TURKEY'S IRAQ COORDINATOR ON IRAQ FUEL AND IRAQI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004822 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2021 TAGS: PREL ECON EPET ENRG ETRD XF TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKEY'S IRAQ COORDINATOR ON IRAQ FUEL AND IRAQI OFFICIALS' RECENT VISITS REF: A. A) STATE 134147 ¶B. B) ANKARA 4707 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkey's MFA Iraq Coordinator Oguz Celikkol updated Ambassador on recent Iraq-related developments, including visits to Istanbul by Iraqi VP Hashimi and seven Iraqi Turkmen parliamentarians, the latter of which was designed to promote unity and common purpose among Turkmen across party and religious lines. Turkey's PKK concerns were prominent in recent talks with the Iraqis, with PM Erdogan urging follow-through on the positive decisions recently taken. FM Gul would like to move ahead with a visit to Iraq, but Ceikkol asked for advice on logistics and other practical issues to make this happen. Celikkol would welcome a visit to Turkey by incoming S/I Ambassador Satterfield. Ambassador delivered ref A demarche on the SOMO fuel trade issue. Celikkol believed that an understanding with SOMO may be near, and Turkish foreign trade undersecretariat staff subsequently followed up with us. Celikkol also reviewed Kirkuk issues and progress on a USD 1 milllion assistance package for the Iraqi military. END SUMMARY. PKK --- ¶2. (C) Celikkol confirmed that FM Maliki called PM Erdogan earlier this month. Maliki outlined the measures Iraq is taking against the PKK. Erdogan reportedly responded that Turkey is hearing encouraging news, but that promises need to be acted upon soon. During his recent visit to Istanbul, Iraqi VP Hashimi asked for a briefing on the PKK and its activities in Iraq, which he got immediately prior to seeing Erdogan. Afterwards, he reportedly said that Iraq should formally declare the PKK a terrorist organization. Most people in Baghdad are not aware of PKK activity in Iraq, Hashimi commented, adding that he will brief other officials upon his return. He thought it will be easier to take action against the PKK if it is declared a terrorist organization. ¶3. (C) Ambassador noted that President Bush had personally raised the PKK during PM Maliki's July visit to Washington, and Maliki had responded constructively. One of the prime benefits of a trilateral discussion mechanism would be to leverage Iraqi implementation of its PKK-related promises, the Ambassador said. Celikkol pointed out FM Gul's helpful comments that morning to the press stressing the high priority the US is giving to the PKK issue by appointing a PKK Coordinator. POSSIBLE FM GUL VISIT TO IRAQ -------------- ¶4. (C) FM Gul is now leaning strongly toward accepting Iraqi invitations to visit, and the visit might happen in the fall -- though no firm decision has been made, Celikkol indicated. He asked to coordinate closely on security and logistics, which are complicated by the fact that the Turkish Embassy is outside of the Green Zone. FM Gul wants to visit more than Baghdad, although Celikkol did not identify other locations under consideration. Celikkol stressed that planning is at a very early stage; Turkey's embassy in Baghdad has not been involved yet. Any USG thoughts about the practicalities of a Gul visit to Iraq would be very helpful. Ambassador said he would notify Embassy Baghdad and seek information that could be shared about how other recent ministerial visits have been handed. ¶5. (C) Ambassador told Celikkol that he had discussed with incoming S/I Ambassador David Satterfield a visit to Turkey soon after he takes over as Iraq Coordinator. Should this not be possible soon, perhaps Celikkol could visit Washington. Celikkol welcomed an early visit and opined that Satterfield's work here with the government and media would be more useful than talks in Washington. He would, however, ANKARA 00004822 002 OF 003 be in the US to attend an Iraq Neighbors foreign ministries meeting that Turkey hopes will take place on the margins of the UNGA opening in September. IRAQI TURKMEN VISIT -------------- ¶6. (C) Celikkol described in positive terms a recent visit to Istanbul by seven Iraqi Turkmen parliamentarians. Turkey had arranged the visit and used it to promote unity of action on issues of interest to ethnic Turkmen throughout the country, despite party and religious differences among the members. The Turks also urged the members to meet with Iraqi government officials and foreign embassies as a group. Shia Turkmen members reportedly requested more GOT involvedment in Iraqi reconciliation. They referred to four sets of meetings planned by PM Maliki among tribal leaders, non-official political groups, clergy, and civil society and encouraged Turkey to host one or more of these dialogue sessions. Celikkol said Turkey would be prepared to host the tribal leaders meeting if requested by the Iraqi government. TURKISH AID TO IRAQ'S MILITARY -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador followed up on the status of Turkey's USD 1 million package for equipping the Iraqi military, which Celikkol had indicated earlier in the summer was being teed up for announcement during a high level visit by Iraqis here or Turks to Baghdad. Celikkol's staff indicated that the Turkish aid agency TIKA has or will shortly receive funding and will be making procurements. Iraq's defense and interior ministers have been invited to Turkey, and these might be an occasion to make this aid public. KIRKUK STILL A CONCERN -------------- ¶8. (C) Both Hashimi and the Turkmen parliamentarians urged increased international pressure on the Kurds to better understand Arab and Turkmen concerns regarding Kirkuk's status, Celikkol said. Tensions are running very high. Celikkol understood that some have proposed an international conference on Kirkuk to move the issue forward, and he endorsed the effort. ¶9. (C) Celikkol also flagged a potential concern regarding the composition of a Kirkuk Normalization Committee that Turkey understands is now being formed. Turkey has heard that the Turkmen representation may consist of two Shia only, one of whom is not well-regarded by the Kirkuk Turkmen community. To succeed in normalizing the situation in Kirkuk, any such committee should include Turkmen regarded as representative of the community, and it should include both Shia and a Sunni Turkmen. IRAQ FUEL DISPUTE -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador carried out ref A demarche on Iraq fuel supplies. He stressed that we believe Iraq is largely complying with the agreements worked out earlier this year to restore normal fuel trade. PM Maliki is describing the situation as increasingly desperate. Every Turkish effort that can be made to resolve outstanding issues and get larger quantities of fuel moving as quickly as possible will be important. ¶11. (C) Celikkol said Maliki and Erdogan discussed the latter. Turkey wants to be helpful. He understood that talks with SOMO are making headway and a resolution is near. He would be meeting with a representative of the Turkish Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU) shortly and would try to be helpful. He said that FTU has concerns about how SOMO is implementing the June agreement. ¶12. (C) Further to ref B, FTU Director General Sevket Ilgac, who has been the GOT's main interlocutor with SOMO, has been ANKARA 00004822 003 OF 003 in touch with Maliki advisor Thamir Ghadban. In a note sent to Ghadban on August 16, the Turks affirmed that deliveries to SOMO are ongoing and stated their readiness to approve additional fuel shipments by Turkish companies on the terms of the MOU agreed in Ankara in February 2006 and reaffirmed in June 2006. As Ilgac explained to us earlier, the most important category that SOMO needs to address is "Category B" that includes shipments made this year. Payment of Category A, consisting of pre-2006 arrears, is on track. Category C, which covers disputed pre-2005 deliveries, is subject to negotiation. Ilgac reiterated that once a letter of credit covering Category B obligations of about $350 million has been issued by the GOI, FTU would no longer require that SOMO contract with the 30 or so companies covered by the MOU and would be free to work with as many or as few firms as it desires. ¶13. (C) Ilgac said that the customs investigation at Habur Gate is no longer an impediment to deliveries and expressed appreciation for our recognition of Turkey's efforts to expedite US military sustainment fuel shipments. He said his interest is purely commercial. He wants to see Turkish companies exporting as much fuel as SOMO requires, so long as the companies -- several of which were nearly put out of business by SOMO past non-payments -- are protected as agreed under the MOU. He is disturbed that SOMO's recent requests seem to ignore agreements made in the MOU and suggested that if SOMO at least acknowledges those obligations he is prepared to discuss the details. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON