ACCUSATIONS OF GOT MEDDLING IN JUDICIARY RING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002596 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE TU SUBJECT: ACCUSATIONS OF GOT MEDDLING IN JUDICIARY RING HOLLOW Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Summary: Judicial officials and opposition politicians often accuse Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of stocking the judiciary with judges and prosecutors who share the party's Islam-oriented views. Most contacts, however, say the accusations are alarmist. They note that applicants must clear a number of hurdles to enter the judiciary, and that it takes at least 15 years for a jurist to qualify for a high-level position. They also say AKP is no more biased in its judicial appointments than previous governments. At the same time, they acknowledge that the judiciary is not fully independent and requires reform, a point echoed in several EU reports on Turkey. End Summary. -------------- PM: How Can You Blame AKP? -------------- ¶2. (U) The presidents of both the Constitutional Court and the High Court of Appeals made public comments in April indicating, without detail, that AKP has been politicizing the judiciary. Such statements have become common among AKP's critics. PM Erdogan issued a sharp rebuttal in an April 16 interview with the daily Hurriyet. The PM averred that it is not plausible to imagine that AKP has been molding the judiciary in its own image during its short tenure in power since the November 2002 elections. Noting the strict requirements for entering the profession, and the long years needed to advance, Erdogan pointed out that the vast majority of judges and prosecutors were appointed by previous governments. "We came to power only three years ago," he said. "If there is politicization in the judiciary, then it involves judges and prosecutors recruited by our predecessors. How can you blame AKP for this?" -------------- Strict Requirements Limit Political Influence -------------- ¶3. (U) We discussed the issue with a wide range of contacts holding a variety of views on AKP. Most agreed that Erdogan has a strong argument. According to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ),508 of Turkey's 9,012 judges and prosecutors have been appointed since AKP rose to power. To become a judge or prosecutor, an applicant must earn a law degree, pass three exams, and complete a two-year apprenticeship. Jurists begin their careers in rural, less developed "Category Five" cities and gradually move up to large "Category One" cities. It takes at least 15 years to rise to Category One, and strict regulations require that appointees to top positions -- such as chief public prosecutors and judges on high courts -- be at the Category One level. ¶4. (U) The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors controls assignments and promotions within the judiciary. Five of seven Council members are appointed by the President (currently a staunch secularist) from among a list of high court judges. The Justice Minister and his Undersecretary also serve on the Council; the Justice Minister is Council president. ¶5. (C) Aykut Kilic, MOJ director general for International Law and Foreign Relations, averred to us that the strict requirements of the judicial system protect it from excessive political interference. He noted that the first, written exam for prospective jurists is controlled by an independent government agency. The second, oral exam is run by the MOJ, providing the first opportunity to screen candidates with political/religious bias. Kilic said he assumes the AKP government, like previous governments, favors like-minded applicants to the extent possible. But he said the space for political influence is limited, given that MOJ officials administering the oral exam can only choose among the small number of jurists who have cleared the previous career hurdles. ¶6. (C) In 2005, the GOT adopted legislation that would have ANKARA 00002596 002 OF 003 allowed the MOJ to recruit practicing attorneys as judges and prosecutors through an expedited process. GOT officials said the move was designed to meet the urgent need of filling 4,000 vacant positions. AKP critics, however, asserted it was an attempt to recruit Islam-oriented jurists. President Sezer vetoed the legislation, and the GOT subsequently dropped it. Sami Selcuk, a former president of the High Court of Appeals who ran for parliament as a Motherland Party candidate, told us the AKP initiative was no different from similar efforts by previous governments desperate to fill chronic staffing gaps in the judiciary. ¶7. (C) Vahit Bicak, attorney and former AKP-appointed head of the GOT's Human Rights Presidency, told us AKP is no more biased than previous Turkish governments when it comes to the judiciary. He noted that Mehmet Mogultay, who served as Justice Minister in the 1990s as an MP of the left-of-center Social Democratic People's Party, was accused by opposition parties of favoring leftist jurists. To this, Mogultay famously retorted: "What do you expect me to do, appoint judges from the (ultra-nationalist) Nationalist Movement Party?" Bicak said the accusations against AKP reflect the frustrations of AKP's critics over the lack of an effective political alternative. -------------- Judiciary Lacks Independence -------------- ¶8. (C) Ayse Arikan, former head of the MOJ General Directorate for EU Affairs, has a different view. Arikan resigned from the ministry recently, largely out of frustration with what she views as AKP interference with the judiciary and MOJ bureaucracy. She told us that the Turkish judiciary is far less independent in practice than it appears. While it is true that the Justice Minister and his Undersecretary wield only two of seven votes on the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, she said, the MOJ dominates Council decisions through its control of the body's funding. The Council meets in MOJ facilities and has no separate budget. The MOJ provides Council members with official vehicles (which Arikan said are often used for personal needs) and pays the bills when Council members participate in international conferences or visit regional courts in Turkey. Arikan said Council members technically can vote down an appointee proposed by the Justice Minister, but they would pay a heavy price, as the Minister could respond by cutting off their perquisites. ¶9. (C) Bicak told us he agrees that the Council lacks independence, though he doesn't share Arikan's views on the extent of MOJ influence. In addition to the points raised by Arikan, Bicak noted that the MOJ maintains full authority over the group of inspectors that drafts performance evaluations for judges an prosecutors. The Council relies on these evaluations when it reviews candidates for promotion, or disciplinary sanction. The Council was more independent before the 1980 military coup -- it had its own budget and supervised the inspectors, for example. The military-drafted, post-coup Constitution established the current system. The EU has issued a number of reports maintaining that MOJ influence over the Council undermines judicial independence, and calling for reform. ¶10. (C) Arikan, who joined MOJ in 1989, averred that AKP has demonstrated less respect for the concept of judicial independence than previous governments. She recalled once learning that a new employee had been assigned, without her knowledge, to work for her at the EU Affairs department. He was a qualified jurist, but spoke poor English (though his Arabic was strong) and had no background in EU matters. She said many positions in the ministry have similarly been filled with unqualified AKP favorites. Moreover, she said, the MOJ personnel department systematically has been seeking out jurists who attended imam hatip (Islamic preacher) high schools and submitting their names for appointments in both the judiciary and MOJ bureaucracy. ANKARA 00002596 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) According to Bicak, however, even if what Arikan says is true, these practices could not have changed the orientation of the judiciary. Given the rigid bureaucratic controls on career advancement, a government would have to be in power for more than 20 years before it could really make an imprint on the judiciary, he said. -------------- Comment: AKP Not the Only Outside Influence -------------- ¶12. (C) The charge that AKP is dramatically overhauling the judiciary rings hollow, given the rigid hierarchy of the Turkish system. That is not to say, however, that the judiciary is completely independent. In addition to the above-noted structural arrangements allowing the MOJ to influence the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the judiciary is also subject to other powerful outside influences. This was clear, for example, in March when a prosecutor in Van Province lost his job, and his license to practice, after naming Land Forces Commander Buyukanit in an indictment. Moreover, the Turkish General Staff regularly issues letters to prosecutors advising them to open cases against individuals who make statements that military officials believe violate the law, and prosecutors often follow through on these requests. Change is needed in the Turkish judiciary - to decrease the influence of the MOJ and the military and ensure more predictability and rule of law; least of all in the appointments system. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON