CSI: TURKEY RESPONDS TO ASSESSMENT WITH NEW PROPOSED

UNCLAS ANKARA 004622 SIPDIS ROME FOR CBP ROBERT STIRITI DHS FOR CSI - TODD HORTON, LISA WAINWRIGHT, KRISTIN DUBELIER DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT ON SECTION 01 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EWWT PTER KTIA TU SUBJECT: CSI: TURKEY RESPONDS TO ASSESSMENT WITH NEW PROPOSED DOCUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION ¶1. On July 31, Embassy received via diplomatic note Turkey's response to the draft Container Security Initiative (CSI) Declaration of Principles (DOP) and Basic Impelementation Procedures (BIP) that were provided to the GOT earlier this year. ¶2. The revised Declaration of Principles (DOP) and Basic Implementation Procedures (BIP) were edited using the documents submitted by the CSI division as a model. The major differences compared to the CSI division's drafts include the GOT's continued unwillingness to grant diplomatic immunity to CSI officers stationed in Izmir (BIP paragraph 5),the GOT's request that officers share with Turkish Customs the information contained in their reports to DHS (BIP paragraph 10),and a stipulation that official communication and correspondence be conducted in Turkish (BIP paragraph 14). In addition, in the DOP, the GOT specifically requests that a corresponding U.S. port be designated for the purposes of potentially posting Turkish Customs officials. ¶3. Comment: While many of the previous issues surrounding CSI have been alleviated, questions related to immunity, language of operation, and the nature of the final signed agreement still remain. The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU) -- which has taken the lead on implementing this program -- indicates that it views this as a negotiable document, from which they received the input and clearance of the other interested Turkish agency, and is open to further discussion. We stand ready to facilitate negotiations between DHS and Turkish government officials. End comment. ¶4. Begin text of Turkish Diplomatic Note 2006/DHGY/316837 regarding CSI in Izmir: (Standard greeting) and with reference to the Latter's Note No: 638, dated 18 April 2006, has the honour to enclose herewith a draft "Agreement for the Implementation of the Container Security Initiative at the Designated Ports of Both Countries." The Ministry kindly requests the Embassy to transmit the enclosed document to the relevant U.S. authorities and looks forward to receiving the Embassy's reply. (Standard closure). ¶5. Begin text of Turkey's proposed DOP: DRAFT (AGREEMENT/PROTOCOL/AGREED MINUTES) BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI) AT THE DESIGNATED PORTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES (note: The concrete headline will be mutually determined by the Parties) The Customs Administration of the Republic of Turkey and the United States Customs and Border Protection (hereinafter referred as the "Parties"); Considering the principles and terms set forth in the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America Regarding Mutual Assistance Between Their Customs Administrations" signed on 28 March 1996, Recognizing the long-standing close and productive relations between the Parties, Being convinced that this cooperation can be further improved by intensifying the exchange of information and best practices between the two customs authorities, Recognizing the high volume of trade between Turkey's seaports and the seaports of the United States of America, Bearing in mind the World Customs Organization resolution on Security and Facilitation of the International Trade Supply Chain adopted in June 2002, Being convinced that there is a need to deter, prevent, and interdict any terrorist attempt to disrupt global trade or to make use of commercial shipping to further their own schemes, Supporting the Container Security Initiative (CSI),which is designed to safeguard global maritime trade by enhancing co-operation at seaports worldwide to identify and examine high-risk containers and ensure their in-transit integrity, Have agreed on the following provisions; Article 1 For the purpose of this Agreement; "CSI Officers" shall mean the US Government officers who will be stationed at Turkey's designated seaports for the purpose of CSI implementation. "CSI Contact Points" shall mean the Turkish Customs Officer(s) who are notified to the US Customs and Border Protection as contact point(s) for the purpose of the CSI implementation. "High risk containers" shall mean the containers which are carrying commodities that pose a risk for terrorism, and destined for the US Ports. "CSI examination" shall mean non intrusive inspection of the US destined containers "Anomaly" shall mean any condition, characteristic or feature of the commodity that indicates a risk for terrorism. Article 2 The Parties shall intensify bilateral customs cooperation, including in particular on the implementation of the CSI in accordance with the basic implementation procedures provided in Annex A that shall constitute an integral part of this Agreement, at designated ports of both countries, within the framework of the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America Regarding Mutual Assistance Between Their Customs Administrations" of 28 March 1996. Article 3 The parties shall intensify bilateral customs cooperation by working closely together to ensure that screening and sealing of high-risk containers is carried out swiftly through the use of inspection equipment that will allow a non-intrusive screening during the examination of the containers, where appropriate facilitate trade flow and strive to ensure the screening and examination of the containers that pose a risk for terrorism. Article 4 US Customs Officers, who will work in accordance with the basic implementation procedures provided at Annex A, shall be stationed on a pilot basis at Turkey's designated seaports with significant volume of commercial traffic to the United States of America. Turkish Customs Officers shall be stationed at US seaports on a pilot basis, upon the request of the Customs Administration of the Republic of Turkey with the same aim and under the same conditions established in this Agreement and its Annex. In this respect, the Parties agreed to start the CSI at the Izmir Port in the Republic of Turkey and at the xxxxxx Port, USA. Addition of new ports within the CSI is to be mutually agreed by the relevant Parties through diplomatic channels. The Parties are not to reimburse any charges or fees due to the enforcement examination or a targeted shipment that poses risk for terrorism at the designated ports within the framework of the CSI. Article 5 The Parties shall consult closely on the implementation of this Agreement, to ensure continuous effectiveness and the reciprocal benefit of the bilateral customs cooperation. Article 6 This Agreement shall enter into force on the date the Parties have notified each other in writing through diplomatic channels that the necessary internal procedures have been completed. The Agreement shall remain in force until three months from the date on which either Party notifies in writing through diplomatic channels to the other party its intention to terminate the Agreement. Done in xxxxxx this xxxx day of xxxxxx in two original copies in Turkish and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. End text of DOP. ¶6. Begin text of Turkey's proposed Basic Implementation Procedures (BIP). ANNEX A Basic Implementation Procedures for CSI Cooperation Between Customs Administration of the Republic of Turkey and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (For Pilot Implementation) INTRODUCTION: THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE Container Security Initiative (CSI) is an anti-terrorism initiative that targets and pre-screens containers, which may pose a risk for terrorism at designated ports of lading. The implementation of CSI shall include, inter alia, the following: - Using information to target containers that pose a risk for terrorism. - Using non-intrusive detection technology to quickly pre-screen those containers that pose a risk at the port departure before they arrive at US ports. - Deploying CSI team works in the host country to target high risk containers in cooperation with the host government which will conduct inspections when deemed appropriate while the US CSI team observes. - Thus, increasing security, CSI facilitates flow of legitimate trade by allowing pre-screened containers to enter the US without delay. This basic implementation procedures document, prepared in line with the Articles 1 and 3 of the Agreement to which it is annexed, aims to arrange the principles of cooperation between the Turkish Customs Administration and the US Government Officers stationed at designated seaport(s). The same procedures shall apply for the Turkish Customs Officers stationed at designated US seaport(s),in case the Turkish Customs requires deploying a Turkish CSI team. SECTION ONE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES ¶1. CBP officers should adhere to the national laws and regulations of the Republic of Turkey as well as rules, and common practices applied at seaports of Turkey where CSI is implemented. ¶2. With a view to the review of the CSI implementation and the further development of Turkish Customs and CBP cooperation, and regular meetings between relevant customs authorities are to be held every three months. ¶3. The issues not mentioned in this document, additional or modified implementation procedures, divergences about the interpretation of this document or any disputes regarding the CSI implementation shall be evaluated and tackled by the Turkish Customs. ¶4. CSI officers will only perform relevant activities within the areas defined in the Agreement. CSI officers are not to directly contact, exchange information or carry out activities with any party of the host country other than the CSI contact point(s). ¶5. CSI officers shall not have diplomatic status. They shall be subject to Turkish laws and regulations and shall not enjoy any privilege or immunity. As such, the US CSI Officers shall be promptly issued with the necessary working permission by the Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security. ¶6. All inspections and customs procedures of high-risk containers are to be conducted solely by Turkish Customs officers. In the case of an anomaly is identified during an inspection, the Turkish Customs is to investigate and address related issues in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Turkey. CBP Officers will be permitted to observe when physical inspection is conducted. ¶7. For day-to-day work, CSI officers are to communicate with the relevant designated departments of