Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA2449
2006-05-03 15:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKISH TROOP MOVEMENTS: WHAT DO THEY MEAN?
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002449
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: TURKISH TROOP MOVEMENTS: WHAT DO THEY MEAN?
REF: A. ANKARA 2333 AND PREVIOUS B. KIRKUK 107 AND PREVIOUS C. ANKARA 2388 D. ANKARA TU 2311 (IIR 6 898 0231 06) E. ANKARA TU 2312 (IIR 6 898 0232 06) F. TD-314/30742-06 G. SERIAL IP 0600034 DTG 072035Z APR 06
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002449
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: TURKISH TROOP MOVEMENTS: WHAT DO THEY MEAN?
REF: A. ANKARA 2333 AND PREVIOUS B. KIRKUK 107 AND PREVIOUS C. ANKARA 2388 D. ANKARA TU 2311 (IIR 6 898 0231 06) E. ANKARA TU 2312 (IIR 6 898 0232 06) F. TD-314/30742-06 G. SERIAL IP 0600034 DTG 072035Z APR 06
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (S/NF) The deployment of troops along the Iraqi border appears to be consistent with GOT practice in past years when PKK terrorism threatened Turkey: The military is apparently sealing the Iraqi border in order to block PKK infiltration. This is what FonMin Gul told the Secretary during their April 25 meetings in Ankara, what Turkish military and intelligence sources tell us, and what Turkish leaders are telling the press. Senior leaders have made clear publicly the limits of what Turkey is doing, but some in military/security spheres are chest-thumping off the record. Under current conditions, we do not believe Turkey would carry out a significant cross-border operation without our knowing about it in advance. Exaggerated press speculation continues to mount, with some papers attempting to parse comments by U.S. officials in order to draw us into the controversy. End summary.
2. (S/NF) Turkey normally stations about 200,000 troops (Jandarma plus Army) in the eastern half of the country. For many years, it has deployed some among this number closer to the border during the warmer months when PKK infiltration rises. Turkish National Intelligence Organization Director Emre Taner told us May 1 that the military is now deploying approximately 90,000 troops along the Iraqi and Iranian borders to prevent PKK terrorists from infiltrating the border (ref f). Sensitive intelligence suggests that as many as six Army battalions and one Jandarma battalion have been deployed to the far southeast as of early April (approximately 5000 personnel),as well as limited heavy artillery and air assets. An additional army commando brigade (approximately another 4000 personnel) also appeared to be preparing to move to Hakkari province (ref g). In order for us to form a baseline to more fully analyze these deployments, DAO has requested from DIA an analysis of troop movements from this period in 2005. However, no evidence available here suggests that there have been significant movements of people or heavy equipment from other parts of the country to the east or southeast.
3. (S/NF) Despite Turkish press speculation (see below),there remains scanty evidence of cross-border Turkish military activity into Iraq. Task Force Band of Brothers LNO to the Turkish Special Forces in northern Iraq visited border villages on the Iraqi side which Kurdish sources claimed had been shelled by the Turks: They were not. The same LNO had a chance encounter with PKK terrorists in the same region; the terrorists denied any hostile Turkish fire (refs d and e). As we have reported, Turkey has long posted approximately 1500 personnel in northern Iraq to monitor PKK movements. These troops are not engaged in operations and are themselves closely watched by KDP and PUK peshmerga. Aside from the Iraqi Ambassador telling us recently that a senior MFA official admitted that Turkish forces have been carrying out limited hot pursuit while chasing terrorists (ref a),there seems to be little activity to report. We note that the Turkey-Iraq border is rugged and not demarcated; limited and local hot pursuit has almost certainly been occurring for some time and has not drawn a negative reaction from Iraq.
4. (C/NF) During the mid-to-late 1990s, the Turkish military often carried out similar significant troop movements toward the border. The intent was to seal the border, and then work backwards toward Turkey's interior, carrying out counterinsurgency operations. Such an operational approach requires significant numbers of troops. While Turkish soldiers are apparently carrying our counterinsurgency activities in the southeast, we have no evidence that they are of the same scale or severity as the relatively indiscriminate operations of the 1990s.
5. (S/NF) In meeting with U.S. officials (including FonMin Gul's April 25 meetings with the Secretary) and in talking to the press, Turkish military and civilian leaders have been strikingly consistent in describing the intent of troop movements within Turkey. Gul told the press May 2 that Turkey has carried out such operations before, and the objective is to seal the border to prevent infiltration by PKK terrorists. It has taken these steps both due to an uptick in PKK activity in Turkey and the Iraqis' inability to control its own borders. He added that Turkish and international law gives Turkey the right to defend its borders, and that the GOI has agreed with this view. LTG Bekir Kalyoncu closely echoed Gul's comments in a May 2 press conference. Thus far both Turkey's military and civilian leadership has shown discipline in not indulging in undue swagger.
6. (C/NF) These sober and rational comments notwithstanding, there has been dramatic and wildly speculative press reporting on these issues. Press commentators claim these are the most extensive troop movements since the mid 1990s, when southeast Turkey was essentially a war zone. Anonymous Turkish officialshave claimed in the papers that Turkish forces have carried out a variety of operations in northern Iraq. One daily even claimed that Turkish Special Forces will carry out operations on the PKK's traditional hideout, Kandil Mountain, which is 145 miles from the Turkish border. The same report claimed that Turkish forces are also massing on the Iranian border to ensure Turkey's security in case of a U.S. military strike against Iran. PRT reporting from Iraq indicates that the Iraqi Kurds are increasingly concerned that Turkey and Iran are preparing to intervene militarily in the north (ref b). However, as we have noted above, evidence of Turkish military activity in Iraq itself is lacking.
7. (C/NF) While military leaders have on the record sought to calm both domestic and international concern, behind the scenes they are likely playing politics, both foreign and domestic. The increased activity -- and the cascade of press coverage -- tells the Turkish people that their military is acting to protect them (in contrast to the civilian government, which has apparently been unable to do so). These also constitute psyops against the PKK, and send a message to the Iraqis, especially Iraq's major Kurdish leaders.
8. (S/NF) Based on government assurances, we do not think significant cross-border action is planned -- now. After all the history related to the PKK in northern Iraq, we do not think Turkey would mount a large-scale cross-border operation (CBO) without our knowing about it in advance. However, if the PKK carries out a mass casualty attack or the level of PKK violence in Turkey rises sharply, the pressure on the military to act will become unbearable. Turkish military planners no doubt have conceived a number of options for any potential CBO. One must be to repeat what Turkey did in 1995 and 1999: 30,000 army troops in northern Iraq (though only a few miles past the border) for a significant period. This seems like the least likely option. Another scenario might entail a relatively small number of air-mobile Special Forces or commandos going into the camps on a search and destroy mission. Such an operation could avoid a potential confrontation with KDP peshmerga. We note that all this is speculation, and we have no hard information on what plans the Turkish military may have.
9. (C/NF) As troop movements and the press barrage continue, the Turkish public and press are also paying close attention to U.S. views. The Turkish daily Hurriyet sought to find differences between comments the Ambassador has made to the Turkish press (to the effect that troop movements within Turkey are nothing new, and that Turkey is taking these actions to prevent PKK infiltration) and the Department Spokesman's response to a question at the May 2 briefing that we call on all of Iraq's neighbors to respect Iraq's sovereignty. We see no daylight between these remarks, but it demonstrates how much we are under the microscope on this sensitive issue.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: TURKISH TROOP MOVEMENTS: WHAT DO THEY MEAN?
REF: A. ANKARA 2333 AND PREVIOUS B. KIRKUK 107 AND PREVIOUS C. ANKARA 2388 D. ANKARA TU 2311 (IIR 6 898 0231 06) E. ANKARA TU 2312 (IIR 6 898 0232 06) F. TD-314/30742-06 G. SERIAL IP 0600034 DTG 072035Z APR 06
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (S/NF) The deployment of troops along the Iraqi border appears to be consistent with GOT practice in past years when PKK terrorism threatened Turkey: The military is apparently sealing the Iraqi border in order to block PKK infiltration. This is what FonMin Gul told the Secretary during their April 25 meetings in Ankara, what Turkish military and intelligence sources tell us, and what Turkish leaders are telling the press. Senior leaders have made clear publicly the limits of what Turkey is doing, but some in military/security spheres are chest-thumping off the record. Under current conditions, we do not believe Turkey would carry out a significant cross-border operation without our knowing about it in advance. Exaggerated press speculation continues to mount, with some papers attempting to parse comments by U.S. officials in order to draw us into the controversy. End summary.
2. (S/NF) Turkey normally stations about 200,000 troops (Jandarma plus Army) in the eastern half of the country. For many years, it has deployed some among this number closer to the border during the warmer months when PKK infiltration rises. Turkish National Intelligence Organization Director Emre Taner told us May 1 that the military is now deploying approximately 90,000 troops along the Iraqi and Iranian borders to prevent PKK terrorists from infiltrating the border (ref f). Sensitive intelligence suggests that as many as six Army battalions and one Jandarma battalion have been deployed to the far southeast as of early April (approximately 5000 personnel),as well as limited heavy artillery and air assets. An additional army commando brigade (approximately another 4000 personnel) also appeared to be preparing to move to Hakkari province (ref g). In order for us to form a baseline to more fully analyze these deployments, DAO has requested from DIA an analysis of troop movements from this period in 2005. However, no evidence available here suggests that there have been significant movements of people or heavy equipment from other parts of the country to the east or southeast.
3. (S/NF) Despite Turkish press speculation (see below),there remains scanty evidence of cross-border Turkish military activity into Iraq. Task Force Band of Brothers LNO to the Turkish Special Forces in northern Iraq visited border villages on the Iraqi side which Kurdish sources claimed had been shelled by the Turks: They were not. The same LNO had a chance encounter with PKK terrorists in the same region; the terrorists denied any hostile Turkish fire (refs d and e). As we have reported, Turkey has long posted approximately 1500 personnel in northern Iraq to monitor PKK movements. These troops are not engaged in operations and are themselves closely watched by KDP and PUK peshmerga. Aside from the Iraqi Ambassador telling us recently that a senior MFA official admitted that Turkish forces have been carrying out limited hot pursuit while chasing terrorists (ref a),there seems to be little activity to report. We note that the Turkey-Iraq border is rugged and not demarcated; limited and local hot pursuit has almost certainly been occurring for some time and has not drawn a negative reaction from Iraq.
4. (C/NF) During the mid-to-late 1990s, the Turkish military often carried out similar significant troop movements toward the border. The intent was to seal the border, and then work backwards toward Turkey's interior, carrying out counterinsurgency operations. Such an operational approach requires significant numbers of troops. While Turkish soldiers are apparently carrying our counterinsurgency activities in the southeast, we have no evidence that they are of the same scale or severity as the relatively indiscriminate operations of the 1990s.
5. (S/NF) In meeting with U.S. officials (including FonMin Gul's April 25 meetings with the Secretary) and in talking to the press, Turkish military and civilian leaders have been strikingly consistent in describing the intent of troop movements within Turkey. Gul told the press May 2 that Turkey has carried out such operations before, and the objective is to seal the border to prevent infiltration by PKK terrorists. It has taken these steps both due to an uptick in PKK activity in Turkey and the Iraqis' inability to control its own borders. He added that Turkish and international law gives Turkey the right to defend its borders, and that the GOI has agreed with this view. LTG Bekir Kalyoncu closely echoed Gul's comments in a May 2 press conference. Thus far both Turkey's military and civilian leadership has shown discipline in not indulging in undue swagger.
6. (C/NF) These sober and rational comments notwithstanding, there has been dramatic and wildly speculative press reporting on these issues. Press commentators claim these are the most extensive troop movements since the mid 1990s, when southeast Turkey was essentially a war zone. Anonymous Turkish officialshave claimed in the papers that Turkish forces have carried out a variety of operations in northern Iraq. One daily even claimed that Turkish Special Forces will carry out operations on the PKK's traditional hideout, Kandil Mountain, which is 145 miles from the Turkish border. The same report claimed that Turkish forces are also massing on the Iranian border to ensure Turkey's security in case of a U.S. military strike against Iran. PRT reporting from Iraq indicates that the Iraqi Kurds are increasingly concerned that Turkey and Iran are preparing to intervene militarily in the north (ref b). However, as we have noted above, evidence of Turkish military activity in Iraq itself is lacking.
7. (C/NF) While military leaders have on the record sought to calm both domestic and international concern, behind the scenes they are likely playing politics, both foreign and domestic. The increased activity -- and the cascade of press coverage -- tells the Turkish people that their military is acting to protect them (in contrast to the civilian government, which has apparently been unable to do so). These also constitute psyops against the PKK, and send a message to the Iraqis, especially Iraq's major Kurdish leaders.
8. (S/NF) Based on government assurances, we do not think significant cross-border action is planned -- now. After all the history related to the PKK in northern Iraq, we do not think Turkey would mount a large-scale cross-border operation (CBO) without our knowing about it in advance. However, if the PKK carries out a mass casualty attack or the level of PKK violence in Turkey rises sharply, the pressure on the military to act will become unbearable. Turkish military planners no doubt have conceived a number of options for any potential CBO. One must be to repeat what Turkey did in 1995 and 1999: 30,000 army troops in northern Iraq (though only a few miles past the border) for a significant period. This seems like the least likely option. Another scenario might entail a relatively small number of air-mobile Special Forces or commandos going into the camps on a search and destroy mission. Such an operation could avoid a potential confrontation with KDP peshmerga. We note that all this is speculation, and we have no hard information on what plans the Turkish military may have.
9. (C/NF) As troop movements and the press barrage continue, the Turkish public and press are also paying close attention to U.S. views. The Turkish daily Hurriyet sought to find differences between comments the Ambassador has made to the Turkish press (to the effect that troop movements within Turkey are nothing new, and that Turkey is taking these actions to prevent PKK infiltration) and the Department Spokesman's response to a question at the May 2 briefing that we call on all of Iraq's neighbors to respect Iraq's sovereignty. We see no daylight between these remarks, but it demonstrates how much we are under the microscope on this sensitive issue.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON