SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 4 VISIT OF DEPUTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DAVID MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 4 VISIT OF DEPUTY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DR. JD CROUCH


Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
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1. (S) Your visit to Turkey comes at an important moment.
Foremost on our immediate agenda is ensuring Turkey's
sustained support for Secretary Rice's May 31 announcement
that we will join EU-3 talks if Iran suspends enrichment and
reprocessing. Turkish officials will be interested in
hearing U.S. views on the way forward on Black Sea security
cooperation. You will hear Turkish frustration over PKK
terrorism and impatience with US inaction against PKK camps
in northern Iraq. You will also find anxiety about further
regional instability that is fueled by fears that Iraq will
fragment, Palestine will implode, and Iran and the West will
collide militarily. Despite these concerns and the fact that
public sentiment toward the US remains largely negative, this
government is committed -- in public and in private -- to
working with us to find a new paradigm for partnership. To
that end, we are putting the final touches on a "Shared
Vision" paper, announced during the Secretary Rice's April 27
visit, committing ourselves to cooperating more closely on
regional and global issues. End Summary.

Bilateral Relationship Improving
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2. (S) During her April 27 visit to Ankara, Secretary Rice
and FM Gul announced our intention to set up a formal and
regular senior-level strategic dialogue consultative
mechanism. The goal was to signal progress toward restoring
confidence and strengthening our ability to work together in
ways helpful to our goals in the region and in Turkey itself.
We are now negotiating the final touches of our "Strategic
Partnership" document, which should be made public soon. We
have restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level
visits over the past ten months. We have shifted our
dialogue on Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about
the PKK and Kirkuk to one of constructive collaboration
politically and logistically in support of our efforts there.


3. (S) The February HAMAS visit to Ankara set this back more
seriously than Turkish officials are willing to admit.
Bitterness towards Turkey remains in some parts of Congress
and especially within the American Jewish community. HIRC
staffer Alan Makovsky met Gul and other officials recently
and conveyed Congressional views. Turkey has made efforts to
patch things up. Abu Mazen was promised Turkish political
support during his April 26 visit to Ankara and Israeli FM
Livni was received warmly here on May 29. President Sezer
will visit Israel on June 10. The Turks told Livni of their
concerns that lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle
East if Israel decides to unilaterally set its borders and
were reassured by Livni's assertions that Israel would prefer
a negotiated settlement, though it currently has no viable
negotiating partner.


4. (S) Here in Ankara, internal politics have moved to the
fore. The May 17 shooting at the High Administrative Court
that killed one judge and injured four served as a catalyst
for secular/military demonstrations, heightening tensions in
the already difficult relationship between PM Erdogan,s
pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) on the one
hand, and the secular/military establishment on the other.
The focal point is the May 2007 presidential election, when
parliament -- currently firmly under AKP,s control -- will
elect Turkey,s next president. The secular establishment
views as anathema an AKPer in Ataturk,s chair --
particularly one whose wife wears an Islamic headscarf.
Secularists, themselves badly divided, continue to lobby for
early general elections (due by November 2007),in the hope
of changing the parliamentary mix in advance of the
presidential election. Erdogan continues, just as firmly, to
reject that possibility.

Key Issues
--------------


5. (S) Iran: Secretary Rice personally informed Gul May 31
of our decision to join the EU-3 and meet with Iran's
representatives once Iran fully and verifiably suspends its
enrichment and reprocessing activities. Official and public
reaction to this initiative has been uniformly positive. The
GOT has publicly supported this move and called upon the
Iranians to respond positively. Turkish officials have taken
a tougher line on Iran since Greg Schulte's March visit. Gul
has told visiting Congressional delegations that Iran's

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nuclear weapons aspirations are the single most important
problem facing Europe and the Middle East, and he has
emphasized the need for a united and decisive international
approach. Ankara has called on Tehran to cooperate with the
IAEA, adopt full transparency on its nuclear programs, and
resume negotiations with the EU-3, most recently in Erdogan -
Ahmadinejad encounters in Baku and Bali and during an early
May visit by Larijani.


6. (S Black Sea Security: Turkey believes that Russian
involvement in Black Sea security structures is essential for
their success. This, coupled with Ankara's pride of regional
leadership, has produced Turkish resistance to expanding
non-littoral (including NATO and the U.S.) naval involvement
in the Black Sea. But this reticence does not apply to
cooperation ashore. Turkey is a strong supporter of and
participant in NATO Partnership for Peace activities with
others in the region, hopes for the Minsk Group's success in
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, coordinates with us
on security assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan,
participated in EUCOM's spirit-of-PfP exercise Sea Breeze 06
in Ukraine, conducted bilateral naval exercises with the USN,
and welcomed a USN vessel to the Black Sea port of Samsun.
Thus, Turkish reaction to our new strategy towards the
region, which was previewed to Ankara in April, has been
generally positive.


7. (S) Turkey greatly appreciates our efforts to convince
Romania and Bulgaria to join its maritime policing operation,
Black Sea Harmony. While Ankara understands that BLACKSEAFOR
will not become the operationally focused organization it
envisages anytime soon, it has not given up the hope that the
other littorals will eventually agree to expand BLACKSEAFOR's
mandate. After initial opposition, Turkey has participated
in the preparatory work for the Black Sea Forum you will
attend in Bucharest and will be represented there by Minister
of State Besir Atalay.


8. (S) Cyprus/EU: Ankara feels cornered by the EU's
insistence that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot goods, its
incessant reform demands -- including on issues that seem
impossible to them (Cyprus, the Greek Patriarchate, Kurdish
rights),and the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish sentiment in many
EU capitals. Incidents in the Aegean (e.g., the May 23
fighter aircraft accident and more recent confrontations
around Imia/Kardak) could further complicate matters if both
Turkey and Greece do not resist their natural tendencies
towards nationalistic righteous indignation. The Turks need
to respond positively to the UN-brokered technical talks on
Cyprus and stop complaining about Kofi Annan's Cyprus
representative. Senior Turkish officials also need to spend
more time courting European allies in the EU process. The
appearance and reality of steady progress on reform is
essential for keeping the EU bicycle aright. The Halki
Seminary and other Greek Patriarchate issues are hard for
Turkey, but progress would do wonders for Turkey's image in
Europe and the US and put beef in the "Alliance of
Civilizations" bun.


9. (S) HAMAS: Erdogan and Gul remain defensive about the
HAMAS visit. They see a rejected and rejectionist HAMAS as
something that will aggravate instability, worsen the 'clash
of civilizations,' and bolster Iran's influence, which they
do not want. But Gul understands the need not to dig a
deeper hole for Turkey: with some prompting, he criticized
HAMAS' failure to condemn the Tel Aviv bombing. Gul will
probe for ways Turkey can be helpful and will want to
describe FM Livni's May 29 talks here. Consulting with the
Turks on how we see the Middle East developing in coming
months will be helpful.


10. (S) Iraq and the PKK: The government and public here
remain worried by recent developments in Iraq, signs of civil
war and fears of Iraq's breakup. Rising PKK violence in
Turkey aggravates this. Turkey has welcomed the
establishment of the new Iraqi government and Turkey's Iraq
Coordinator Celikkol went to Baghdad (thanks to Embassy
Baghdad assistance) May 30 to announce Turkey's support,
present the Iraqis with a proposal for security cooperation,
and invite Iraqi officials to visit Ankara. Turkey has
expressed disappointment with what it perceives as inadequate
Turkmen representation in government ministries and on the
Iraqi National Security Council, and remains concerned with
Kirkuk's status. You may wish to reiterate our commitment to
helping with the PKK problem and our readiness to participate
in trilateral talks with Turkey and Iraq on security as soon
as practicable. We are encouraging FM Gul to visit Iraq soon.


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11. (S) Armenia: The Turks realize that this always
difficult issue is now harder because of HAMAS. Erdogan is
counting on the Administration to pull out all stops to
prevent passage of genocide language. Turkey has reached out
to Armenia in recent months with proposals for a
mutually-acceptable Turkish-Armenian mechanism to review the
history and begin laying the groundwork for reconciliation
and normalization of the bilateral relationship. Yerevan has
responded tentatively and contacts continue. We are urging
the Turks to consider opening the Armenian border, especially
in the context of an Armenian-Azeri peace deal.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON