TRILATERAL TALKS ON THE PKK -- WHAT DOES TURKEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004744 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2026 TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS IZ TU SUBJECT: TRILATERAL TALKS ON THE PKK -- WHAT DOES TURKEY WANT? REF: A. ANKARA 4451 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2768 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) The GOT's comprehensive "Measures to be Adopted to Terminate PKK/KONGRA-GEL Activities in Northern Iraq" (ref a) lists Turkey's desired outcomes prior to and following US-Turkey-Iraq trilateral talks on the PKK. The list includes political and public affairs, security, legal, and other measures focused on curbing PKK activities in northern Iraq and elsewhere. The GOT's goal is a reduction of PKK attacks in Turkey through the removal of PKK encampments across the border in Iraq and the general hindrance of PKK activities in northern Iraq. In the following paragraphs we analyze Turkish desiderata in terms of their contribution to reducing PKK violence in Turkey. We should move quickly to bilateral talks and focus our -- and Turkey's -- attention on those measures that can be agreed on and implemented in the immediate post-trilat period to hinder PKK activities while fostering cooperation and mutual confidence between Turkish and Iraqi security forces, including the KRG. End Summary -------------- Steps to be Taken Before Trilats -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Before trilateral talks begin, the GOT wants Iraqi authorities, as well as the U.S., to make declarations condemning the PKK and endorsing the termination of the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq as the agreed goal of the talks. The GOT's goal is to create the atmosphere and political cover it believes are essential to entering into direct discussions with the Iraqi government and Kurdish authorities, given that PKK attacks in the southeast are likely to continue. We should encourage Iraqi authorities, including Kurdish leaders, to back up their reported efforts to close PKK front offices and dissuade PKK members from terrorism by articulating in a clear and public fashion their opposition to PKK terrorism prior to trilateral talks. -------------- After the Trilats -- Turkey's Goals -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The GOT's desired outcomes for the immediate post-trilat period fall into several categories: -- KRG actions in northern Iraq, to include shutting down PKK front offices, warning PKK terrorists to cease operations in Turkey, and curtailing PKK mobility. Baghdad reporting (ref b) indicates Kurdish leaders have begun to take these promised measures. We need to ensure follow through and publicity for the actions taken -- preferably through the Iraqi and then Turkish media, and not as USG claims that would not have the same impact. (Comment. We note there is some discrepancy between what Talabani reportedly promised the Turks and what he has told U.S. officials the KRG is committed to doing, especially in terms of limiting PKK mobility). -- Security measures, to be undertaken by Iraqi and KRG forces, to physically cut-off and eliminate PKK camps in the border area and ultimately throughout northern Iraq. This includes joint activities by Turkish and Iraqi forces to secure the border and the use of Iraqi and U.S. military action if other means fail. These measures constitute a continuum ranging from getting PKK out of the border area to their ultimate elimination from Iraq. -- Legal measures, to prevent free movement of PKK forces and provide for the extradition to Turkey of PKK leaders and cadres, prevention of PKK organized crime activities, and cutting off of financial support, including from Europe. This can build on our existing initiatives in Europe. -- Other measures, to eliminate PKK recruitment and propaganda, promote joint Turkey-Iraq counterterrorism cooperation, and ensure security of Turkish truck commerce. These measures are not directly relevant to disabling the PKK but reflect ambitions to establish more routine cooperation in security matters. -------------- What This Means -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The GOT has provided us a menu of actions, some of which can be achieved in the short term and others of which, including the total removal of PKK camps and terrorists in northern Iraq, will be difficult even over the longer term. Turkish officials have made clear to us that their immediate and primary interest is that Talabani and Barzani implement, in a concrete and public fashion, their promise to curtail PKK political activities and mobility in northern Iraq, and that PKK forces and encampments are removed from and kept out of the immediate border area. While such initial measures will not completely stop PKK terrorism in Turkey, they will contribute to its reduction and will calm hysteria here. To date, the Turks are not convinced that Talabani and Barzani have done enough, at least in the public sphere, to send a hard message to the PKK that its activities in northern Iraq can no longer be tolerated. ¶5. (S/NF) Security in the immediate border area is the other Turkish concern. PKK camps within 10-12 kilometers of the border constitute for the Turks a flagrant provocation and a nearly irresistible target for unilateral, cross-border military action. A main goal of trilateral talks should be to find a mechanism whereby Turkish and Iraqi (probably largely KRG) security forces can cooperate to rid the immediate border area of PKK elements and impede the movement of PKK terrorists from Iraq to Turkey and back. A means to establish security in the border area, which includes long stretches of difficult terrain, in a joint and verifiable fashion may be a reasonable deliverable for the trilateral talks. -------------- The Way Ahead -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) An initial bilateral meeting should review the state of play and the kinds of actions that could reasonably be taken to hinder PKK mobility and limit its cross border activities. We should avoid a line-by-line discussion of Turkish desiderata and focus instead on those actions with the greatest potential to have a short-term impact on PKK terrorism emanating from Iraq. Our longer-term agenda should be to foster direct coordination between GOT and Iraqi (including KRG) security forces that will build confidence and lead to more intensive bilateral counter-terror and security cooperation. -------------- -------------- Track Two -- Getting the PKK to Declare a Cease-fire -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Senior Turkish officials have spoken of the need to have the PKK declare a unilateral cease-fire, or even a complete and permanent cessation of hostilities. Some official efforts are underway, including low-key GOT contacts with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and Turkish Kurd political figures, reported in separate channels. While chances are slim that the PKK will declare a cease-fire absent some immense concession on the GOT's part, such an outcome would greatly ease the challenge before us. Meanwhile, we must press ahead with the appointment of a special representative and engagement in the trilateral process as soon as possible. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON