DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES IRAQ AND PKK WITH TURKISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004290 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2021 TAGS: PREL PTER ENRG ETRD TU IZ SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES IRAQ AND PKK WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS REF: ANKARA 4085 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior MFA officials emphasized to visiting EUR DAS Bryza that Turkey was pleased with US-Turkey cooperation in Iraq and noted Turkey's interest in cooperating with Iraq to develop Iraq's energy resources. However, they also stressed that it was time for the Iraqi Government to take action against the PKK in Northern Iraq and pushed for the next trilateral meeting between the US, Turkey, Iraq to produce tangible steps against the PKK in Iraq. They also expressed their appreciation for US efforts against PKK operations in Europe. END SUMMARY -------------- Iraqi Neighbors Meeting a Success -------------- ¶2. (C) EUR DAS Bryza discussed Iraq and the PKK with Special Envoy for Iraq Ambassador Oguz Celikkol on July 10 and MFA Director General for Security Affairs Hayati Guven on July ¶11. Celikkol recounted the high points of the recent Iraqi Neighbors meeting in Tehran, noting that it was positive, with no surprises. The Iranians tried to insert a paragraph into the joint communique about the current Palestinian situation and the "Zionist" Israeli regime, but both Turkey and Jordan rejected the attempt. The Turkish delegation pressed for a paragraph urging new embassies be opened in Baghdad and that neighboring countries send hig-level visitors to Iraq. Celikkol told us that the Saudis pushed back on this initiative, citing security concerns. The Turkish delegation also suggested that the ministers meet again informally at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Celikkol said that Iraqi FonMin Zebari was pleased with the communique, which noted the neighbors' support for the new Iraqi government and cooperation against terrorism. Some delegations had pushed for the next Neighbors meeting to be held in Baghdad, but the security situation was deemed too risky. The next formal meeting is scheduled to be held in Cairo. -------------- -------------- Additional Border Gates and Consensus Solution on Kirkuk -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Celikkol told Bryza that Zebari's visit to Ankara (reftel) was positive, with Zebari characterizing it as the most successful trip he had ever had to Ankara. Celikkol was pleased that the GOI had agreed to open two new gates along the Turkey-Iraq border, noting that he assumed this agreement had been blessed by both President Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani. The second gate, to be built near the Habur Gate, is scheduled to open within one year and the third gate, at Ovakoy, will open within the next three years. Celikkol also noted that the FonMins had agreed to a direct rail link between Northern Iraq and Turkey. ¶4. (C) Zebari reportedly told the Turks that the Iraqi Kurds understood the need for a consensus solution to the Kirkuk issue. Celikkol told us that Zebari supported reaching out to the Turkmen and Arabs to try reach consensus solution on Kirkuk that would be acceptable to all sides; this solution would then be the issue for the referendum. Celikkol noted that although Talabani had previously suggested this solution, this was the first time Celikkol had heard approval of this solution from the KDP (Zebari is a high-ranking KDP official). The GOT believes that if consensus on the referendum cannot be reached then the referendum should be ANKARA 00004290 002 OF 004 delayed for a couple of years. -------------- Iraq's Energy Resources -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked about oil and gas pipeline issues Celikkol stated that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Salih had told him that the Iraqis were working to make the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline workable and secure. Meanwhile, Turkish firms are interested in exploring for natural gas in Northern Iraq. Celikkol said he believed Turkish-Iraqi cooperation on energy resources could be limitless, but that the security situation has to improve before this can happen. ¶6. (C) Bryza then asked Celikkol about Turkey's apparently contradictory actions on the Iraqi natural resources issue. Bryza noted that although Turkey continues to insist that Iraq's energy resources should be controlled by the Iraqi central government, the GOT is allowing Turkish firms to sign production sharing agreements with the KRG. Celikkol reiterated that the Turkish position is that Baghdad should have control over Iraqi natural resources and that only Baghdad should have the right to sign production sharing agreements. However, he explained, the GOT does not want to interfere in private business and has, therefore, allowed Turkish companies to sign contracts with the KRG. He told us that the GOT advises private Turkish firms to wait to sign agreements until after the natural resources issue is settled in Baghdad, and warns them that the GOT will not assist them if Baghdad refuses to honor separate agreements made with provincial governments. ¶7. (C) DCM noted that this position appears to undermine Turkey's demand that Baghdad retain control over Iraq's resources. Celikkol repeated his previous statements and noted that Turkish firms are eager to sign agreements with the KRG now because they want to get the best possible deals. Bryza suggested that Turkey might be able to stimulate progress on this issue by inviting representatives from Baghdad, the KRG, and Turkey to talk about development of energy resources in northern Iraq. Celikkol answered that Turkey would be happy to arrange such a meeting, but that it did not want to be accused of interfering in a sovereign state's business. -------------- UN Meeting in Istanbul -------------- ¶8. (C) Celikkol noted that Turkey is sponsoring a United Nations meeting on State Administration on July 25-27 in Istanbul. Both Iraqi Vice Presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi and Adil Abd al-Mahdi, might attend and FonMin Gul will host the meeting. He conjectured that the Iraqi VPs' attendance would send a positive message about Sunni and Shia unity in Iraq and he urged us to encourage the Iraqis to attend. -------------- Habur Gate Backup -------------- ¶9. (C) DCM reiterated the dire nature of the continuing backup at the Habur Gate crossing and the effect that it was having on coalition troops. She noted that we were told that Turkey could guarantee that 80 fuel trucks a day be let through, but that we needed at least 100 trucks a day. So far nothing was going through, despite the fact that the Embassy had sent the requested prioritized list of trucks to the MFA and Customs officials. Celikkol reiterated the GOT's ANKARA 00004290 003 OF 004 readiness to solve the problem. -------------- Makhmour Camp -------------- ¶10. (C) MFA Director General for Security Affairs Guven told Bryza that UNHCR has written President Talabani requesting the Iraqi Government help in "securing Makhmour camp." Guven interprets the request to mean active engagement by Iraqi Security Forces to remove/eliminate the approximately 250 PKK militants there. There has been no reply yet from the Iraqis, although Guven asserted that UNHCR has a commitment from Iraq to kick the PKK militants out of the camp. For details, Guven referred us to the UNHCR operations plan. He said the big "question mark" is about how effectively the Iraqis will provide security. Turkey has not been satisfied yet with Iraqi cooperation on PKK-related matters. ¶11. (C) Bryza assured Guven the issue has been discussed in high-level USG meetings. Our goal is to enable and convince the Iraqis to provide security, which could entail U.S. forces filling in gaps in other areas currently handled by Iraqis. Guven explained that Turkey,s overriding priority on Makhmour is that it be definitively closed and not be usable subsequentl by the PKK militants. As to what becomes of the militants, he added, Turkey would prefer to have them extradited back to Turkey but this is less important than shuttering the camp. -------------- Trilaterals -------------- ¶12. (C) Guven reiterated that Turkey,s priority for the US-Turkish-Iraqi trilaterals is that they produce tangible results. Turkey wants to avoid yet another trilateral meeting with no meaningful action taken against the PKK in Iraq. For this reason, the GOT would rather take the time to prepare a meaningful meeting than rush ahead. He also pointed out that it would be better to await the expected personnel changes at the Turkish General Staff this August. Guven said MFA is working with the Turkish General Staff and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization to come up with a list of suggested actions. He expects to have the list of actions in about ten days and will share it with us, realizing that the US will have ideas as well. ¶13. (C) Bryza asked about the status of actions discussed at the last trilateral meeting. Guven said the Iraqis had now agreed that the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty is still valid and that no new extradition agreement is needed. Turkey is still open to US, Turkish and Iraqi legal experts holding further discussions. Turkey tried to get the Interior Ministers of Iraq's neighbors to agree on "strong language" on PKK at their last meeting, but other countries could not accept the Turkish-proposed language. Guven said the Saudis have now proposed milder language, but this is not enough for Turkey. -------------- Dealing with the Iraqi Government -------------- ¶14. (C) Although he did not participate in the Zebari meetings with the GOT, Guven was concerned that Zebari implied that the PKK in the Kandil mountains was beyond Baghdad's control. Guven said Turkey has waited for elections and the establishment of the new government; so it is time to act. Bryza agreed and pointed to Secretary Rice's ANKARA 00004290 004 OF 004 pledge to redouble US efforts to work with Iraqis against PKK. Bryza informed Guven that Ambassador Khalilzad has been talking with Barzani about the issue. Bryza explained that the US and Turkey share the important goal of a unified Iraq but that when the central Government professes an inability to take action in the north, the USG is willing to take up the PKK issue with the northern regional authorities in order to get results. Bryza linked these efforts to the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue and said Turkey and the US need to be pursue these issues with the Iraqis more frequently and in a more structured way in order to get results. -------------- PKK in Europe -------------- ¶15. (C) Guven expressed his appreciation for US efforts against PKK networks in Europe, going over the list of countries in which the US has engaged. He thought it might be useful to add the Netherlands in the future. Bryza reiterated that the US knows that actions in Europe are not a substitute for action against PKK in Iraq. DCM suggested it might be useful to get Guven together with the British, French, and German DCM,s in Ankara and strategize how to make further progress; Guven agreed. He also reacted positively to the idea of trilateral working groups in key western European capitals that would bring together law enforcement, intelligence and foreign ministry officials from the US, Turkey and the host country to share information and target collections and ultimate law enforcement actions. ¶16. (C) Guven explained that a crucial reason the Europeans do not take more action against the PKK is that the EU Clearinghouse designation only applies to te financing of terrorism--it does not make it a crime to be a member of the PKK. According to Guven, only in Germany is PKK membership a crime. Bryza responded that this is why it is useful to try to go after PKK operatives for whatever crime they can be charged for, even though in an ideal world it would be preferable to be able to charge them for terrorism. DCM pointed out how disruptive it would be to arrest a key PKK operative such as Riza Altun (NOTE: Guven noticed that apparently Altun has been replaced. END NOTE). Guven reiterated how helpful all the US messages have been and said they make a difference in increasing European political determination, adding that the US efforts in Europe also sent a message to the PKK that their activities are not acceptable. ¶17. (C) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON