SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT GENERAL HAGEE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000331



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016

TAGS: MARR, MASS, MOPS, PREL, PGOV, TU, IZ, AF, RU

SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MARINE CORPS

COMMANDANT GENERAL HAGEE



REF: DCD PROFILER6 JAN. 19 EMAIL TO MAJOR CRAIG MILLER



Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (S) SUMMARY: Your visit to Turkey comes at an important

time. The tone of the relationship has been improving since

PM Erdogan,s visit to Washington last June, but Iraq

continues to dominate our agenda, including Turkey,s

concerns regarding the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds, independence

aspirations, and the fortunes of Ankara,s perceived

constituents, the Iraqi Turkmen. While the Nov. 9-10 High

Level Defense Group (HLDG) meetings in Ankara ) the first in

two years ) helped move our defense dialogue away from "all

Iraq all the time,8 the issues have not gone away. You will

want to acknowledge Turkey,s contribution to the war in Iraq

and the overall Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): the logistics

hub at Incirlik, the Habur Gate GLOC, Turkey,s military and

reconstruction contributions to Afghanistan and engendering

regional cooperation in the Black Sea. It will be important

to respond to complaints about US inaction against the PKK in

Iraq by pointing to what we are doing to help Turkey to

combat the PKK elsewhere and in other areas of the GWOT.

Your visit also provides an opportunity to foster an

atmosphere of increased engagement and cooperation in the

near future. END SUMMARY.



2. (S) We aren't out of the woods yet, but our bilateral

relationship is on the upswing from the trough that deepened

in fall 2004 with MNF-I operations in Tal Afar and Fallujah,

repeated Turkish truck driver abductions and killings, and

factually incorrect and biased Turkish press coverage which

Turkish officials failed to refute and in some cases abetted.

Despite the continued unpopularity of the war in Iraq (over

95% of the population opposes the war) this no longer

dominates the news. Then DCHOD GEN Basbug took the first

step toward improving relations in a January 26, 2005

nationally-televised press conference, in which he

underscored the importance of the bilateral relationship.

Following US and Turkish media stories in February 2005 about

deteriorating bilateral relations, NSC Sec Gen Alpogan, FM

Gul and others scrambled to match GEN Basbug's words. In an

April speech to the Istanbul War Academy, CHOD GEN Ozkok

called the bilateral relationship &too broad and important

to be defined by one issue.8 With the visits of PM Erdogan,

FM Gul and DCHOD Basbug to Washington in early June, the

Sept. 8-9 visit of GEN Jones and then-CENTCOM Deputy

Commander LTG Smith, the Sept. 24 visit to Ankara of APNSA

Hadley, the December visits to Ankara of FBI Chief Mueller

and CIA Director Goss, and most recently the Jan. 17 visit of

EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Wald, both sides have demonstrated

our commitment to rebuild our historically strong ties

through concrete actions and by improving the tone of our

public statements.



PKK -- GETTING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE

--------------



3. (S) TGS Deputy Chief GEN Kosaner did not raise the PKK

with EUCOM DCDR GEN Wald on January 17 and may not with you.

However, the PKK was one of the themes of TLFC Commander GEN

Buyukanit's counterpart visit to the US in December, and he

may raise the terrorist group's presence in Northern Iraq

with you. Your response should point to what we have done

and what we have offered to do to address the PKK problem

more widely. During the September visit of Generals Jones

and Smith, TGS rejected EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance

inside Turkey, but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to continue

aerial overflights of PKK camps on the Iraqi side of border;

CF now carry out flights every two weeks. Turkey accepted

EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO) support; EUCOM

staff is developing an interagency proposal that will assist

TGS/MFA in developing a more effective IO program. TGS also

welcomed an enhanced intelligence-sharing program on an

intermittent basis tied to specific Turkish operations.

Indications are the intelligence provided was beneficial to

GOT. CENTCOM offered to expand the list of PKK HVI on the

CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil contacts,

which may include joint border patrols. These offers remain

under discussion, but will likely not bear fruit in the short

term.

4. (C) The interagency initiative to partner with Turkey and

the Europeans to pursue law enforcement cases against the PKK

is continuing. A CIA/DIA/FBI/DOJ/Treasury team visited

Ankara in December; they and the Turks identified two PKK

operatives in Europe to pursue together. Your interlocutors

may complain about the absence of kinetic action against the

PKK, but we have a good story to tell and we should tell it.



5. (S) Despite our efforts, with PKK attacks continuing to

cause casualties among Turkish military personnel, the

Turkish public and the political class continue to clamor for

US military action in Iraq against the PKK, or for a Turkish

cross-border operation. There is widespread public belief

that lack of US action against the PKK is "punishment" for

Turkey's March 2003 failure to give permission for US forces

to transit Turkey en route to Iraq.





SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT

--------------



6. (S) One of the casualties of the Iraq war was the

relationship between our Special Forces (SF). The July 4,

2003 Suleymaniyah incident in which US forces hooded and

handcuffed Turkish SF officers remains a wound in Turkey's

military and national pride and with the Turkish public that

will possibly take a generation to fully heal. We welcomed

the Joint Staff invitation to Turkish Special Forces for a

Washington Sept. 19-27 visit to begin to restore that once

close relationship, and we continue to support a

SOCEUR-initiated SF JCET originally scheduled for March 2006,

though budgetary constraints may force a postponement.

Additionally, Turkish Land Forces Commander GEN Yasar

Buyukanit has just returned from the first Counterpart Visit

(CPV) with the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in nine years. GEN

Buyukanit was accorded full military honors and had a

substantive program as well. We believe that visit will

contribute greatly to restoring post-OIF army to army

relations.



BEHIND THE SCENES INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

--------------



7. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has

provided significant logistical support to both Operation

Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan. Turkey has approved

multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base,

including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered

over 28 million gallons since operations began in 2003 and

flown over 2,600 sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on

rotation from Iraq from January through April 2004; and the

establishment in May 2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6

US military C-17 aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took

9-10 military aircraft to move from Germany. This hub has

facilitated the movement of 41,339 tons of supplies since its

inception; flown 1280 C-17 sorties; received 577 wide-bodies

cargo aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel. Turkey

also approved the use of hub flights for the emergency

evacuation of US soldiers from Iraq.



8. (SBU) The Habur Gate, the only border crossing from Turkey

into Iraq, provides 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces

in Iraq and two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments

for the Iraqi people. Significant shipments of food and

water for coalition forces also pass over the border.



9. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its

support through its public announcements of support for the

recent elections; its plans to re-open its consulate in Mosul

in early 2006; provision of training in Turkey for Iraqi

diplomats, political parties, and (as part of the NATO

training mission) Iraqi Security Forces; hosting a conference

for Iraqi constitution drafters in July, and a meeting of

Iraqi Sunni leaders with Ambassador Khalilzad in Istanbul in

December.



10. (C) Turkey currently maintains approximately 1300 of its

own forces in Northern Iraq in camps established prior to

OEF. These forces contain elements of armor, mechanized

infantry, commando, and Special Forces units commanded by the

Turkish Special Forces Brigade HQ located in Silopi, Turkey.

This HQ also provides Turkish LNO teams to Coalition HQs in

Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal Afar while hosting a US Liaison

officer and NCO at the HQ in Silopi.



PARTNER IN GWOT

--------------



11. (S/NF) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided

valuable assistance and cooperation to the GWOT. On Aug. 8,

Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it

held for six months and during which time it contributed over

1,600 troops. Turkey, France and Italy have agreed on an

eight month rotating command of the ISAF Kabul Regional

Command starting the second half of 2006. The GOT permits

OEF detainees (Operation Fundamental Justice Flights) to

transit Incirlik AB. Turkey also contributes to

reconstruction and training efforts in Afghanistan. It is

involved in the reconstruction of schools and is exploring

counter-narcotics training programs for Afghan police and

alternative livelihood options for poppy farmers. Following

PM Erdogan's May 2005 visit to Afghanistan, the GOT increased

its reconstruction budget for Afghanistan ten-fold, to $100

million. Turkey continues to provide significant personnel

and assets for Operation Active Endeavor, KFOR, and Operation

Althea.



12. (U) Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military

assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their

abilities to protect key energy transport routes. Turkey

subscribes to every security arrangement it is eligible to

join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

It will host the first PSI combined air, land and sea

exercise (ANATOLIAN DEER) in May 2006 and the US is committed

to participate in both the Command Post Exercise and the Live

Exercise.



13. (C) Turkey continues to resist significant cooperation on

Black Sea maritime security outside the context of

BLACKSEAFOR and Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH). The

Turks argue that an active U.S./NATO role would be

threatening to the Russians, who might respond negatively.

That said, they raise no objection to our naval engagement in

the region provided we abide by the Montreux Convention which

imposes restrictions on Bosporus Straits passage.



14. (C) While U.S. Navy ship visits to Turkey fell

drastically in 2004 and 2005, with only four port visits each

year, 2006 looks more promising. CVN 71 Theodore Roosevelt

and CG 56 San Jacinto are conducting a port visit in Marmaris

during February with another port call proposed for DDG 51

USS Burke later in the month. The July 2005 visit of the LPD

USS Nashville to the port of Aksaz included the embarkation

of 30 Turkish Naval Infantry for training while continued use

of Mersin port by coalition fuel tankers are essential for

fuels flowing into Iraq.



IRAN AND SYRIA

-------------- ---



15. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is

"engagement." While the military and Ministry of Foreign

Affairs are concerned about the dangers of the Iranian

nuclear program, PM Erdogan's pro-Islam Justice and

Development Party (AKP) government is not yet convinced. PM

Erdogan told EU Ambassadors on January 20 that he does not

believe Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons; one of his

advisors had indicated the same sentiment one day prior.

Part of the Turkish government's motivation is a desire not

to jeopardize its nascent trade development opportunities,

including energy, or its renewed intelligence exchange with

Iran on the PKK. Some AKP elements even admire Iran's

efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. According to TGS, Turkey

and Iran began sharing intelligence this summer on the PKK,

holding regular meetings at the border. As of September,

Iran had turned over 40 suspected PKK members or

sympathizers. Turkey touts its support for the EU-3 dialogue

and multilateral efforts through the IAEA. Turkish officials

stress to us the need to maintain dialogue and to identify a

diplomatic solution. The tepid Turkish response to Iranian

President Ahmedinejad's initial statement about wiping Israel

off the map have been followed equally weak statements

against the re-start of Iran's uranium enrichment program.

However, recent equivocation on whether or not Turkey is

planning for a visit by Ahmedinejad demonstrates that Turkey

is trying to walk both sides of the line on Iran. Turkey's

tack toward Syria is much the same. They and others in the

government regularly urge US engagement and stress the need

to deal directly with, and support Asad ) whom they see as

reform minded - against the hardline Ba,athists in the

regime who seek to undermine him.



DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK

--------------



16. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral

relationship, security cooperation, is significantly

declining. Under Turkey's current policy, the emphasis is

on Direct Commercial Sales at the expense of Foreign Military

Sales and American companies are having difficulty competing.

The last significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm

was the 2002 win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and

Control (AEW&C) system. In early 2004, SSM (the Defense

Industries Undersecretariat ) Turkey,s major procurement

agency) cancelled three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and

attack helicopters) all of which had American companies in

contention. General Atomics (UAVs) and General Defense

(tanks) have both pulled out of Turkey.



17. (SBU) The revised ATAK Helicopter tender was issued in

February 2005 and was the first to contain new standard

(i.e., non-negotiable) terms and conditions (T&Cs). (Note:

The first tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron.

SSM cancelled it over technology transfer issues. End Note.)

The three US firms that took the tender (Bell, Boeing,

Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so onerous that they were unable

to justify participation.



18. (SBU) The GOT,s goal is to develop an indigenous defense

industry that can supply a significant portion of the Turkish

military,s requirements, and has outlined an aggressive

timetable to do so. To meet that schedule, SSM recently

began requiring companies to confirm at the time of bid

submission the host government's willingness to allow

transfer of the required technology. Although SSM

understands the USG will not guarantee approval of technology

transfer before a contract is signed, SSM has refused to

revise the tender to remove that requirement. MND and SSM

are requiring similar T&Cs on other tenders and American

companies are frustrated. We have raised our concerns about

the negative impact of the SSM program on US participation in

the Turkish defense market with FM Gul, CHOD Ozkok, MND

Gonul, the service chiefs and others. Across the board, the

military pledged their preference for US equipment but

professed an inability to influence the process.



AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

--------------



19. (SBU) We are currently working with the GOT on some

airspace management issues in northern Iraq. Over a 60 day

period this fall, the TGS noted 17 incidents where, they

claim, CF aircraft flew very close to the TU-IZ border.

These incidents result in alerting of TU aircraft and other

intensive actions, including scrambling F16s. After

discussing this issue with TGS, as a short term solution we

have coordinated to have the relevant information passed from

CENTAF to the Turkish Air Force. We believe the long term

solution is for the TGS/TUAF to use CENTRIX to obtain the

daily Air Tasking Order and determine if CF flights may

approach the Turkish border. At present, the Turkish

military can access CENTRIX through its LNOs located with

Coalition Forces, in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tal Afar;

There is also a CENTRIX terminal at the ODC in Ankara. TGS

has yet to agree to the expense (about $35,000) to have us

install a CENTRIX terminal at TGS HQ, allowing them to have

full access to CENTRIX right here in Ankara.

WILSON