AVOIDING A TURKEY-EU TRAIN WRECK: CONSULTING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005333 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2021 TAGS: PREL TU EU CY US SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TURKEY-EU TRAIN WRECK: CONSULTING IN ANKARA REF: A. ANKARA 5204 (EXDIS) ¶B. NICOSIA 1521 ¶C. ANKARA 5268 lassified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 14 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint message from Embassies Ankara, Athens and Nicosia. ¶2. (C) Summary: We are seeing increasing signs that Turkey may indeed be headed for a train wreck in its relations with the EU late this fall. Derailment would endanger Turkey's EU accession bid, which the US has supported for decades. It could seriously undermine Western interests here by feeding the perception that the West is rejecting Turkey. It would undermine our regional interests regarding Iran, Iraq and the Middle East, as well as in promoting peaceful development in Southeast Europe. To help forestall this, we urge a vigorous US effort this fall. One component of this could be a mission to the region led by USEU Ambassador Gray. End summary. ¶3. (C) PM Erdogan has drawn a line in the sand on Cyprus; the Turks will not open ports and airports to Greek Cypriot trade (i.e., ratify and fulfill their Ankara Protocol commitments) until the EU makes good on what the Turks see as its promise to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation. In addition, Turkey is in pre-election mode, with both presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2007. There are rumors that PM Erdogan may be tempted to scrap the whole EU effort. ¶4. (C) Turkish Parliament convenes a special session September 19 to take up a new package of EU-related reforms. It will include the Foundations Law, the Ombudsman Law, a harmonization package (the earlier rewriting of the Turkish Penal Code in its entirety means relevent sections of pre-existing legislation must be harmonized with it -- a painstaking endeavor needed for full implementation),and likely a re-write of Penal Code provisions relating to freedom of speech (ref c). This may go some distance toward giving Turkey's few EU friends ammunition to prevent a breakdown in negotiations. But it may not be sufficient. ¶5. (C) If the parties are left to their own devices, the situation could evolve in a way deeply disadvantagous to Western interests in Turkey. The Finns are quietly working a package that we should support (refs a and b). Turkish public opinion, though, has soured on the EU and the West generally, because of what Turks perceive as promises broken and because they are increasingly skeptical that the EU will ever let them in. This is mirrored in polling data, such as the German Marshall Fund's (GMF) just-released Transatlantic Trends, which sees Turks as increasingly cool to relationships with the US and the EU, which they no longer see as working to their benefit. Similarly, the GMF report noted that the percentage of Europeans who see eventual Turkish membership as a positive has slipped. ¶6. (C) This is an opportune time for active US diplomacy to keep Turkey's EU effort on track, reflecting the longstanding priority we have given to the issue. It will take place at the highest levels -- when the Secretary sees FM Gul on the margins of UNGA and when the President meets PM Erdogan in early October. These Turkish leaders have an obligation to strongly and actively reaffirm their commitment to the EU, the West and the US, and to defend those relationships against critics here. We suggest that the Secretary also consider using UNGA meetings with European allies to challenge them to consider carefully the kind of Turkey-EU relationship they want, and the serious consequences of a breakdown of negotiations. ¶7. (C) We believe another form of direct diplomacy could reap real dividends. One central problem concerns misperceptions: GOT misperceptions about Brussels and individual EU members and their intentions, matched, we suspect, by EU misperceptions on just how far Turkey is prepared to go to maintain its active candidacy. To help us rekindle a constructive debate here on EU accession issues and to reinforce the right kinds of approaches to Turkey's EU accession that the Greek and Cypriot governments say they support, we propose that USEU Ambassador Boyden Gray consider visiting the region this fall. If Ambassador Gray were accompanied by one or several EU member state counterparts, the effort could be doubly useful. ¶8. (C) Talks in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus could be billed as educational, but would offer an opportunity to make our key points on Turkey's EU accession and public diplomacy to counter negative attitudes here and potentially also with ANKARA 00005333 002 OF 002 Europeans. Such a visit could be a vehicle for refocusing European audiences on the strategic, political, and economic benefits of EU expansion and Turkey's inclusion in that process. It could provide a useful forum to demonstrate to the Turks that EU member states are serious on Cyprus -- and to listen to the concerns of Turks, Greeks and Cypriots. (We would not, however, envision any EU ambassadorial delegation trying to mediate on Cyprus issues.) ¶9. (SBU) A visit this fall would be optimal -- definitely prior to the EU's December ministerial. The planned October 24 release of the EU's progress report on Turkey, which we understand could slip, it also a key data point. Debate in Europe and here will sharpen at that time. ¶10. (C) If Turkey-EU negotiations reach a de facto or de jure suspension, they may never be revived, and we will all have lost an enormous opportunity to influence this strategic ally in ways beneficial to our long-term interests. We hope that USEU Ambasasdor Gray might be prepared to help us out. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON