under Secretary Ahmet Uzumcu to EUR A/S Fried (ref b) that he saw no catastrophic outcome resulting from Kosovo independence. GOT officials have added, however, that NATO should maintain a strong presence in Kosovo after a final status decision, and express misgivings about a possible transition to an EU-led force. ¶3. (C) Asan appreciated U.S. acknowledgment of concerns regarding political stability in Serbia, noting the strong potential for radicalization of Serbian politics, especially in the aftermath of Serbia "losing" Montenegro and the strong hold Kosovo has on the Serb national psyche. Nonetheless, Asan agreed that this should not delay a final status decision. In his view, Serbia will require a delicate approach that includes appropriate EU and NATO incentives and gestures, with a close eye on reactions in Voivoidina and Presevo. Asan opined that Turkey's powerful military establishment would be comfortable with independence for Kosovo. He described Turkey's current diplomatic relations with Serbia as "correct," with no recent high-level visits. ¶4. (C) Turkish National Security Council Secretary General Yigit Alpogan told House International Relations Committee staffer Alan Makovsky earlier this summer that Turkey is well aware that the U.S. seeks a final status decision this year. He said the international community should take care that an independent Kosovo rest on solid foundations -- with strong emphasis on meeting standards, achieving decentralization, and guaranteeing human and minority rights -- to avoid further problems in the region. ¶5. (C) Ankara-based Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) Kosovo watcher (and ethnic Kosovar Turk) Erhan Turbedar described to us how the official GOT attitude towards Kosovo had changed since the Balkan crises of the 1990s. At that time, Turkey focused its attention on Belgrade, limiting its contacts with ethnic Turks in Kosovo. Dealing with a virulent Kurdish insurgency in the southeast, the GOT feared that support for ethnic Turkish rights in Kosovo could have a boomerang effect and encouraged Kosovo's Turks to deal directly with Belgrade. Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova asked the GOT to recognize Kosovo's independence during a meeting with then-Turkish President Ozal in 1990. With the Kurdish insurgency in mind, Ozal refused. The result, according to Turbedar, was increasing friction between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Turks as the Kosovar Albanians pursued their parallel structures and eventually an insurgency. ¶6. (C) The GOT's attitude changed after NATO's 1999 entry into Kosovo, Turbedar explained. Since then, Turkey's Balkan policy has been closely aligned with that of the U.S. and EU. He noted that FM Gul stopped first in Pristina before making an official visit to Belgrade in October 2005. He characterized the ethnic Turk minority in Kosovo as well ANKARA 00005475 002 OF 002 integrated with the majority Albanians. Political parties representing the Turk minority seek the restoration of linguistic rights embodied in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution, but Turbedar characterized their efforts as uncoordinated and amateurish. ¶7. (C) Turbedar said that, since many Turkish politicians have Balkan roots, there remains a residual concern for and interest in the area. Turkish politicians are sensitive to the fact that several million Turks of Albanian descent are in Turkey -- a sizable voting bloc. The Albanian ambassador here speculated that the pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is warm to Kosovar independence in large measure to gain the support of traditionally secular Turks of Albanian descent in upcoming elections. ¶8. (C) That political sensitivity aside, Middle East Technical University Balkans Studies professor Mustafa Turkes acknowledged a lack of Turkish public interest or debate concerning Kosovo. He saw little official GOT concern, or any particular strategy, for dealing with Kosovo independence and its possible effect on the Turk minority there, and expected Turkish policy to be largely reactive. He was less sanguine about the Turk minority's prospects in an independent Kosovo and suspected they would increasingly fall prey to ethnic Albanian pressure. While acknowledging independence as the likely outcome, he wondered whether statehood would solve Kosovo's inherent problems and lead to long-term stability for the region. He opined that the political influence of Balkan-origin ethnic groups in Turkey had been strong under the Ecevit government pre-2002 but had less impact over the AKP government currently in power. ¶9. (C) Comment. Despite concern for Serbia's stability and residual interest in the welfare of ethnic Turks in Kosovo, the GOT does not appear to see an independence outcome for Kosovo as worrisome, but rather inevitable, manageable, and possibly politically useful. Turkish officials have told us they are concerned by Russian arguments that Kosovo independence will set a precedent for Caucasus and other conflicts. Despite an uptick in Kurdish violence in Turkey and enduring Turkish fears of an independent Kurdistan emerging from northern Iraq, we see little inclination here to compare the Kosovo and Kurdish situations. When pressed, Turks are just as likely to quip that Kosovar independence might be a useful precedent for northern Cyprus should comprehensive settlement negotiations there suffer a catastrophic failure. End Comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON