TURKEY'S MILITARY AND AKP GOVERNMENT: FURTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003772 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2026 TAGS: PGOV MARR TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S MILITARY AND AKP GOVERNMENT: FURTHER CRACKS IN THE VENEER REF: A. ANKARA 2924 ¶B. ANKARA 2901 ¶C. ANKARA 2828 ¶D. ANKARA 1254 ¶E. ANKARA 1153 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The March indictment of Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC) Commander GEN Buyukanit on charges of interfering in the trial of a Jandarma officer accused in the Semdinli book store bomb attack (ref d) furthered a public decline in the already-cool relationship between Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief of the General Staff (CHOD) GEN Ozkok and the ruling pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. The subsequent shooting of five judges at the Council of State (ref c),followed by Ozkok's public praise of the protests it triggered and a surprise police round-up of several military officials in connection with an alleged plot to kill politicians, have increased civil-military tensions. Maintaining public decorum, Erdogan and Ozkok held a private June 7 meeting to discuss "security issues." However, PM Erdogan's presumed presidential aspirations, combined with the anticipated August appointment of the staunchly secular and outspoken Buyukanit as CHOD, threaten to deepen the cracks in the veneer of the relationship. END SUMMARY. HIGH-PROFILE INCIDENTS DEEPEN THE FISSURES -------------- ¶2. (C) The March 5 indictment of Buyukanit in connection with the Semdinli bombing, widely presumed to have some level of government knowledge or involvement, has only strengthened Buyukanit's chances of becoming CHOD on Aug. 30. Following GEN Ozkok's intervention with PM Erdogan, the charges were dropped and the prosecutor who issued them was removed from his job and disbarred. The TLFC Commander is the traditional next-in-line to the CHOD. Under Turkish law, his appointment is made by a decision of the Council of Ministers with the approval of the President. Ozkok is slated to retire this year, setting the stage for Buyukanit's ascension. Given the public assumption of AKP complicity in his indictment, we are told that a Council of Minister's decision opposing Buyukanit as successor would serve only to confirm suspicions of AKP's guilt. We expect the Council of Ministers to rubber stamp the decree. ¶3. (C) The subsequent wounding of four judges and the death of another on May 17 at the Council of State, the court which had recently issued an opinion banning teachers from wearing head scarves even en route to work, brought the secular community in Ankara -- with the military leadership front and center -- out in force for large protests unseen during the past decade (ref b). Ozkok's May 19 comments calling the attack a terrorist act and urging Turks in greater numbers to protest in defense of secularism on a regular basis were widely reported in the press. Erdogan retorted that Ozkok's comments were "irresponsible" and scolded the General for not only welcoming the protests but encouraging more. TRUTH IS STRANGER THAN FICTION -------------- ¶4. (C) Erdogan publicly blamed the court attack on a "deep conspiracy." FM Gul said the aim of the attack was to damage the relationship between the government and military. He alluded to the November 1996 Susurluk incident which exposed a relationship between two public figures -- the Istanbul Deputy Police Commissioner and a parliamentarian from the southeast -- and a notorious Mafia figure and his girlfriend, when the car they were riding in was in a serious accident. Among those called in for questioning in relation to the Council of State shooting -- initially presumed to be carried out by a fundamentalist extremist but later characterized as a nationalist - was a retired ARMY major. A surprise May 31 raid resulted in the arrest of several additional military officers and a retired mayor on information gained during the shooting investigation about a supposedly unrelated plot against the Prime Minister. ¶5. (C) According to press accounts, the officers rounded up were part of the so-called "Atabeyler Guerrilla Group," which was gathering information about Erdogan, one of his advisors and several parliamentarians from the southeast. Several weapons, including a Glock were found. (Note: A Glock was used in the Council of State shooting. See ref a.) Ozkok publicly complained that he had to learn about the operation from media. As he did after the Semdinli incident, he held a private meeting with the PM on June 7 to discuss "security issues." Details of the meeting have not been made public but the media widely reported that the two discussed the arrests in the Atabeyler case. MEANING BEHIND THE WORDS -------------- ¶6. (C) Some view Ozkok's latest public statements as another shot across the AKP's bow. Generally not directly critical of the government in public, Ozkok has, however, listed "separatist, reactionary and fundamentalist activities" as the top threats to Turkey and has used the press to remind the GOT and the public of the role of the military when government actions have approached that red line. Views of the military's support for the government and its policies vary. Some interlocutors suggest that the military leadership sincerely supports the AKP government's EU accession process because a Turkey in the EU is consistent with Ataturk's view of a Turkey firmly rooted in the West. According to that view, the military does not like to meddle in politics and speaks or acts only to correct the government's course when it veers too far from the Western path. ¶7. (C) Those closer to the military are less optimistic. They suggest that TGS has accepted the government reforms that have lessened its authorities because it does not want to be seen as the force that derails the country's EU process, and therefore lose some of its significant popularity. Those in this camp say that the military supports continued western-style reforms as consistent with a democratic, secular Turkey rooted in the West, but does not necessarily believe that Turkey will join the EU. ¶8. (C) A third group, a bit darker in thinking than the second, says the military gave Erdogan and the EU process a chance but has become convinced that the EU does not want Turkey to achieve membership. For that reason, they say, the EU will continue to throw up roadblocks that Turkey will be either unwilling or unable to surmount. Among others, these include Cyprus-related issues and TGS subordination to the Minister of Defense. This group questions how hard Turkey should work to meet EU requirements if the goal of EU membership remains elusive. THE NEAR FUTURE OF RELATIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) The civil-military balance in Turkey has been compared to a three-legged stool, with the parliament, the presidency and the military as the legs. The Presidency has traditionally been a bastion of secularism. Together with the military, it has provided a counter-balance to parliament, historically been made up of an uncomfortable coalition of constantly changing and unpredictable partners. A new president will be elected by Parliament in May 2007. If the AKP maintains its parliamentary majority, it could, in theory, elect one of its own as President. Despite his public silence, there is strong press speculation that PM Erdogan has his eye on this job. ¶10. (C) Many in the secular establishment are opposed to an "Islamist" President. They pin their hopes on TLFC Commander GEN Buyukanit to prevent such a development when he takes the helm of TGS on Aug. 30. However, any military maneuvering, they assert, would take place behind the scenes. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON