DEEPENING ANTI-PKK COOPERATION WITH GERMANY

S E C R E T ANKARA 002539 SIPDIS SIPDIS TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON AND JSERAFINI NSC FOR MERKEL EUCOM FOR CHRIS BURDICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2010 TAGS: KTFN PTER EFIN PGOV TU GE SUBJECT: DEEPENING ANTI-PKK COOPERATION WITH GERMANY REF: A. STATE 013857 ¶B. TD-314/25971-06 ¶C. BERLIN 988 ¶D. BERLIN 889 ¶E. ANKARA 2417 ¶F. 05 ANKARA 7497 ¶G. 05 STATE 186669 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Following the productive launch of discussions with German authorities on combating illegal PKK support activities in Germany, we may wish to consider bringing Turkish services directly into the conversation with German counterparts in the trilateral exercise foreseen by ref A. Using the German analytical paper (ref B) as a starting point, establishing a law enforcement/intelligence working group would ensure maximum information-sharing and lead development between Germans, Turks and Americans and would help break down barriers between intelligence, law enforcement and foreign ministry officials. It will also be important to take maximum advantage of anti-money laundering and terrorism finance tools. Germany could help strengthen the spines of other European countries that take a more tolerant approach to PKK criminality. End Summary. -------------- Break Down Barriers with a Working Group -------------- ¶2. (S) As refs C and D clearly demonstrate, there has been a positive initial reaction from German officials to our approaches on PKK, and German officials -- unlike German courts -- take a hard-nosed approach to PKK without illusions that the PKK is merely a political movement. While we defer to our colleagues in Embassy Berlin, our sense is that we need to move smartly to take advantage of this good start in ways that keep Turkey fully engaged and increase the likelihood of reaching results that disrupt PKK networks. ¶3. (S) The German report on PKK activities shared with us (ref B) could be a springboard for launching this effort. Using this paper as a starting point, German, U.S. and Turkish intelligence experts could identify gaps in our collective knowledge of PKK activities in Germany. They could then work with their respective agencies to prioritize and target those information gaps for collection and action. After a careful reconciliation of what the three countries collectively know and do not know about PKK support activities in Germany, we would then be in a better position to determine next actions. -------------- Maximum use of AML/CTF tools -------------- ¶4. (S) At the same time, as was suggested by French authorities for France, there could be utility in further discussion with German counterparts of the possible use of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) tools to disrupt financing flowing to PKK headquarters in northern Iraq. In ref C, the Interior Ministry Counterterrorism DG told Embassy Berlin that Germany had made good progress gathering information on the PKK, particularly on the financing side. We recommend Washington and Berlin consider checking into how well law enforcement and intelligence information is flowing to agencies responsible for financial crimes, and whether Germany is using the EU Clearinghouse designation of PKK and KGK to freeze assets of individuals and front organizations. Likewise, PKK individuals and fronts may be vulnerable to money-laundering charges. -------------- -------------- Leveraging German Experience and No-nonsense Approach -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) Germany's experience monitoring and combating the PKK and its sober, unromantic view of the terrorist organization is also an opportunity to leverage with other European countries. Asking German officials to brief European counterparts on their experience with PKK would impart knowledge and also send a signal that all countries need to take PKK more seriously. This might be particularly fruitful in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, which were criticized by the German Interior Ministry DG for their generous asylum and free speech policies. PKK abuse of asylum and refugee status might be a particularly fruitful area for Germany to share its expertise with others, given Schindler's statements that Germany no longer allows such status to be granted to PKK figures, and given the large number of PKK operatives who have obtained -- and abuse -- their asylum or refugee status in western European countries. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON