C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003339

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD ENRG KPAL XF IZ IR IS AM
NATO, RU, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/RUSSIA: LAVROV VISIT LESS THAN SATISFYING


Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b,
d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Foreign Ministry DDG Murat Burhan and Russian embassy
PolCouns Vyacheslav Kunekov provided us read-outs of Foreign
Minister Lavrov's May 31-June 1 visit to Ankara and Istanbul.
While the Russians and Turks were in general agreement on
regional issues, the Turkish side was disappointed with lack
of Russian support on Cyprus, Turkey's 2009-2010 UNSC
candidacy, the PKK, and the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. End
Summary

Wide-ranging agenda
--------------


2. (C) Russian FM Lavrov met with PM Erdogan, FM Gul,
Parliament Speaker Arinc, and President Sezer during his May
29-30 visit to Ankara and Istanbul. Burhan said that
Lavrov's restricted format meeting with Gul lasted much
longer than expected, covered most outstanding issues, and
left little for the full delegations to talk about. Lavrov
left Ankara for Istanbul May 31, where he met with the
Secretary General of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

SIPDIS
(BSEC). Burhan said Lavrov discussed the range of regional
issues with his Turkish hosts, including Iran, Iraq, the
Caucasus, Middle East, and Cyprus. Lavrov and Gul also
discussed Turkey's EU accession as well as NATO enlargement.
Neither side raised the Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh, or
Chechnya. Turkey also brought up PKK terrorism with the
Russians.

Iran -- No Automatic Sanctions
--------------


3. (C) Burhan said that Secretary Rice's call to FM Gul to
preview the May 31 U.S. initiative on Iran occurred during
the Gul-Lavrov meeting. Lavrov reportedly told the Turks
that the Secretary had briefed him earlier on the U.S. move

and noted that he was on his way to Vienna to discuss the
EU-3 package. Without addressing the U.S. proposal directly,
Lavrov told the Turks that Iran must be offered a face-saving
formula and that, even if Iran does not accept such a
formula, sanctions should not be automatic; the UN Security
Council should make the decision. The use of force must be
avoided in any case, the Russians insisted.

Iraq - Lavrov Calls for International Conference
-------------- ---


4. (C) Lavrov told the Turks that Russia saw Iraq elections
and installation of the new government as positive. The
Russians had believed that some sort of national consensus
before the government formation would have been preferable,
but realized this could not be achieved. Lavrov repeated an
earlier Russian proposal for an international conference on
Iraq that would include the P-5, Iraq's neighbors and Iraq.

Middle East
--------------


5. (C) According the Burhan, Lavrov said that Russia supports
Palestinian President Abbas's dual aims of engaging Israel in
direct talks and simultaneously forging a consensus among
Palestinian factions. Russia is pleased that Abbas has
endorsed the Palestinian National Accord. Like Turkey,
Russia has encouraged Hamas to enter a dialogue with
Abbas. Lavrov informed the Turks that Russia has provided
USD 10 million in urgent humanitarian aid to the Palestinian
people.

Syria-Lebanon - A Bilateral Issue
--------------


6. (C) Lavrov and Gul agreed that Syria must comply with all
relevant UN Security Council resolutions and cooperate with
the Hariri investigation. Russia is in favor of Syria
normalizing its relations with Lebanon, opening an Embassy in
Beirut and demarcating the border. Lavrov noted, however,
that Syria-Lebanon relations are a bilateral matter that
should not be subject to UNSC decisions.

Armenia -- Russia Can Help

ANKARA 00003339 002 OF 003


--------------


7. (C) Burhan and Kunekov said that Turkey asked for Russian
support with Armenia, noting Turkey's proposal of a Joint
Historical Commission. Both reported that Lavrov agreed with
the Turkish position that history should be left to
historians and that he undertook to encourage Armenia to be
more flexible.

Strengthening Black Sea Institutions
--------------


8. (C) Gul explained Turkish views on Black Sea security,
focusing on making existing instruments and mechanisms, such
as BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, and Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH),
more efficient. Lavrov attributed to bureaucratic obstacles
Russia's delay in responding to Turkey's invitation to
participate in OBSH, but suggested Russia could announce its
intent to join before President Sezer's visit to Moscow in
late June. Turkish and Russian officials also discussed
coordinating efforts to revitalize BSEC during the respective
Russian (May-Oct 2006) and Turkish (May-Oct 2007) BSEC
presidencies.

No Satisfaction on Cyprus
--------------


9. (C) Turkish officials asked Lavrov for Russian political
support on Cyprus and concrete measures to ease Turkish
Cypriot isolation. They noted that, during Sezer's December
2004 visit to Moscow, President Putin had spoken of the need
to redress the Turkish Cypriots' unfair situation. They
asked specifically for Russian endorsement of Gul's January
action plan, which proposes opening all ports simultaneously.
Burhan stated that the Russian response was disappointing.
Russia would only approve of initiatives agreed to by both
sides and the Greek Cypriot sid had rejected Gul's proposal.
He noted that a Russian trade delegation had visited
northern Cyprus, but Burhan said this had been hardly
satisfactory as the delegation had landed in the Republic of
Cyprus before going to the north. The Turkish side saw as
positive, however, Lavrov's emphasis on the UNSYG's Good
Offices Mission as the primary vehicle for a final settlement.

Turkey/EU -- Russian Visa Concerns
--------------


10. (C) Burhan said the Russian delegation expressed concerns
about the effect of Turkey's EU accession negotiations and
asked the Turks to ensure their EU-conforming legislation
does not prejudice bilateral relations. The Russian concern
focused on EU visa requirements and the potential effect on
Russian tourism in Turkey. The Turks resisted Russian calls
for regular consultations on this issue, calling them
premature.

Russian Fears of NATO Enlargement
--------------


11. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian concerns over potential NATO
expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, as well as new NATO bases
in Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, however, he
appeared satisfied with the operation of the NATO Russia
Council but said Russia desired to tackle more concrete
issues in that forum.


No Russian Commitment to Turkey's UNSC Candidacy
-------------- ---


12. (C) Burhan reported that Gul had asked Lavrov for Russian
support for Turkey's candidacy for a 2009-2010 UNSC seat.
Lavrov refused to commit, arguing that P-5 members had an
agreement that none would publicly announce their support for
a particular candidate before the voting process begins.

Russian Listing of PKK Sought
--------------


13. (C) Burhan said Turkish officials had renewed a previous
request to the Russians to officially declare the PKK a
terrorist organization. Lavrov expressed sympathy but
offered nothing concrete, citing domestic legal obstacles.

Economic Cooperation and Energy

ANKARA 00003339 003 OF 003


--------------


14. (C) Burhan reported that bilateral economic issues did
not feature on the agenda as many had been covered during a
May meeting of the Turkey-Russia Joint Economic Commission in
Istanbul. In that forum, Turkey's complaints about its USD
10 billion trade deficit with Russia were met by Russian
insistence that this deficit is compensated for by a huge,
unofficial "suitcase trade" from Turkey to Russia, large
Turkish investments in Russia, and the annual sojourn of some
two million Russian tourists in Turkey. Turkey complained
that Russian customs officials used artificially high
reference prices for Turkish exports to Russia, while Russian
officials replied that Turkish exporters deliberately
undervalued their products.


15. (C) Both Burhan and Kunekov reported that Russian
companies, including Gazprom, are seeking to invest in the
Turkish energy sector, including the construction of
distribution networks and storage facilities for natural gas.
Discussions are ongoing between Gazprom and BOTAS. Turkey
had solicited Russian interest in the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.
Burhan and Kunekov said the Russian side was still studying
the Turkish plan. Burhan also mentioned that, at the
inauguration of the Blue Stream terminal in 2005, Putin had
raised the export of Russian natural gas to third countries,
but the Turks had heard nothing further from the Russians.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON