SCENESETTER: YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002199 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU VISIT SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) Madam Secretary, ¶1. (S) Thank you for coming to Turkey. The Mission and I look forward to seeing you here. Your visit can help us achieve three things. -- First, we need to restore lost confidence --on both sides -- about intent and capacity for genuine collaboration. Announcing the start of a strategic dialogue will reinforce that effort. -- Second, we need a clearer common understanding on Iran that will help us avoid Turkish wavering (or worse) and ensure Ankara is with us when we need it. -- Third, we need to help the Turks see a way forward on Cyprus and the EU that welcomes UN technical work, activates Turkish diplomacy and politicking in European capitals, and shows more momentum on domestic accession issues. You will hear, privately and publicly, a great deal of frustration over PKK terrorism and impatience with US inaction against PKK camps in northern Iraq. You will also find anxiety about further regional instability that is fueled by fears that Iraq will fragment, Palestine will implode, and Iran and the West will collide militarily. Despite these concerns and the fact that public sentiment toward the US remains largely negative, this government is rhetorically committed to working with us to find a new paradigm for partnership. The test for both of us is whether we can replace that rhetoric with reality. Where We Find Ourselves -------------- ¶2. (S) You come to Turkey at a time when our relations should be strong, but remain frayed. It's not for lack of trying. The Turks were and are immensely grateful for your role in getting the EU accession talks started last October. We have restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level visits over the past nine months. We have shifted our dialogue on Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about the PKK and Kirkuk to constructive collaboration politically and logistically in support of our efforts there. ¶3. (S) The Hamas visit set this back more seriously than Turkish officials are willing to admit. You know better than we the bitterness toward Turkey that exists in some parts of Congress and especially the American Jewish community. For this and a variety of reasons, we still have a Turkey problem. There are tactical problems on this or that issue, but the fundamental problem is a continuing lack of confidence ) on both sides. ¶4. (S) Left alone, the problems will get worse. None of the regional challenges is getting any easier. Internally, politicking has begun ahead of the presidential election in May 2007 and parliamentary elections that must occur by November 2007. Infighting among secularists, AKP Islamists and nationalists is intensifying. Each side regards the US as both a punching bag and a source of support. Though PM Erdogan remains by far Turkey's most popular politician and AK has no serious competitor, he and FM Gul -- in the face of rising PKK violence, EU obstinacy on Cyprus, angst about Iraq and Iran, and obvious tension over US-Turkish relations -- are vulnerable to nationalists and to the military. Reverting to Turkish pugnacity, the predictable course of action, will likely worsen matters for us here. How We Can Use Your Visit -------------- ¶5. (S) Your visit can give public profile to the positives in our relations and our collaboration on key global issues. It is a step toward restoring confidence, Gul's reported theme for your visit. Really restoring confidence requires action, of course, and your talks here can help us better organize Turkey for progress on those issues that can improve the atmosphere and move away from the problems that are undermining our ties. You will be investing in relationships with Erdogan and Gul -- both of whom look set to be in leadership for a while, share our goals in many areas, and have influence and credibility in the region. The fact that they want and need US support internationally and as they look toward a crucial 18 months of domestic transition gives us leverage. Key Issues -------------- ANKARA 00002199 002 OF 003 ¶6. (S) Iran: Greg Schulte came here in February to share our intelligence on Iran's nuclear efforts and consult on the way forward. Gul told visiting Congressional staff last week that Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations are the single most important problem facing Europe and the Middle East, and he emphasized the need for a united and decisive international approach. In public and apparently in private, Ankara has called on Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA, adopt full transparency on its nuclear programs, and resume negotiations with the EU-3. Gul should hear where you want to take the Iran debate and how Turkey must be with us on this critical threat to it and to our alliance -- through diplomacy now and/or through any protective, preventive or other military efforts that may be required in the future. You should also tell him that Turkey must not break ranks and de-isolate Tehran -- Ahmadinejad and Larijani visits here have been mooted and shot down recently, but probably not killed. 7 (S) Cyprus/EU: Ankara feels cornered by the EU's insistence that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot goods, its incessant reform demands -- including on issues that seem impossible to them (Cyprus, the Greek Patriarchate, Kurdish rights),and the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish sentiment in many EU capitals. Erdogan and Gul need both support and tough love. You should compliment Gul's Cyprus proposals of last January and his EU-related reform package of several days ago, and tell him the US will continue to push the EU to keep the accession process on track. But the Turks should also be told to respond positively to the UN-brokered technical talks on Cyprus and to stop complaining about Kofi Annan and his Cyprus representative, which only undermines their interest in getting a UN process restarted. You should tell them that senior Turkish officials need to spend a lot more time courting European allies in the EU process ) they have only the UK now. The appearance and reality of steady progress on reform is also essential for keeping the EU bicycle aright. The Halki Seminary and other Greek Patriarchate issues are hard for Turkey, but progress would do wonders for Turkey's image in Europe and the US and put beef in the "Dialogue of Civilizations" bun. ¶8. (S) HAMAS: Erdogan and Gul are deeply defensive about the HAMAS visit. They see a rejected and rejectionist HAMAS as something that will aggravate instability, worsen the 'clash of civilizations,' and bolster Iran's influence, which they do not want. But Gul understands the need not to dig a deeper hole for Turkey: with some prompting, he criticized HAMAS' failure to condemn the Tel Aviv bombing. Gul will probe for ways Turkey can be helpful and will want to describe Abu Mazen's April 24-25 talks here. Consulting with the Turks on how we see the Middle East developing in coming months will be helpful. You should also restate your disappointment that HAMAS came here, suggest that Turkey find ways to call publicly for HAMAS to change, and urge that there be no more surprises. ¶9. (S) Iraq and the PKK: The government and public here are unnerved by recent developments in Iraq, signs of civil war and fears of Iraq's breakup. Rising PKK violence aggravates this. Gul wants a fresh sense of our Iraq game plan and what we expect of Turkey. Besides this, you should reiterate our commitment to helping with the PKK problem, note that we have limits, and urge the government to stop painting itself in a corner by incessantly calling for more that it knows we can deliver. You should also encourage Erdogan and Gul to flesh out a political vision on Turkey's Kurdish issue and draw moderate Kurdish leaders into the system. ¶10. (S) Armenia: I understand that Gul has sent you a letter on the annual Armenian genocide resolution. The Turks realize that this always difficult issue is now harder because of HAMAS. Erdogan hopes you will reaffirm the Administration,s determination to pull out all stops to prevent passage of genocide language. In addition, you should commend Turkey's efforts to establish a mutually-acceptable Turkish-Armenian mechanism to review the history and begin laying the groundwork for reconciliation. Opening the Armenian border, especially in the context of an Armenian-Azeri peace deal, would be a huge step forward. ¶11. (S) Strategic Dialogue: As we complete this message, we are still awaiting a response to the 'strategic partnership framework' document that EUR presented to the Turks several weeks ago. We are pressing the MFA to agree on a text that can be part of your visit. Announcement by you and Gul that we intend to set up a formal and regular senior-level strategic dialogue consultative mechanism will signal progress toward restoring confidence and strengthen our ability to work the Turks in ways helpful to our goals in the region and in Turkey itself. ANKARA 00002199 003 OF 003 Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON