TURKEY/IRAQ/BLACK SEA/AEGEAN: D/NSA CROUCH'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003905 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2026 TAGS: PREL ENRG IZ TU SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAQ/BLACK SEA/AEGEAN: D/NSA CROUCH'S ANKARA CONSULTATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On his way to the Black Sea Forum in Bucharest, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor Dr. J.D. Crouch discussed Iran, Iraq, Black Sea, energy and Greek-Turkish relations with Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, MFA Undersecretary Ali Tuygan, and National Security Council SecGen Yigit Alpogan on June 4. Iran discussions are reported septel. Turkish officials tod Crouch they are ready to engage the new Iraqi government but remain disappointed about poor Sunni and Turkmen representation in the government and about Kurdish actions in Kirkuk. Turkey shares U.S. objectives for soft security in the Black Sea region, stressing the need to keep Russia engaged and work within existing structures. Turkey is also ready to collaborate with the U.S. on energy projects and seeks to be a hub for Caspian and Central Asian energy. Crouch urged Turkey to use recent Greece-Turkey tensions in the Aegean, and muted public reaction on both sides, as an opportunity for confidence building. End Summary. -------------- Iraq -- Concerns over Turkmen, Kirkuk and PKK -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA D/US Tuygan told Crouch that Iraqis should decide on their own about the government of their country, but their decision should not lead to Iraq's dismemberment. He worried that Iraqi groups are focusing on separate interests and carving out their territories -- a recipe for continued conflict. He emphasized the need for a positive agenda for a prosperous future and cooperation between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in the north. Tuygan also stressed Turkish concern that the Turkmen minority be fairly represented. He confirmed that Turkey has invited PM al-Maliki and President Talabani to visit Ankara. ¶3. (C) Alpogan told Crouch that Turkey is more optimistic after the Iraqi government formation, stressing that stability is the near-term priority. In the longer-term, however, constitutional issues need to be resolved. Alpogan stressed that the international community must not allow a "fait accompli" in Kirkuk; where Kirkuk goes, so does Iraq. All Iraqis and not just those in Kirkuk must participate in the referendum on Kirkuk. Alpogan and Crouch agreed that if it suits the Iraqis, some delay in consideration of constitutional issues and the Kirkuk referendum might be useful to provide time for the government to make the progress on security and essential services necessary to solidify its legitimacy. ¶4. (C) Alpogan asked the U.S. to do more against the PKK. Crouch noted U.S. efforts against PKK financing in Europe and our increased intelligence sharing. Crouch assured Alpogan the U.S. considers the PKK a high priority in its engagement with the Iraqi government and asked Alpogan to look for ways to better inform the Turkish public about our mutual efforts. Crouch and Alpogan agreed that trilateral security talks with Iraq should be restarted as soon as possible. Crouch encouraged Alpogan to look ahead to Turkey's long term defene relationship with Iraq. ¶5. (C) PM advisor avutoglu stressed that a divided Iraq would mean the end of the balance of power in this region. A storm is approaching, he warned; every day, dozens die and the ethnic/sectarian divide is growing. Mosul is divided between Kurds and Arabs, Kirkuk is Iraq in miniature, the Sunnis are fleeing Basra, and in Baghdad the front lines are being drawn from neighborhood to neighborhood. Should Iraq fragment, the Iranians would have a corridor down to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. ¶6. (C) Davutoglu reported that PM Erdogan was upset when he saw the list of the new Iraqi government. It contains some Sunni leaders, but not in any critical ministries; only the deputy president and a few unimportant posts. The Turks have worked hard for Sunni political engagement, but not to this ANKARA 00003905 002 OF 003 end. This government, he stressed, reflects too much compromise to the pro-Iranian Shi,ites. The Turks will continue to work with them, but are not altogether happy with the result of these long months of negotiations. -------------- Black Sea, Central Asia, and Energy -------------- ¶7. (C) Crouch noted that he was on his way to the Black Sea Forum in Bucharest and he outlined an agenda regarding enhanced economic cooperation, regional stability, and soft security. Tuygan told Crouch that Turkey,s views are close to those of the U.S. in terms of Black Sea security, not only in relation to the increased energy transit from Central Asia and the Caucasus, but also in terms of human and narcotics trafficking and smuggling. Tuygan said the GOT believes the focus should be on using existing mechanisms, reinforcing security, and increased economic cooperation. Any successful cooperation must include Russia, Tuygan stressed, describing Turkey's experience with BLACKSEAFOR. ¶8. (C) Tuygan asked Crouch about Europe,s views on energy security. Crouch said that, though east and west are divided somewhat, the UK and Germany now see the necessity for diversification. Tuygan expressed appreciation for the U.S. presence at the June 5-6 Black Sea Forum as a sign of increasing communication among the participants. ¶9. (C) Tuygan highlighted the importance of getting the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline back into operation. He mentioned the recent attack on a Saudi Arabian facility to underscore energy vulnerabilities. Tuygan welcomed Crouch,s assurance that the U.S. is working hard for the security of the pipeline, agreed that Turkey can provide more security for the oil fields as well as the pipeline, and welcomed any ideas the U.S. might offer. ¶10. (C) Asked about Central Asia and energy, Alpogan said the most promising situation is in Kazakhstan, which is stable and can handle Russia. Kyrgyzstan is not stable yet; it needs to break with the past. Uzbekistan is a "hopeless case," drifting back to the Russian embrace. Turkmenistan could go either way, Alpogan opined. Turkey believes a good possibility exists for cooperation on energy routes; in that context, Turkey is interested in "mega" projects between the U.S. and Turkey. Alternative routes, not only Russian, must be sought and activated. Turkey wants to be an energy transit country and sees the trans-Caspian pipeline as vitally important. ¶11. (C) Alpogan and Davutoglu both highlighted the fact that some 55,000 Turkish trucks transit to Central Asia via Iran every year. How the international community deals with Iran could impact Central Asia. -------------- Aegean Tensions -------------- ¶12. (C) Noting recent incidents in the Aegean, Crouch asked about tension between Greece and Turkey. Alpogan said that Greece has expected concessions from Turkey for its support of Turkey's EU Accession. Meanwhile, Turkey's EU bid is losing support in Turkey, popular doubts are increasing, and Europe makes no positive statements. Alpogan stated that solutions to bilateral problems, such as the Patriarchate and Halki Seminary, will come with time. On the recent plane collision in the Aegean, Alpogan said he was encouraged by the Greek press reaction, noting that some prominent Greek analysts are now criticizing Athens for wasting lives and money on harassment of Turkey. He stated that Greek FM Bakoyannis will visit Istanbul June 10, where Greek and Turkish officials will announce a military hotline and discuss other confidence building measures. Crouch encouraged Alpogan to consider current Turkey-Greece tension as offering an opportunity to resolve issues and build confidence. ¶13. (U) D/NSA Crouch cleared this cable. ANKARA 00003905 003 OF 003 Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON