TURKEY/CYPRUS/EU - MEETING WITH TURKISH ACTING FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000191 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2025 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EU CY SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS/EU - MEETING WITH TURKISH ACTING FM REF: A. STATE 08233 ¶B. ANKARA 07631 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action message. See paragraph 8. ¶2. (C) Summary: Ambassador and UK Ambassador Westmacott were convoked January 18 by Turkish Acting FM Tuygan to discuss Cyprus and related EU accession issues. Tuygan described in familiar terms the elaboration of FM Gul,s proposals to deal with the EU Customs Union ports/airports issue, ease the isolation of Northern Cyprus and enable Turkey to meet its EU Customs Union obligations. He said that Turkey,s UN ambassador will meet with UNSYG Annan on Friday, January 20 to solicit support, and he appealed for an encouraging word to Annan,s office about US and UK interest in the Turkish initiative. Both the US and UK ambassadors welcomed the Turkish initiative and undertook to relay the request to New York. Westmacott did not address specifics in the Turkish initiative, but urged packaging it in a strategic context ) that the status quo on Cyprus is bad for its people, the region and the world. He and the US Ambassador also urged careful marketing, including accompanying it with Turkish moves on non-Cyprus issues, such as dropping freedom of expression prosecutions and making a gesture on Cypriot membership in international organizations. Regarding the Turkish paper we had seen earlier (but that the Turks did not discuss further),the Ambassador urged that the Turks describe their ideas as pragmatic and flexible. Per ref a, he suggested that one element might be Turkish ports in exchange for Famagusta access. Tuygan said he wants to see Turkey act on a variety of fronts, including the non-Cyprus issues to which the Ambassadors referred, but urged that the US and European responses to the Turkish initiative not focus too much on the other things Turkey needs to do; such an approach would empower those here who say the whole EU and Cyprus diplomacy efforts are fruitless and should be abandoned. Post recommends that USUN indicate to the UNSYG,s office that the US welcomes the Turkish initiative and is prepared to work with the UK, the UN, the EU and others on it. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Tuygan said that Turkey believes the EU accession process is proceeding well. Cyprus remains a problem which FM Gul,s May 2005 initiative on ports/airports and trade had been designed to move forward. Since there had been little reaction, Turkey had decided to try again and to elaborate Gul,s ideas in ways that might stimulate discussion and get Cyprus out of its current dead end. Besides discussions in late 2005 with the US and the UK, Turkey had briefed Russia, China and France, and the reaction was by and large positive. Turkey,s UN PermRep hopes to get some positive reaction from UNSYG Annan (e.g., &workable8 or &useful8) that might facilitate negotiations. Turkey is prepared to sit down with the Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and whomever else is interested and work out an arrangement. For years, the US and UK had urged Turkey to take the high moral ground on Cyprus. Despite the erosion of Turkey,s high ground since the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, this initiative was being put forth in that spirit, and Tuygan appealed for support with Annan prior to the Friday meeting. ¶4. (C) Westmacott admitted that the EU had badly handled Cyprus. The failure - for reasons largely not of Turkey,s making - of the Cyprus settlement was bad for the EU, bad for the EU,s important enlargement initiatives, bad for regional security, and bad for the people of Cyprus. EU members need to take more responsibility on Cyprus, without supplanting the UN, and show greater resistance to the tactics of one member (Cyprus). He urged that Turkey, in presenting its initiative, describe this in a broader context, including why the lack of movement on Cyprus is bad. The UN Good Offices mission needs a breath of fresh life, and Turkey,s initiative is a useful addition. ¶5. (C) Marketing the Turkish initiative in the EU will be difficult, Westmacott indicated. The strategic vision would be important. Positive words from the UNSYG will help. As far as possible, Turkey should try to move ahead on non-Cyprus issues on the accession agenda, including, e.g., the Pamuk/freedom of expression cases, the Halki Seminary, and other items in the news recently, such as the Agca case and alcohol bans. Turkey should also consider making a gesture on Cypriot membership in international organizations ) such as the OECD on-line information initiative, an international weather organization, etc. Turkey might even drop its objection to Cypriot membership in Wassenaar and call on Nicosia to stop blocking Turkey,s European Defense Agency (EDA) bid. Even if Cyprus rejected the quid pro quo, ANKARA 00000191 002 OF 002 Turkey would help itself with other Europeans. ¶6. (C) Ambassador endorsed, echoed Westmacott,s arguments, and made the points in ref a. He recommended that the Turkish proposals be as narrowly focused and have as many flexibilities (e.g., in timing and phasing) as possible. He specifically mentioned the Famagusta proposal contained in ref a, to which Tuygan did not respond. He strongly urged action on the non-Cyprus agenda of issues, including especially freedom of expression, Halki and the various other issues associated with the Ecumenical Patriarch, all of which were the right thing to do and would help build support for Turkish EU accession among skeptical European publics. Ambassador also seconded Westmacott,s points on Cypriot membership in international organizations and Wassenaar. What is needed is (a) something to delay a derailment in the accession process over Cyprus while the effort achieves a cruising altitude and (b) Turkish steps on other fronts that show Europeans that Turkey is indeed reforming and is good and important for European security, values, etc. Turkey might even consider this when staking its position on Iran (also a topic of discussion with Tuygan) or activating its diplomacy on Caspian gas to European markets. ¶7. (C) Tuygan did not disagree with any of the ambassadors, suggestions and said flexibilities are built into Turkey,s Cyprus initiative. He stressed that Turkey wants to, as PM Erdogan has put it, stay one step ahead of the Greek Cypriots, and this initiative is designed to do that. If the EU accession process boils down to the one problem of opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels, especially now, then the process will stop before it even gets started. The goal should be to prevent that. ¶8. (C) Action request: Post recommends that USUN find a way to make the UNSYG,s office aware that the Turks have consulted us and the UK on their initiative, that we welcome it and support what it represents, and that a positive reaction ) that avoids endorsement of the specifics put forward by the Turks ) by the SYG will be helpful in getting Cyprus out of its current dead end. WILSON