Turkish Customs. All CSI officers' requests for non intrusive inspection are to be specified in a written format and relayed to the appropriate Turkish Customs office in a timely manner, at least 24 hours before shipping, stating why the inspection is requested. ¶8. CSI officers' all non intrusive inspection requests made via the appropriate written format are to be responded to by Turkish Customs within a reasonable time frame. ¶9. Turkish Customs Administration and CSI officers are to consult on all targeting results of high-risk containers selected for non intrusive inspection. Turkish Customs officers reserve the right to determine whether and how an inspection is to occur. ¶10. CSI officers shall provide information to the Turkish Customs, concerning the monitoring reports to be submitted to the US CBP. ¶11. If CBP officers need to enter Turkish Customs controlled areas/premises, they may do so only with permission from Turkish Customs and shall be accompanied by a CSI contact point. The CSI officers are prohibited from taking photographs or films within Turkish Customs controlled areas and shall not take out any document. ¶12. CSI is to operate within the normal office hours of the Turkish Customs. ¶13. Turkish Customs is to identify personnel as points of contact for CBP officers during weekends and holidays, and overtimes other than normal office hours. ¶14. Language of communication and correspondence between the CSI officers and the CSI contact points will be Turkish. ¶15. In case of seizure of commodities within the CSI project, the CSI officers will not be provided with samples of the captured commodities. SECTION TWO: INSPECTION ¶1. After CSI officers select a container(s) for non intrusive inspection through risk analysis, they are to submit a completed written referral to the CSI contact points in a timely manner. ¶2. When making requests for non-intrusive inspection (NII),CBP is to provide all necessary identifiers of the targeted shipment to the appropriate Turkish Customs Office, stating why the inspection is requested. ¶3. If an inspection is to be conducted, Turkish Customs officers are to complete a written response, stating the time and place of the inspection. ¶4. If an inspection is not to be conducted, Turkish Customs officers are to complete a written response, stating why the request for inspection is not accepted. ¶5. Once a container is selected for inspection, Turkish Customs should try to arrange for a non-intrusive inspection (NII). If the NII is inconclusive or an anomaly is detected, or a radiological isotope is identified, Turkish Customs may arrange for a physical inspection. Turkish Customs officers are to perform all inspections. Capacity and workload of Turkish Customs and infrastructure of the designated Turkish seaport will be taken into consideration by the CSI officers when requesting non-intrusive inspection. ¶6. CSI officers will be allowed solely to observe all inspections of containers based on high-risk referrals originating from the CSI team. ¶7. All containers that have had a CSI examination are to have the CSI security bolt seal and tamper-evident tape applied by Turkish Customs officers to distinguish the CSI examined goods from other goods. ¶8. Containers examined at designated seaports of Turkey will not be re-examined once they arrive in United States unless a specific justification that indicates a risk for containers has occurred after the CSI examination. In case of re-examination of containers which were examined in Turkey, the US CBP will notify the Turkish customs about the reasons for such examination. ¶9. CSI officers request for CSI examination of cargo already laden on a departing vessel, will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. ¶10. During the pilot phase of CSI program, a total of 5 CSI officers will be assigned to the CSI port located at Izmir. The number of CSI officers may vary depending on the volume of trade, subject to mutual agreement of the Parties. ¶11. Establishment and operation of any communication and data exchange equipment require prior approval of Turkish Authorities. Thus, installation of communication and networking equipment on port premises will be coordinated with the appropriate Turkish Authorities. ¶12. The Turkish Government shall not bear any functional or personal costs of the CSI officers. SECTION THREE: GENERAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS CBP Officers operating in the Republic of Turkey as part of the CSI may: ¶1. Request information related to and subsequent of the examination of only maritime shipments destined to the United States. ¶2. Request Turkish Customs to perform inspections of selected containers; ¶3. Observe the non intrusive and physical inspections when accompanied by Turkish Customs Officers. ¶4. Request physical inspection by Turkish Customs if NII screening is inconclusive or an anomaly is detected, or a radiological isotope is identified. CBP Officers operating in the Republic of Turkey as part of the CSI are not to: ¶1. Carry or possess any weapons or firearms; ¶2. Wear CBP uniforms at any time; or ¶3. Engage in activities not in conformity with Turkish laws and regulations. ¶4. Perform any task outside the scope of this Implementation Plan without mutual consent from the CSI partners. ¶5. Delay or hinder any shipment that does not pose any risk for terrorism. End text of BIP. Wilson