US-TURKEY SECURITY RELATIONS: INCREASINGLY

S E C R E T ANKARA 004526 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2031 TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV TU SUBJECT: US-TURKEY SECURITY RELATIONS: INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT BUT STILL WORTH THE EFFORT Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c) ¶1. (S/NF) After the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote vetoing a northern front for the Iraq War and the July 4, 2003 arrest (including hooding) of Turkish special forces personnel in Suleymania (an event widely seen in Turkey as a national insult),our security relations were at their lowest point since the post-Cyprus invasion embargo in the 1970s, or argubly even worse than that. Both sides recognized that this situation served neither country's interests and set out to reestablish productive relations. US and Turkish military leaders exchanged visits, with EUCOM, USAFE, NAVEUR, USAREUR, the JCS Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Army in particular reaching out to their Turkish counterparts and others with invitations and exchanges. Visits by other senior officers, such as the recent visit by CDR TRANSCOM Gen Schwartz have also been helpful. NATO conclaves and the annual American-Turkish Council conferences have provided additional opportunities for bilateral senior dialogue. Most Turkish generals now tell us that they believe the military-to-military relationship has been repaired and the most significant problem we face lies with the low opinion the Turkish public views the United States. But while public opinion is undeniably a problem, our military-to-military and broader bilateral security relations still need work. -------------- Public Opinion Matters -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) While many old Turkey hands may wax eloquently of the days when Turkey was "always" at our side (Korea, Somalia, Bosnia, etc.),the fact is that, with the possible exception of the late 1950s, those days never existed. The US-imposed arms embargo over Cyprus, Turkey-imposed restrictions on northern no-fly zone enforcement out of Incirlik Air Base, and similar examples reflect how policy differences have long impacted on the security relationship and the level of our military cooperation. Turkish officials still chafe at President Kennedy's decision to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey -- without consulting the GOT -- in order to defuse the Cuba Missile Crisis, and at President Johnson's 1964 letter warning against a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Due to late Ottoman history drummed into students early during primary school, Turks have long been suspicious of foreign interest in Turkey and jealously guard Turkey's sovereign prerogatives. Still, even in the worst of times, in order to effect cooperation, winning the agreement of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was usually sufficient. ¶3. (S/NF) Prior to the EU-mandated reforms, the generals had the power and the will to impose their decisions on elected governments. While the military retains considerable influence, its ability to consistently have its way has diminished. For example, despite military objections to significant elements of the Annan Plan for a Cyprus settlement, Turkey supported it. Similarly, with PM Erdogan the most popular politician in Turkey and EU membership still broadly popular, TGS Chief GEN Ozkok has been supportive of some democratic reforms and reluctant to oppose the government on others, except when they approach the military's red lines on preserving the secular nature of Turkey's government structure and the honor of the military. On military and security initiatives, the first question we now hear from TGS is "have you asked MFA?" For us, this means gaining Ankara's approval on proposals and initiatives, including military operations at Incirlik Air Base, has become more political with greater civilian voice in decision-making. And for elected politicians public opinion must factor into their decisions, even if they decide to go against it. ¶4. (S/NF) The Turkish public (and many within the military) blame the disorder in Iraq and the rise of PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party, aka KGK) terrorist violence in Turkey on the United States. The centralized and compartmented nature of the TGS and the GOT in general means our increased efforts to combat the PKK in Europe and Turkey are not well known even within official circles in Ankara. For example, MFA DG Guven (S/CT-equivalent) urged us to keep Turkey's European Embassies informed of our efforts in Europe because reporting cables were more likely to reach FM Gul than Guven's memos. But without a highly visible arrest, rendition, attack or other measures against the PKK that the man-in-the-street (and the soldier in the barracks) can appreciate, our popularity is likely to remain low and cooperation with us will have political costs at home for politicians and within the ranks for military leaders. -------------- Making the Effort -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) As the relationship has become more diffiult, the importance of maintaining contacts has increased. The Security relationship benefits from some long-established structures for dialogue -- the High Level Defense Group and its working groups, Joint Staff Talks and the Defense Industry Cooperation meetings. For these mechanisms to work, however, senior officials must invest time in them. Exchanges at the 0-6 level and