Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA3004
2006-05-25 11:38:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR MAY 30 VISIT OF CODEL BLUNT TO

Tags:  OREP TU 
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VZCZCXRO7464
PP RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #3004/01 1451138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251138Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5902
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0712
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0634
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0900
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0492
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4114
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0823
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0792
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0588
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3659
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0062
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUSNNOG/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 003004 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO H/SUSAN SHEYBANI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 30 VISIT OF CODEL BLUNT TO
TURKEY

REF: STATE 82968

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 003004 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT PASS TO H/SUSAN SHEYBANI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OREP TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 30 VISIT OF CODEL BLUNT TO TURKEY REF: STATE 82968 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Ankara warmly welcomes the visit of CODEL Blunt on May 30. Turkey is a strong ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),facilitating the distribution of critical supplies and fuel to the coalition in Iraq and supporting the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) there; publicly calling on Iran to comply with its IAEA commitments; and pressuring Syria and Hamas to renounce their support for terrorism. This summer Turkey will share command of ISAF-Central with France and Italy and open its first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. But there are challenges. Bilateral defense cooperation is on the decline. An increased Turkish security presence along the Iraqi border to combat an up-tick in PKK terrorist activity has raised concerns with the Iraqi government. Turkey's EU accession aspirations are frustrated by slow implementation of reforms and the lack of progress on Cyprus, though all concerned are working to avoid a train wreck. Domestic political tensions between traditional secularists in the Ataturk mold, who continue to control the military and important institutions like the Presidency, and a more religiously-minded conservative strain represented by PM Erdogan were heightened by a May 17 attack on a court that left one senior judge dead and four wounded. You may wish to welcome their partnership in GWOT, urge Turkey to continue to stand firmly and publicly with the international community on Iran, and encourage early FM travel to Baghdad. Israeli FM Livni will have just concluded her first trip to Turkey on May 29. END SUMMARY. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During an April 25 visit to Ankara, Secretary Rice unveiled with Foreign Minister Gul an agreement to formalize a regular series of meetings to further our bilateral efforts on issues such as Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia, among others. Our two governments are currently putting the finishing touches on the document and hope to release it soon. As a majority Muslim country that straddles Europe and the Middle East, Turkey shares a history and culture with many countries of US concern and is poised to increase its constructive role in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative and potentially in the Mi
ddle East Peace Process. This will also provide a forum to dialogue with Turkey on issues of importance to its future, including Cyprus and the EU accession process. A PARTNER IN GWOT -------------- Iraq: ¶3. (SBU) Turkey's agreement to allow the use of its territory as a logistical hub has been a crucial asset in our Iraq operations. Two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments (3 million gallons per day) for the Iraqi people and 25% of sustainment fuel for the coalition crosses into Iraq through the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Border Gate. Since Turkey approved the use of Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub to support coalition operations in Iraq in May 2005, over 152 million pounds of equipment has been shipped to US troops. Six C-17 aircraft now deliver from Incirlik the amount of supplies it took 9-10 planes to deliver from Germany. Additionally ten KC-135 tanker aircraft based at Incirlik since 2003 have run 2800 refueling sorties, delivering 192 million pounds of fuel in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Turkey has four personnel assigned to NTM-I in Iraq and, under this rubric, has trained 57 Iraqi military officers in Turkey. Iraqis ANKARA 00003004 002 OF 005 have pledged to send officers to at least seven additional courses this year. ¶4. (SBU) Turkey shares the US goal of a unified, democratic Iraq that is secure within it borders. While Kurdish aspirations and the PKK presence in northern Iraq remain a significant concern, the government is contributing to efforts to ensure the success of the country as a whole. The GOT vocally supported the participation of all ethnic and religious groups in the elections and the constitution referendum; and separately hosted a multi-party conference on the Iraqi constitution, a dialogue of hard-line Sunni leaders with US Ambassador Khalilzad, and a meeting of tribal leaders from the city of Talafar in an effort to calm the situation there. It provided extensive training to over 300 Iraqi diplomats and political party members, and spearheaded a "neighbors meetings" process which has helped Iraqi government leaders interact with their regional counterparts. The Turks are considering providing more training, and are sending their Special Representative to Iraq, Oguz Celikkol, to Baghdad shortly, both to issue invitations to GOI officials to visit Turkey, and to lay the groundwork for a subsequent FM Gul trip to Baghdad. ¶5. (SBU) In addition to Turkey's desire for political stability, a sovereign, stable Iraq is in Turkey's economic interest. Bilateral trade in 2005 was $2.87 billion, of which $2.42B was Turkish exports to Iraq. Turkey exports 270 MW of electricity to northern Iraq. Both countries aim to increase electricity exports from Turkey to 1000MW, which equates to 25% of Iraq's current peak capacity. Turkey has pledged $50M in assistance to Iraq for energy, health and other projects, which remains mostly unfunded for security reasons. Turkey's port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the oil pipeline from Kirkuk. Afghanistan: ¶6. (SBU) Turkey has twice successfully led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most recently from February to August 2005. Beginning in mid-2006, it will share joint command of ISAF-Central in Kabul for a two-year period, and will open its first PRT in the neighboring province of Wardak. PM Erdogan visited Afghanistan in spring 2005 and subsequently increased Turkey's pledged assistance ten-fold to $100M. This will be allocated in $16M increments for five years to build schools, hospitals, medical clinics and drinking water wells throughout the country. Four hospitals have already been constructed. The GOT provides counter-narcotics training in Turkey to Afghan security forces and will initiate such training in Afghanistan this year under the auspices of the Wardak PRT. President Karzai demonstrated his gratitude for Turkey's assistance by participating in a March counter-terrorism conference at Turkey's NATO Center of Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism. Other: ¶7. (SBU) In addition to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey continues to cotribute forces to the peacekeeping efforts inthe Balkans and provides training to Georgian security forces, including for pipeline security. Turkey has contributed $41M in equipment to Georgia over the past six years, and has trained some 1400 Georgian personnel. In Azerbaijan, Turkey has provided some $150M in equipment and over $100M in training and facilities over the past six years. INCREASING PKK THREAT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Since ending its self-imposed cease-fire in May ANKARA 00003004 003 OF 005 2004, the PKK terrorist group has stepped up bomb attacks in Istanbul and increasingly clashed with Turkish security forces in the country's southeast. A PKK off-shoot, the Kurdish Freedom Hawks (TAK),has warned foreigners to stay away from Turkey and threatened additional attacks in tourist centers. The funerals of 14 PKK terrorists killed in a March operation led to civil unrest in Diyarbakir and other southeastern cities, which in several cases turned violent. Televised news programs are filled with the funerals of Turkish security forces. Tourism bookings are down from 2005. ¶9. (SBU) The PKK issue is the biggest irritant in bilateral relations. The Turkish public and the GOT expect the US to take action against the PKK in Iraq. The government welcomes our efforts with European allies to eliminate the PKK's financing sources and support networks in Europe and our intelligence-sharing program, but both the GOT and the public insist on US action against the PKK presence in northern Iraq. While recognizing that the insurgency prevents coalition troops from engaging the PKK in Iraq, the GOT remains frustrated at its inability, and US unwillingness, to stop attacks it believes are emanating from the other side of its border. ¶10. (SBU) Security forces have had some success against the PKK in Istanbul and Ankara, where significant caches of plastic explosives were found and suspects arrested. The early up-tick in terrorist activity in 2006 also hastened the military's push to strengthen its troop presence along Turkey's border with Iraq, as it does every spring. The Turkish press speculates that Turkey is either already conducting or will engage in cross-border operations into northern Iraq where the PKK has a presence. The Chief of the Turkish General Staff GEN Hilmi Ozkok and FM Abdullah Gul have both publicly dismissed these reports and said that Turkey is doing nothing more than protecting its sovereign territory, as it does every year. REGIONAL DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Given its shared historical, cultural and religious ties with countries in the region, as well as its geographic location bridging both east and west, Turkey feels both a right and a responsibility to engage countries of concern on issues of importance to the international community. Turkey has worked hard in recent years to re-establish relations with Iran and Syria both to bolster its fight against the PKK, which has a presence in those countries, and to strengthen its economeQnQlG29, and the Turkish president will travel to Israel early in June. ¶12. (SBU) The MFA, military and many in the AKP government view a nuclear Iran as a threat to Turkey but all view diplomacy as the only road to a solution and therefore insist on engagement. The GOT is averse to broad economic sanctions that could disrupt a growing commercial relationship with Iran, particularly energy imports, but is willing to consult with us on targeted financial sanctions. The government's public statements -- which we are told match their private statements -- on Iran's nuclear program have significantly strengthened since Iran resumed uranium enrichment. You may want to welcome these statements and to encourage a continued strong message. CYPRUS THREATENS TURKEY'S EU BID -------------- ANKARA 00003004 004 OF 005 ¶13. (SBU) The EU has expressed frustration with what it perceives as lackluster GOT efforts to fully implement democratic reforms. Indictments against novelist Orhan Pamuk and other writers and intellectuals for statements purportedly undermining the Turkish identity, and unresolved issues with Turkey's Kurdish population that are exacerbating the PKK problem, give ammunition to those who want to prevent Turkey's accession. But the lack of a settlement of the Cyprus question may be the biggest immediate threat to Turkey's EU bid. Turkey remains bitter over the 2004 Greek Cypriot vote against UN secretary-general Annan's plan for a comprehensive settlement and the lack of measures to reward Turkish Cypriots for their favorable vote, and continues to look to the UN for the way forward. Under its EU customs agreement, amended in 2005 and expanded to include all new EU members -- including Cyprus -- Turkey must, in theory, open its sea and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels by the end of ¶2006. Turkey is unwilling to do so in absence of some opening of Turkish Cypriot ports and an end to Turkish Cypriot economic isolation. In January, FM Gul put forward a proposal that would include this. The lack of a deal could stall further EU negotiations, though all parties seem intent on finding creative ways to avoid a Cyprus &train wreck8 that could derail Turkey,s accession negotiations. THE DOMESTIC EQUATION -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Over the next year or so, though, getting the Turkish Government to undertake anything even moderately controversial ) whether related to its own southeast, Cyprus or the EU ) will be difficult. In the run-up to the presidential election (May 2007) and parliamentary elections (scheduled for November 2007),the government's room for maneuver will be limited. This is even more so in the aftermath of a May 17 gunman's attack at the Council of State (an administrative appeals court) that left one judge dead and four others wounded. This has heightened pre-existing tensions between PM Erdogan's pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the military/secularist establishment. ECONOMY RECOVERING STRONGLY, BUT VULNERABLE -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The AK Party government has implemented key economic and structural reforms that have supported the strong economic recovery from the deep 2001 financial crisis. An average GDP growth rate of nearly 8% over the past three years is one of the highest in the world, foreign investment has strengthened, and high inflation has been subdued. The IMF is currently overseeing a $11.8 billion stand-by program and the World Bank's loan portfolio of $6 billion is one of the largest for any country. Reforms and optimism engendered by the EU accession process have also bolstered economic performance. Yet, despite the significant achievements, the current account deficit is large (about 7% of GDP this year) and the government remains heavily indebted. This leaves the economy vulnerable to market swings that could threaten economic and political stability. Unemployment and poverty also remain serious problems. These vulnerabilities were highlighted since mid-May by a global market pullback that coincided with increased political uncertainty in Turkey, leading to a 16% fall in the exchange rate and 18% drop in the stock market and a shap increase in domestic interest rates. However, if the government continues to follow-through on reform commitments -- as it recently did by reaffirming the IMF program -- and EU accession remains on track, the economy should be able to weather the current turbulence. ANKARA 00003004 005 OF 005 DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION DECLINING -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Defense industry cooperation, once the strongest aspect of our military-to-military relationship, is in significant decline. No US firm has won a direct commercial sale since Boeing was awarded a contract for an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2002. In 2004, three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks, and attack helicopters) were canceled. Two US firms, Boeing and Bell, were interested in a second attack helicopter tender, but declined to participate due to onerous liability and technology transfer requirements. (Several non-US firms did submit bids.) Sikorsky may choose not to participate in a tender for 54 utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed Forces and Forestry Service for the same reason, and Raytheon may bow out of contention for an aircraft trainer tender. Both in Ankara and in Washington, US firms and the USG have raised the technology transfer and liability concerns with Turkey's Ministry of Defense and Defense Industry Undersecretariat (SSM). Despite both Turkish military and government insistence that it wants US competition in these tenders, SSM has resisted making the necessary changes to the tenders to ensure it. AGGRESSIVE COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAM -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Turkey remains a significant transit country for Southwest Asian heroin destined for European markets. Turkish law enforcement vigorously pursues opiate traffickers and have made extensive opiate seizures. Arrests resulting from large seizures are prosecuted and generally result in lengthy sentences. Over eight metric tons of heroin were seized in Turkey in 2005, while nearly ten metric tons were seized in 2004. Several of the world's largest verified opiate seizures have been made in Turkey in recent years, including 7.5 metric tons of morphine base that were captured in a single seizure in 2002. In 2004, 4.4 metric tons of morphine base were seized and in 2005 there were two heroin seizures of over 1,000 kilograms each. Turkish law enforcement is actively participating in DEA's Operation Containment, a regional plan for combating Afghan opiates. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON

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