Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA5401
2006-09-18 07:46:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

REMOVING TURKEY'S GSP BENEFITS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Tags:  ETRD ECON TU 
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VZCZCXRO5632
PP RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #5401/01 2610746
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180746Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8737
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1290
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1110
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005401 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EB A/S SULLIVAN
PASS USTR FOR AUSTR DONNELLY AMD MERIDETH SANDLER
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/CRUSNACK
TREASURY FOR JONATHAN ROSE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECON TU
SUBJECT: REMOVING TURKEY'S GSP BENEFITS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

REF: A) ANKARA 5093, B) STATE 128359

SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005401 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EB A/S SULLIVAN PASS USTR FOR AUSTR DONNELLY AMD MERIDETH SANDLER USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/CRUSNACK TREASURY FOR JONATHAN ROSE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD ECON TU SUBJECT: REMOVING TURKEY'S GSP BENEFITS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE REF: A) ANKARA 5093, B) STATE 128359 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Progress has been made and is still being made in opening Turkish markets to U.S. exports and resolving long standing problems like inadequate intellectual property protection. Reducing Turkey's access to GSP benefits would deprive us of one of the few instruments we have to work with Turkey on market access issues, and would likely work against Turkish support for our WTO and multilateral objectives. On top of potential bilateral setbacks, loss of GSP benefits would have disproportionate impact on Turkey's struggling SME sector, potentially undermining recent economic gains. If these companies lose the competitive edge they have enjoyed thanks to GSP benefits, the winners will be exporters from competitors like Europe, China and India and the losers would be U.S. consumers. In Turkey, loss of GSP benefits -- ven in the context of a global review of the program -- would be viewed as a punishment and would increase the multiple challenges we face managing our relations with a key ally in a turbulent region. End Summary. SETBACK TO BILATERAL ECONOMIC AGENDA -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Our bilateral economic dialogue has revived over the last year. After a three-year hiatus, USTR and Turkey's Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU) came together in January for a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council meeting, which improved the atmosphere for reducing trade impediments. We are currently working to schedule an Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) meeting, the first in three years. Turkey's State Minister for Foreign Trade, Kursad Tuzmen, made 2006 the "Year of America" and has traveled extensively throughout the U.S. to promote trade and investment. ¶3. (SBU) Turkey has made progress opening markets to U.S. imports and resolving business disputes that have long plagued commercial relations. Although IPR and agricultural market access issues remain, the loss of GSP coverage may retard or reverse this progress. Unlike other countries under review and unlike its main competitors in the region and world-wide, Turkey apparently cannot enter into other types of preferential trade agreement
s with the U.S. because of its membership in the European Customs Union. GSP is thus one of the few benefits the U.S. can use with Turkey to promote our interests. Taking away these benefits in one fell swoop for reasons exogenous to Turkey would deprive U.S. trade negotiators of one of the few instruments they have to advance U.S. companies' interests in better market access, including U.S. agricultural and pharmaceutical companies. It is likely to preserve this flexibility that PhRMA wrote USTR in support of maintaining Turkey's eligibility for the GSP program. ¶4. (SBU) While not an active player in the Doha Round, Turkey has been strongly supportive of the U.S. NAMA initiative. It also worked closely with the U.S. textile industry on proposals designed to ease the transition from the end of the global textile quota system. Turkey has not been particularly associated with the countries that have undermined Doha. It should not be punished with them. SETBACK TO ECONOMIC STABILITY IN TURKEY -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The United States has led the world investing in Turkey's economic stability and prosperity. This includes our support for economic reforms bilaterally and under the auspices of the single largest IMF and World Bank programs worldwide. In 2003, Congress appropriated $1 billion to support Turkey's economy during a time of heightened regional turmoil. Although Turkey did not need to draw on these funds, this facility was a strong symbol of our ongoing commitment to Turkey and its economic welfare. Our efforts to encourage reforms and sound policies are paying off in the form of improved financial stability and broadly based economic growth. ¶6. (SBU) This work is also not done. Turkey's economic progress remains vulnerable both to external financial markets and to internal political developments. There is risk of "reform fatigue" growing out of a perception that the benefits of better policy are not widely diffused. Populist policy responses are always a danger here. Turkey continues to suffer from high unemployment (8 - 10 percent),poverty (25 percent),and vast regional income ANKARA 00005401 002 OF 002 disparities. These and other problems in the ethnically Kurdish southeast are reflected in high infant mortality and illiteracy rates that have made the area fertile ground for the siren song of PKK terrorism. To address these disparities, the United States and IFIs have encouraged greater diversification within the economy and regionally. In the export sector, we specifically encouraged reduced reliance on textile exports following the end of the Multi Fiber Agreement quota regime. SME'S BIGGEST LOSER -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The vehicle for diversification is Turkey's small and medium enterprise sector, which accounts for 99 percent of registered companies, but a much smaller share of economic activity. TUSIAD, the organization that represents big Istanbul-based business groups like Koc and Sabanci, estimates that its members account for 70 percent of Turkish exports. Stronger SME performance domestically and in exports will create jobs and spread wealth and income more widely. SME's in the jewelry, stone and olive oil sectors are the major beneficiaries of Turkey's GSP benefits and would feel a loss of access most acutely. These companies operate in highly competitive sectors and believe their products would not be competitive in the U.S. market without GSP. The potential of Turkey's SME's is highlighted by the economic success and relative tranquility of the southeastern city of aziantep, which recently hosted a U.S. Chambe of Commerce program aimed at developing SME sector trade and investment ties between our two countries. ¶8. (SBU) Among Turkish SMEs, the most affected would be in the jewelry sector, which operates on very thin margins and very tight delivery schedules. It accounted for 36 percent of Turkey's $1 billion in GSP exports in 2005, including the waivers of competitive needs limitations (ref a). Turkish jewelry producers maintain that only countries like India, Italy and China can produce the same quality of jewelry in the quantity that is produced in Turkey under the tight time constraints demanded by U.S. importers. This makes it unlikely that less-developed countries not currently exporting to the United States could meet U.S. market needs after the removal of CNL waivers or access to GSP. Turkey's regionally-based and rapidly growing olive oil industry, also a major GSP beneficiary, competes mainly with such more developed Mediterranean countries as Italy, Greece and Spain. In both cases, the beneficiaries of Turkey's loss of GSP benefits would not be the poorest countries, and the costs would be born by U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices and reduced availability of products. COMMENT: POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WILL ALSO RESULT -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) This year has seen improvement in Turkish-U.S. relations, culminating in the signing of the Shared Vision and Strategic Framework document and a Turkish contribution to UNIFIL. We are at the start of serious cooperation against the PKK. Reflecting our improved ties, the President and Prime Minister Erdogan will meet next month. Erdogan's government is facing strong opposition attacks for its cooperation with us on the PKK, Iraq, UNIFIL and other issues, and this criticism will rise as Turkey approaches parliamentary elections in 2007. The withdrawal of GSP benefits and eligibility -- even in the context of a global review of the program -- would be viewed here as a punishment directed at Turkey. This would increase the multiple challenges we face advancing the U.S. economic and political agenda with this key country at a time of regional turmoil. End Comment. Wilson

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