below are fine for passing information, but in the Turkish system, no ONE below a general will venture a comment that is not authorized by superiors in advance. For dialogue to be effective in harmonizing our approaches to regional issues or winning a better understanding of each side's requirements, engagement must occur at senior levels, and our structured meetings must occur at regular intervals. Our record on this score has improved over the last 18 months, but it is far from perfect. ¶6. (S/NF) It is easy for formal meetings with Turkish officials, especially with senior officers who are not fully comfortable in English, to degenerate into simple recitation of talking points. To effect real dialogue, we need to push the Turks to expand agendas beyond simple lists of requests so that they encompass issues of importance to both our countries. Once we have done that, we need to come to the meetings prepared to listen as well as to talk, and to ask questions to stimulate discussion. ¶7. (S/NF) But regularizing frequent senior exchanges is only part of the answer to improving our security relationship. America's low standing in public opinion is mirrored in the ranks of the military. While the Turkish military is an extremely disciplined organization, commands have submitted to pressure from below in the past. A recent example was the ending of Turkey's practice of filing NATO flight information for its air activities over the Aegean -- both TGS and MFA sources told us separately that this act was the result of pressure on TUAF and TGS commanders from the officer corps. ¶8. (S/NF) Our tools to address attitudes below senior levels within the military have diminished in recent years. IMET is the most effective way we have to counter anti-Americanism among mid-level officers, but funding for Turkey in that program has dropped by almost 50% in the past two years. Joint training that used to be a regular feature of our relationship have dropped off significantly since 2003 -- USAFE continues to participate in Turkey's Anatolian Eagle exercises, but special forces JCETs have not occurred in years and the ONE that was scheduled for early 2006 was canceled for lack of funding. Ship visits also fell off after 2003, picked up again over the last year, but US Navy security policy means liberty is not always permitted for visiting ships. With less liberty granted, we anticipate the number of ship visits to drop again as commanders look elsewhere for better opportunities. GOT defense procurement policies that are preventing American firms to compete risk diminishing the quantity and quality of exchanges that go with operating the same equipment. FMF funding cuts reduce one incentive to continue to buy American. We recognize that our forces are busy conducting operations and have less time for training and engagement activities, and we understand that budgets are tight. Yet with fewer opportunities to train or exercise with American service members or to travel to the United States, increasing numbers of young Turkish officers are going longer in their careers without professional exposure to American counterparts, and their negative attitudes go longer before being addressed. -------------- Why Bother -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Why should we care? An insular officer corps, trained to believe that its role in society is to protect the secular and Kemalist Republic from foreign and domesti threats, could make decisions that appear illogical in the real world. This danger will grow in the coming months as the Islamist-leaning AK Party considers who to elect as the next Turkish President. EU pressure for more reforms that further reduce the military's influence may add to the pressure many officers perceive as assailing their concept of the Turkish Republic. ¶10. (S/NF) Another reason the US-Turkey security relationship matters is what we get out of it. While Turkey denied us a northern option in the Iraq War, -- Turkey offered 10,000 troops to OIF in October 2003 which we turned down because of Iraqi opposition; -- we currently fly more cargo to Iraq from Incirlik AB than any other air field in the world, carrying with six C-17s what used to take 9-10 from Germany; -- 25% of MNF-I's sustainment fuel and two-thirds of fuel for the Iraqi people passes over the Turkish border to Iraq; -- Ankara was active in Sunni outreach before last year's referendum and election in Iraq; -- Turkey is developing a healthy trade relationship with Iraq ($2.87 billion in 2005); -- blanket aircraft clearances permit easy overflight; and more. In Afghanistan, Turkey is establishing a PRT in Wardak and will share command of the ISAF central region with France and Italy. In Kosovo and Bosnia, Turkey maintains a battalion in each under NATO and EU command, respectively. Turkey is contributing a C-130 to the NATO mission in Dafur, an aircraft and more than a dozen personnel to the EU mission in the Congo, several ships to NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, etc. While Turkey may be difficult, it has the capacity and the will to contribute to missions that serve our interests. ¶11. (S/NF) Its size, location and traditions ensure Turkey will continue to play a role in the various regions it borders -- the Middle East, Caucasus/Central Asia, Balkans, Black Sea and eastern Med. Ensuring that role furthers US goals requires investment in time and resources. But the return in the form of meaningful contributions to resolve regional problems can be worth much more. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON