IRAN/TURKEY - DISCUSSION WITH ACTING TURKISH FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000188

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC TU IR
SUBJECT: IRAN/TURKEY - DISCUSSION WITH ACTING TURKISH FM

REF: A. SECSTATE 06236

B. ANKARA 16

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and British Ambassador Westmacott
used a meeting on Cyprus with Acting Turkish FM Tuygan
January 18 to register US concerns on Iran and urge stronger
Turkish support of diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to
abandon its nuclear program and cooperate with the
international community. Tuygan heard the pitch, declined to
say what further Turkey may say or do, and suggested that he
regards a nuclear Iran as a virtual inevitability. Tuygan
also said that no visit to Turkey by Iranian President
Ahmedi-nejad is in the works. Besides briefing Turkey on the
Iranian nuclear program as we have suggested (ref b),post
recommends that the Turks also hear from us on what we see as
the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, including for the
Turkish security posture as a member of NATO. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador drew from ref a points on Iran.
Elaborating, he noted a statement made on Iran January 16 in
which PM Erdogan called on Iran to be more moderate,
conciliatory, and transparent in its dialogue with the IAEA
and the EU-3. For Turkey, this was not an unhelpful
statement and was better than it could have been. But we,
Turkey and the many countries concerned about the Iranian
nuclear program need stronger support. Ambassador said that
the EU-3 effort appears to have failed and that for the
diplomatic track with Iran now to have much chance of
success, more countries such as Turkey need to recognize and
say that Iran,s behavior is radical and dangerous. This is
especially so given Turkey,s vulnerability because of its
proximity to Iran and to international WMD terrorism.
Ambassador observed that action will now turn to the IAEA
Board and then to the UNSC. Turkey should add its voice and
encourage UNSC members Russia and China and other non-P5
members of the need for an approach that has a chance of
persuading the Iranians to reverse course. Ambassador also
noted the security and political implications of a nuclear
Iran for Turkey, including for Turkey's status as a regional
power and the additional military and defense measures that
Turkey will be required to take to protect itself and
contribute to NATO,s defenses against a nuclear armed Iran.


3. (C) UK Ambassador Westmacott echoed these points. He said
that a critical next step is for the UNSC be united. If it
could be united in taking real action, that would surprise
the Iranians and might help bring them back to the table and
away from confrontation.


4. (C) Tuygan said that Turkey supports US and EU diplomacy
on Iran, but declined to indicate what Turkey might further
do or say on the issue. He opined that Iran seems bent on
developing nuclear weapons, will not likely give up those
efforts, and probably cannot be stopped from acquiring
nuclear weapons in several years' time. He said that Turkey
has &other priorities8 in the region, pointing to Cyprus
(which was the main subject of the meeting). Nevertheless,
he took note of the argument that a nuclear-armed Iran would
have extremely important security consequences for Turkey,
the US and NATO, and that Turkey,s approach needs to reflect
that reality more strongly than has been the case.


5. (C) During a brief one-on-one at the conclusion of the
meeting, Ambassador raised press reports here about a
possible visit to Turkey by Iranian President Ahmedi-nejad.
He noted that other senior Turkish officials had debunked
these reports, but that we understood a Turkish embassy
officer had recently told Department officials such a visit
may indeed be in the works. Such a visit, especially at this
time, would be a big mistake. Tuygan stated categorically
that a visit by the Iranian president is not on. He said the
Iranians had inquired about the possibility some time ago and
were told that such a visit would &require a lot of
preparation.8 Tuygan made clear that no visit will happen
anytime soon and especially not in the current climate.


6. (C) Comment: The visit January 17 of EUCOM General
Charles Wald, which focused heavily on Iran, was helpful at
least with his military interlocutors. Wald told press here
that a nuclear-armed Iran would necessitate a number of
defensive measures by us and others, including on missile
defense, which may lead to more realistic thinking by the
Turks on the implications of a nuclear Iran. Post requested
in ref b a delegation to describe in more detail what we know
about the Iranian nuclear program, and we understand that
this may now be in the works. Turkey should also hear from
that group and perhaps in NATO councils what we expect will
be the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran ) arguments that
may strengthen the hand here of those who want to see Turkey
take a stiffer line with Tehran.

WILSON