TURKEY/IRAN NUKES: GOT ON BOARD DIPLOMATIC TRACK;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001891 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IR TU SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAN NUKES: GOT ON BOARD DIPLOMATIC TRACK; WIDESPREAD PUBLIC FEAR OF MILITARY ACTION Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOT supports UNSC deliberations on the Iranian nuclear program and has indicated a willingness to dialogue with us about future steps including targeted sanctions. FM Gul has made supportive public statements and has convoked Turkish Ambassadors in the region to brainstorm about the issue. The Turkish public remains deeply wary of possible military action, which many pundits assrt is immediate, inevitable and guaranteed to produce greater instability. End Summary. -------------- GOT Supports Diplomatic Track -------------- ¶2. (C) The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on March 30 supporting the UNSC presidency statement on Iran (paragraph 10 below). The MFA statement indicted, in part, that "we believe this statement creates great opportunity for peaceful resolution of the problem. We support this statement which reflects the common expectations of the international community on Iran." On April 4, FM Gul stated at a press corps breakfast that "Turkey is against the emerging of a nuclear power in its region" and Turkey hopes that the Iranian nuclear problem will be solved through peaceful means. He reiterated both Turkey and Iran's right to nuclear energy programs and asserted that Iran is one of the most important countries in the region. Gul said, "Turkey is also assuming an active role in solving the problem through diplomatic means." Gul also noted that the U.S. supports a diplomatic solution. -------------- MFA OFFICIALS GET THE POINT -------------- ¶3. (C) We discussed the Iranian issue with two senior MFA officials -- DG for the Middle East Bozkurt Aran and MFA Energy Coordinator Mithat Balkan -- both former Turkish Ambassadors to Iran. They said that the Iranians were determined to proceed with their nuclear program and they did not believe that the UNSC presidency statement would deter Tehran. We asked if Turkey was ready to discuss next steps possibly including targeted sanctions. Balkan said that sanctions would be very controversial in Turkey, but he saw no other option. Both agreed that it was essential the international community present a unified front to Tehran. Aran said the Turkish government does not want to be seen as conspiring against the Iranian people, but the MFA would be ready to offer suggestions regarding targeted sanctions when the time was right. We pushed back by noting that if Ankara waits too long, the decisions may be made without Turkey's input. Our Turkish colleagues got the point. ¶4. (C) We also discussed the issue with working-level MFA officials. MFA First Secretary and Iran desk officer Aziz Sevi told us that the presidency statement represents a new and important development. It shows that the P-5 are united. He also reiterated the MFA refrain that the GOT's position is clear -- they support the international consensus on Iran. MFA First Secretary and counter-proliferation desk officer Guven Begec was very pleased with the UNSC presidency statement. He told us that his office had done its job and "convinced the ministry" that the international community was serious about Iran's violations of the NPT and that Turkey must join the international consensus. -------------- OTHERS STILL HAVE DOUBTS -------------- ¶5. (C) Many Turks outside the government view this issue through the prism of the Iraq war. They believe diplomatic steps will not deter Iran, fear that the U.S. will pressure Turkey to accept economic sanctions against Iran, and dread the possibility of another war in the region. Some of our contacts, moreover, tell us that Iran intends to use its nuclear weapons against Israel or the smaller Persian Gulf states, but not Turkey. ¶6. (C) Many of our nongovernmental contacts doubt European, Russian, and Chinese resolve and do not believe that the ANKARA 00001891 002 OF 002 international consensus will last. Bilkent University International Relations Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu told us that Russia and China will not support economic sanctions against Iran. MP Ziyadeen Akbulut, a senior member of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP),told us that, as with Iraq, America's European allies will not support military action against Iran. Seyfi Tashan, director of the Foreign Policy Institute, argued that China will never agree to sanctions against Iran because it needs Iranian oil and questioned Russia and China,s commitment to supporting the U.S. and EU-3 on Iran. ASAM think tank expert Bahadir Koc asserted that the USG did not get as strong of a statement from the UNSC as it had wished and the unanimity of the P-5 on the presidency statement is likely to break down over the long haul. ¶7. (C) Most of our nongovernmental contacts also do not believe diplomatic pressure or even sanctions would be effective in changing Tehran,s policies. Bulent Karadeniz, the vice chairman of the MFA,s Center for Strategic Studies and Arif Keskin, an expert on Iran at the ASAM think tank, have told us that foreign pressure or sanctions are likely to have the unintended affect of rallying the public around the Tehran regime. ¶8. (C) Some, however, have suggested that freezing the overseas assets of Iranian leaders and government institutions might be an effective way to pressure the regime without hurting the people. MFA Iran Desk officer Aziz Sevi, who until six months ago was serving in Damascus, noted that the UN's decision to freeze Syrian assets after the Harari assassination had a significant impact upon the SARG's behavior. Although he is not optimistic about their likelihood of success, ASAM's Keskin told us that UN-backed, targeted sanctions -- such as freezing the overseas bank accounts of Iranian leaders, banning Iranian military purchases, and restricting foreign travel by Iranian governmental leaders -- might pressure the regime in Tehran. ¶9. (C) Comment: We have actively argued the U.S. case on the Iranian nuclear issue and we have been successful with many in the GOT. FM Gul has gathered Turkish Ambassadors this week to hear their views on the matter. Nonetheless, many of our Turkish interlocutors and the Turkish public remain deeply worried about U.S. intentions and the future direction of this issue. They do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, but believe Tehran is caught in a corner and cannot and will not back down. End Comment. -------------- TEXT OF TURKISH MFA STATEMENT -------------- ¶10. (U) Unofficial translation of March 30 Turkish MFA statement. Begin text. At the March 29 meeting of the UN Security Council, a statement of the Council Chair was made regarding Iran's nuclear program. In this statement, the UN Security Council acknowledged the right of countries that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, without discrimination against any particular country, to carry out production and research toward the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The statement also gives voice to the expectation that Iran will fulfill its responsibilities and carry out full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency within the framework of its obligations that originate in the same agreement. It highlights that Iran's compliance with the Agency,s decisions will make an important contribution toward reaching a peaceful resolution of the problem through diplomacy. We believe this statement creates great opportunity for peaceful resolution of the problem. We support this statement which reflects the common expectations of the international community on Iran. End text. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON