TURKISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004978 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV USUN LE TU SUBJECT: TURKISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPPORTS PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL; STILL NEEDS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL REF: A. ANKARA 4893 ¶B. ANKARA 4878 ¶C. ANKARA 4875 ¶D. ANKARA 4953 Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Turkish Council of Ministers announced its support of Turkish participation in UNIFIL on August 28; it plans to seek parliamentary approval within the next week or two. A united front by PM Erdogan, FM Gul and Speaker Arinc, along with the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) parliamentary majority, make approval likely, though strong opposition and events out of their control -- such as continued PKK-related bombings at tourist sites -- could derail AKP's careful planning. Turkey's president has come out against a deployment and opposition leaders are vocally resisting troop participation. The Turkish General Staff (TGS),which has remained publicly neutral, has stated that the military is prepared to deploy wherever the government directs. The vote does not now look nearly as momentous as the March 2003 vote on the Iraq war, but its results might provide insights into the durability of Erdogan's leadership ahead of the May 2007 presidential election. End Summary. -------------- Cabinet Announces Support but Needs Parliamentary Approval -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Erdogan's Council of Ministers publicly announced its support for Turkish participation in UNIFIL following an August 28 meeting. Senior government officials are meeting August 29 to discuss when to convene parliament, according to Government Spokesman and Minister of Justice Cemil Cicek. Cicek said the government may convene an extraordinary session of parliament for a vote as early as next week; AKP whips have told the press they already have the number of signatures needed to convene a special session. A parliamentary vote is required under the constitution. ¶3. (C) Cicek made clear that the government's decision is to participate in the peacekeeping force "within the framework of UNSCR 1701." The government has begun the process to make Turkey's airports and airspace available in support of UNIFIL, based on an earlier cabinet decision, according to Cicek. ¶4. (C) It was "out of the question for Turkey to remain a mere spectator," Cicek stated, adding that some may exploit the issue for domestic political purposes. Consistent with earlier government statements, he stressed Turkish troops would only go to protect the peace and "not to disarm Hezbollah." While Cicek did not mention deployment details, PM Erdogan advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told Ambassador on August 26 that the GOT is looking at sending 500 to 1000 troops; MFA spokesman Namik Tan referred on August 28 to "several hundred". Davutoglu added that deployment at the outset of Ramadan (which starts September 24) is unlikely; troops would likely arrive in Lebanon after October 1. -------------- AKP Laying the Groundwork -------------- ¶5. (C) PM Erdogan has been out front on this issue for weeks, publicly making a case for Turkish participation. FM Gul has also been laying the groundwork for deployment, including a well-publicized regional tour to Beirut, Tel Aviv and Damascus to gauge the views of regional actors. Each visit included a high-level Turkish military officer to discuss logistics (Refs A and B). The GOT also plans to use SYG Annan's September 6 visit to good effect. We understand that Annan may give a speech at parliament, and the GOT may choose to time a vote to coincide with that or take place soon thereafter. The PM also appears to have parliamentary ANKARA 00004978 002 OF 003 speaker Bulent Arinc on board. Arinc responded to a negative spin by President Sezer, stating that voting on a troop deployment was the prerogative of parliament, not the President. ¶6. (C) PM Erdogan advisor Davutoglu told Ambassador August 26 that AKP is thinking carefully about how to use the press to measure public reaction and calibrate next steps. He and PM Advisor Egemen Bagis tell us that AKP is in touch with columnists and opinion makers to help make the case. We have heard reports of a leadership-initiated gag order on ruling party deputies, and that unfortunately, the chairman of parliament's foreign affairs committee, Mehmet Dulger, as well as habitual AKP dissenters, have spoken out publicly against a deployment. Party leaders may well tell dissenters to absent themselves on the day of the vote. ¶7. (C) AKP would prefer not to impose party discipline, Bagis told us. Almost all AKP deputies owe PM Erdogan their seats. If Erdogan is in parliament for the vote, Bagis emphasized, "No one can look him in the eye and vote against him." Bagis and Davutoglu distinguished this vote from the March 1, 2003 vote on Iraq, noting that the UNIFIL vote will be for a peacekeeping mission (vice war) involving Turkish troops (vice American ones) under PM Erdogan's tested government (vice Gul). The GOT had learned its lessons well, he added. It now knows how to maneuver vis-a-vis the opposition Republican People's party (CHP),a skill its then-fledgling MPs had not yet developed in March 2003. -------------- But Parliamentary Approval Not Guaranteed -------------- ¶8. (C) AKP cannot afford to declare victory too early. President Sezer, in response to a press question on the margins of the August 25 Turkish Land Forces Change of Command ceremony, stated that he opposes Turkish participation in UNIFIL. Turkey's priority should be to "solve its own problems," not protect the interests of other countries or solved security problems abroad. Nobody has backed Turkey on the PKK issue, Sezer stated; why should Turkey extend support to others? ¶9. (C) Other secular leaders have been voicing opposition since the cease-fire took hold. The main opposition party, CHP, which was instrumental in derailing the March 1 vote, has publicly opposed a deployment barring an additional UN resolution that clarifies the mission. Following the Council of Ministers decision, CHP Vice Chairman Onur Oymen (a former Turkish Ambassador to NATO) declared that it would be "extremely wrong to send troops to a minefield." Other parties, including the nationalist MHP and center-right Motherland Party (ANAP),echoed these statements. -------------- Military Will Follow Civilian Lead -------------- ¶10. (C) GEN Yasar Buyukanit, who assumed command as Chief of the General Staff on August 28, stated on August 25 that the military would "do as it was told" with regard to sending troops to participate in a robust UNIFIL, according to the press. In discussions with Embassy officials and in other public pronouncements, the Turkish military leadership has been somewhat more circumspect, saying only that Turkey's participation would be reviewed in light of the expanded UNIFIL mandate and the cease-fire conditions. Some observers have commented that the military wants to be able to point at the government as having made the decision to deploy should post-deployment circumstances on the ground in Lebanon lead to negative public reaction. Following several interagency meetings -- including the August 21 National Security Council meeting -- to discuss Lebanon, MFA officials have suggested that the General Staff supports participation in UNIFIL but is concerned about placing troops in a position where they may have to shoot -- or could be shot by -- other Muslims. ANKARA 00004978 003 OF 003 -------------- Recent Bombings Complicate the Situation -------------- ¶11. (C) Another possible complicating factor that could lead some to follow President Sezer's lead is home-grown terrorism. A series of seven bombings from August 24 to 28 killed at least three and injured more than 40 in Istanbul, Adana and the tourist centers of Antalya and Marmaris. The PKK-affiliated Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (ref D) finally claimed responsibility late August 28. This uptick in PKK-related violence will strengthen those who argue Turkey should take care of its own problems first. Absent sufficient initiative on combating the PKK and speed in bringing the proposed deployment to a vote, these arguments may gain traction in parliament. Alternatively, a PKK cease-fire or significant action by the U.S. or Iraq against the PKK could serve to dilute the isolationist and nationalist appeal. -------------- Comment: This is Not March 1 -------------- ¶12. (C) The government, Erdogan leading the charge, has come out four-square in favor of a UNIFIL deployment. AKP has not gone in blindly, despite serious misgivings of many in government and military alike on placing troops where they risk having to shoot at (or disarm) fellow Muslims. Foreign Affairs Committee chair Dulger voiced what many were reluctant to -- that Turkey would be stepping into an unknown, with equally unknown consequences. He represents the status quo attitude of traditional Turkish governments. Erdogan has chosen instead to pursue his activist ambition that Turkey play a more robust role in the region. With leadership comes risks, and Erdogan is putting his leadership on the line, both within his diverse party and internationally. The PM may rightly believe that he and his whips can control enough of his party, but he has no control over outside actors such as the PKK/TAK or a vocal opposition. The outcome will serve a a barometer of the PM's power and internal party loyalty as Turkey enters a dual election year. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON