TURKEY: PKK VIOLENCE AND KURDISH VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001899 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2026 TAGS: PTER PHUM PREL PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: PKK VIOLENCE AND KURDISH VIEWS REF: A. ADANA 72 ¶B. ADANA 60 ¶C. ADANA 64 ¶D. ADANA 67 ¶E. ADANA 68 ¶F. 05 ANKARA 5109 ¶G. 05 ANKARA 4842 Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In discussing the recent unrest in southeastern Turkey (reftels A-E),Kurdish contacts describe a growing sense of rage and frustration in the region. They say many Kurds oppose violence by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),but have lost hope that the GOT will address the region's problems. The GOT failed to seriously address the issue during the years of relative peace following the 1999 capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. A November 2005 bookstore bombing in the southeastern city of Semdinli, apparently carried out by security forces, caused an abrupt increase in anti-government sentiment. The GOT has made limited reforms on Kurdish expression, but much of what southeastern Kurds want -- including an amnesty for PKK militants -- will be increasingly difficult, especially if the PKK carries through with its threats to continue and expand the violence. End Summary. -------------- GOT Blames PKK for Riots -------------- ¶2. (C) Ihsan Arslan, AKP MP from Diyarbakir, claimed that AKP has won support in the southeast by adopting reforms, including reforms related to Kurdish language and cultural rights. He said the PKK feels threatened by AKP's success, and sought to undermine progress in the region by sparking conflict. However, Arslan told us he was surprised that demonstrators had vandalized AKP offices, given the party's efforts to address problems in the region. AKP MP Yasar Yakis told us the PKK wants to demonstrate that it remains powerful, in a futile effort to force the GOT into negotiations. -------------- Kurds Cite Deeper Causes -------------- ¶3. (U) Kurdish contacts, however, argue that it is a mistake to view the disturbances simply as a PKK provocation. They maintain that the protests tapped into a well of anti-government rage that is far broader than the influence of the terrorist group. ¶4. (C) Rojbin Tugan, an attorney and activist in the southeast, told us April 6 that most southeastern Kurds are weary of the violence in the region and resentful of the PKK's efforts to build support through intimidation. She recalled that she recently helped produce a statement on behalf of a women's organization condemning PKK violence; the PKK responded by threatening each member of the organization. In July 2005, Hikmet Fidan, a Kurdish political figure who had criticized the PKK, was murdered in Diyarbakir. Many believe PKK leaders ordered the killing. ¶5. (C) Tugan said such brutal tactics had caused an erosion of PKK support -- until a November 2005 incident in which local residents caught two Jandarma officials fleeing the scene of a bookstore bombing in Semdinli, Hakkari Province. The Jandarma agents are on trial for the bombing, which sparked a series of violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces in which five protestors were killed. Tugan said the Semdinli bombing, and its aftermath, caused a sharp increase in anti-government sentiment. As a result, she said, Kurds in the southeast now feel they have nowhere to turn for support. ¶6. (C) Yusuf Alatas, a Kurdish attorney and president of the Human Rights Association, told us he traveled to Diyarbakir in March to participate in Nevruz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations, and was shocked to see how radicalized the ANKARA 00001899 002 OF 003 youth had become. A couple of years ago, he said, residents were hopeful that EU-mandated reforms would gradually bring freedom and prosperity. But today hardly anyone believes the GOT will implement meaningful reforms, and optimism is rare. Kurds in the southeast view police and Jandarma as occupying forces, and the security forces view residents as enemies, not fellow citizens. "Young people in the region are not even asking for economic support or cultural rights anymore," he said. "They feel nothing but hate, and just want to lash out." ¶7. (C) Alatas believes GOT authorities fail to understand this reality. He criticized prosecutors for opening an investigation against Diyarbakir Mayor Baydemir for his comments praising demonstrators' "courage," while urging them to disperse. Alatas said Baydemir delivered just the right message under the circumstances -- given the depth of public rage, the crowd would have jeered the mayor if he had simply ordered them off the streets. Diyarbakir businessman Sahismail Bedirhanoglu, president of the Southeast Anatolian Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, told us Baydemir confided to him that concerns about PKK retribution prevented him from making a stronger statement condemning the unprecedented rioting and looting in Diyarbakir. Tugan told us that Baydemir, while vilified by the GOT, is considered by more radical Kurds in the region as too soft in criticizing the state. -------------- No Progress During "Peace" -------------- ¶8. (C) Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk, co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP),told us the roots of the problem extend far beyond the Semdinli bombing. (Note: DTP is widely seen as linked to the PKK. Party members deny any direct links, claiming they share some of the PKK's goals but reject violence. End Note.) Turk averred that the 1999 capture of Ocalan led to a PK ceasefire and "six years of peace," but the government failed to capitalize on the situation by negotiating a settlement with the PKK and providing economic support to the region. He said the GOT has resisted EU-related reforms on Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, and has failed to properly implement the few measures it has adopted. The economy, meanwhile, remains weak. Similarly, Tugluk said, Kurds in the region are frustrated by PM Erdogan's failure to follow through on his August 2005 speech in Diyarbakir (reftels F-G),in which he indicated a new approach to the "Kurdish problem." -------------- GOT Has Made Limited Reforms -------------- ¶9. (C) The GOT, under EU pressure, has adopted some limited reforms on Kurdish expression. Parliament passed legislation allowing private Kurdish language courses and Kurdish-language broadcasting. But these rights were placed under such tight restrictions that their impact has been minimal. (Note: At the same time, Bedirhanoglu told us that Kurds in the region have benefited from broader reforms expanding the freedoms of assembly and expression. End Note). The Southeastern Anatolia Project, a massive hydroelectricity and irrigation program, has not made an impact in the heavily Kurdish parts of the region. Erdogan did not make any specific promises in his August speech, but his comments broke new rhetoric ground and raised hopes of a new democratic approach to the region. However, many of the steps Kurds in the region would like to see -- such as an amnesty for PKK militants and electoral reforms that would improve DTP's chances of entering Parliament -- are not considered politically viable. AKP MP Arslan told us such measures could not even be considered until after the 2007 general elections. ¶10. (C) Alatas said the GOT has no plan for the southeast, other than to fight the PKK. In his view, the GOT considers the Kurdish identity, not just the PKK, as a threat. Many state and government leaders believe reforms aimed at ANKARA 00001899 003 OF 003 expanding Kurdish linguistic/cultural rights are dangerous concessions. For them, he said, the latest disturbances prove that EU-mandated reforms have emboldened Kurdish separatists. Alatas recalled that he once asked FM Gul why the government did not do more to loosen restrictions on Kurdish expression. Visibly annoyed, Gul replied, "Haven't we done enough?" -------------- Comment: GOT Must Address Region's Problems -------------- ¶11. (C) The GOT,s continuing failure to address the southeast,s underlying political and economic problems has perpetuated anger and alienation among a large swath of the southeast,s heavily ethnic-Kurdish public. This has created the political space in which the PKK operates. The GOT will have to find ways to inspire hope among southeastern Kurds - including creating jobs and a broader acceptance of Kurdish cultural rights -- even as it fights the PKK. Otherwise, another generation will grow up viewing the Turkish state as an occupying force in the region. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON