TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT ON THE DEFENSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002804 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2021 TAGS: PGOV ECON TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT ON THE DEFENSIVE Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A confluence of events has Turkey,s ruling pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government on the defensive. AKP,s reaction to secularists, criticism, launched by President Sezer, has revealed cracks within the party. At the same time, the failed March indictment of Land Forces Commander Buyukanit, rioting in several southeastern cities, and increased PKK violence have forced the AKP to take a nationalist tack. AKP, proclaiming business as usual, has shifted into pre-election mode. Economic reform has also lapsed, but the government bounced back with decisive actions to keep its IMF program on track. The AKP still has the clout to push through policy and legislation when it chooses to do so. These events mark the first salvos of a busy presidential and parliamentary election year as secular state institutions take aim at AKP. End Summary. He Said, He Said: Under Attack, AKP's Fissures Show -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey's secularists are uneasy about two trends: alleged AKP attempts to pack the government bureaucracy with Islamists, and the prospect that the current AKP-dominated parliament will elect Turkey,s next President in May 2007. In an April 12 speech at the war academy, President Sezer took aim, warning that "fundamentalism" was creeping into Turkish education, politics and the state system. ¶3. (C) In an April 23 speech marking the 86th anniversary of the founding of Turkey's parliament, pious AKP parliament Speaker Arinc issued a rejoinder, criticizing "some institutions" for acting like &sultans" and resisting reforms. He charged that parliament,s functions were in danger of erosion, called for a &new definition of secularism", and hinted that PM Erdogan was overly willing to compromise with state institutions. ¶4. (C) PM Erdogan distanced himself from Arinc in a subsequent address to AKP's parliamentary group, terming the remarks too divisive. AKP whip Salih Kapusuz said that Arinc was speaking for himself only. Most here, including some AKP MPs, view the Arinc speech as an opening salvo in his bid to run for President. Many see the PM's reaction as the first sign of fissures that break the AKP. Others have pointed out that Arinc,s remarks make PM Erdogan ) another potential presidential hopeful - appear moderate by comparison. ¶5. (U) Former President Demirel joined the fray in an April 30 media interview by taking up the headscarf issue, a political talisman for secularists and Islamists alike. He said that students who wish to wear headscarves should go where it is permitted, "such as Saudi Arabia." Demirel issued another media blast at the AKP government's weakness two days later. ¶6. (C) AKP officials close to Erdogan have shrugged off Demirel's comments as complaints from a has-been and other attacks as politicking aimed at forcing an early election, which they insist is not in the offing. The focus here is AKP's ambitions for the May 2007 presidential elections. AKP Government and the Military -------------- ¶7. (C) Since March, a series of events has raised nationalist sentiment, pressing the AKP government to keep pace with the military, the bastion of Ataturkist nationalism. The first was the March indictment of Land Forces Commander Buyukanit. The AKP government denied involvement, but the public remains convinced AKP was behind it. The indictment died, and the prosecutor was hung out to dry: the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors not only dismissed him, but barred him from further practicing law. This punishment then generated a countercurrent of criticism against the government for supposedly allowing the military to interfere with the judiciary. ¶8. (C) Then came the March riots in the southeast. That, combined with continuing casualties from PKK violence, further pressed the nationalist hot button and closed ANKARA 00002804 002 OF 003 whatever window may have remained for Erdogan to push further democratic reforms for the region. The armed forces returned to center stage with a series of troop deployments to the region. General Buyukanit received considerable coverage of his appearance at an emotional April 5 funeral of a soldier killed in the southeast; PM Erdogan and FM Gul followed suit, attending another soldier's funeral several days later. AKP Turns to Nationalist Appeal -------------- ¶9. (C) Although AKP officials insist the party's popularity is unchanged, AKP is trying to regain the offensive and appeal to Turkey's rising nationalism. It is a delicate balance. At a March gathering of the AKP parliamentary group, Erdogan noted a poll that indicated 17% of youth preparing to vote for the first time prefer the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP). He urged AKP MPs to reach out to this segment of the youth. ¶10. (C) AKP's nationalistic approach is evident in its policies toward the heavily-Kurdish southeast. In response to unrest there, the government's has drafted anti-terror legislation that many view as draconian. Erdogan has refused to meet with pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) leaders and mayors unless they declare the PKK a terrorist organization, a move that would be POLITICAL or literal suicide. In Tunceli on April 14, during Erdogan,s first trip to the region after the riots, the PM gave a nationalistic speech denying that AKP favored ethnic or regional nationalism. He stressed "one flag, one country, one nation" in contrast to his August 2005 admission that Turkey had a "Kurdish problem." ¶11. (C) On May 7, Erdogan returned to Diyarbakir for AKP's provincial congress. Moderating his tone, he struck a gentle chord, condemning those who exploit children in conflict (a reference to a PKK bus bombing in Hakkari that killed the children of military personnel, and youth participation in the March rioting),while calling for harmony and solidarity among all of Turkey's ethnic groups, including the Kurds. He also attended a factory opening and, out of the eye of the cameras, shook the hand of Diyarbakir,s DTP Mayor, Osman Baydemir. Economic Policy Drifts, Then Bounces Back -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The economy has posed challenges to AKP as well. After allowing reform of Turkey,s bankrupt social security system - a central reform needed for its IMF program - to languish in parliamentary committee for three months, and further damaging RELATIONS with the IMF with a populist VAT rate cut for the textile sector, the government rammed social security legislation through parliament April 19, despite popular opposition. ¶13. (SBU) The government,s handling of the Central Bank Governor appointment followed a similar pattern. Rather than make a smooth transition by nominating a candidate well in advance, the GOT failed to nominate a replacement to Sureyya Serdengecti until the last minute. Its first candidate was rejected by President Sezer. Only on April 18, Sezer approved the government's second candidate. AKP,s reaction ) voiced by parliamentary whip Kapusuz ) is that Sezer regularly oversteps his constitutional boundaries, holding up government nominations for long periods or refusing to sign off on them altogether. In effect, per Kapusuz, the Council of Ministers is empowered to nominate and is held politically accountable; the President,s role is merely to say &yea8 or &nay8. The secularists say the Presidency is intended precisely as a check on the government's power, and worry about an AKPer in the presidential palace. ¶14. (C) Comment: We will see further uncertainty and turmoil in Turkey as the 2007 election cycle approaches. Criticism of the AKP will heat up steadily, as critics look for vulnerabilities to erode AKP support, possibly split the party, force early elections and prevent AKP from electing the next President. AKP will fine-tune its nationalist message, as much to avoid losses from its own constituency as ANKARA 00002804 003 OF 003 to appeal to others. As a result, the government's room for maneuver on domestic hot button issues (such as Cyprus) has diminished substantially. AKP still enjoys a substantial majority in parliament but will increasingly act with its eyes clearly on the next election, the secular opposition and the military. End Comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON