Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA1877
2006-04-07 10:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON

Tags:  PREL GG AR TU 
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VZCZCXRO5698
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #1877/01 0971052
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071052Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4612
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001877 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL GG AR TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON
GEORGIA AND ARMENIA

REF: A. ANKARA 1557


B. ANKARA 1790

C. ANKARA 1651

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

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Summary
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001877 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016 TAGS: PREL GG AR TU SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON GEORGIA AND ARMENIA REF: A. ANKARA 1557 ¶B. ANKARA 1790 ¶C. ANKARA 1651 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) MFA Caucasus Director General Resit Uman briefed DAS Bryza April 4 on Turkey-Georgia relations, focusing on President Sezer's March visit to Tbilisi (ref a). He said Georgian MFA officials had told the Turks Georgia would prefer a "5 plus 2" formula in order to internationalize negotiations on the frozen conflicts. Bryza reported on Friends of the Secretary General efforts to reinvigorate talks on Abkhazia and promote economic contacts, as well as efforts to promote South Ossetia talks. Uman said Turkey supports intensified dialogue with Georgia but worries a MAP would set Georgia on an irrevocable path toward NATO membership, which might embolden Tbilisi (refs a and b). Bryza countered that a NATO perspective should encourage Georgia to behave more responsibly. On Armenia, Uman said Ankara has received no response to the non-paper it presented to Armenian officials on March 10 (ref c) and wondered if we could help with Yerevan. End Summary. -------------- Adjara and Frozen Conflicts -------------- ¶2. (C) DG Uman briefed DAS Bryza on President Sezer's mid-March visit to Tbilisi, highlighting President Saakasvili's remark that "Georgia is a political and economic extension of Turkey." Sezer had urged the Georgians to reduce their anti-Russia rhetoric, expressed support for Georgia's Euroatlantic integration, and offered Turkish help - through its large Abkhazian diaspora - to mediate the Abkhaz conflict. During Sezer's visit, Georgian officials reportedly told the Turks they would prefer a "five plus two" negotiating formula, similar to Transnistria talks, in order to further internationalize the frozen conflicts. The GOT remains concerned over Russia drawing parallels between Kosovo final status and the frozen conflicts in Georgia. ¶3. (C) Uman said Sezer had asked the Georgians not to further erode Adjara's autonomy. The GOT is concerned that gradual loss of Adjaran autonomy, in disregard of the Treaty of Kars, will set a negative example for other regional conflicts. Bryza noted that U.S. and Turkish views are largely aligned and that the U.S. has also raised thes
e concerns in Tbilisi, although the professed loss of Adjaran autonomy is not an issue in Adjara itself. Still, the U.S. sees the situation in Adjara as vastly improved from before and manageable. ¶4. (C) Bryza briefed Uman on U.S. efforts within the Friends of the Secretary General (FSG) group to reinvigorate negotiations on Abkhazia, counter Russian parallels to Kosovo, and achieve gradual progress in Abkhazia while enhancing its economic prospects. The U.S. appreciates Turkey's readiness to ease Abkhazia's isolation and facilitate talks, including with the help of Turkey's large Abkhazian minority community. All this contributes to our goal of building Abkhaz confidence in Georgia and its place there. ¶5. (C) On South Ossetia, Bryza recounted how the U.S. has encouraged Tbilisi to moderate its rhetoric towards Russia. We need to find a better format for political negotiations while still using the JCC to work on the first two elements of the Georgia peace proposal (demilitarization/CBMs and economic rehabilitation). We are looking forward to an OSCE donor conference this spring and formation of working groups to promote economic rehabilitation. Perhaps these working groups could then provide an effective negotiating platform. -------------- MAP for Georgia Needs Careful Thought -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to Georgia's NATO aspirations, Uman ANKARA 00001877 002 OF 002 acknowledged our demarche on intensified dialogue with Georgia (ref b). He stated that Turkey views intensified dialogue positively but remains cautious on Georgia's desire for a Membership Action plan (MAP). Turkey views a MAP as an important step, a practically irrevocable commitment to NATO membership for Georgia. Turkey is not against a MAP but believes it must be considered carefully in terms of potential value added to the regional baance versus the risks of irritating Russia and emboldening the Georgians to act more aggressively towards Moscow. Uman suggested that Ankara is not convinced Georgia sees a peaceful way out of the deadlock. ¶7. (C) Bryza responded with the U.S. view that the prospect of NATO membership will give Georgians hope and forestall the possibility that Georgian frustration with Russia's intractability over the frozen conflicts will degenerate into serious military confrontation. If Georgia knows it has an open door to NATO if it takes the right steps, both internally and with regard to the conflicts on its territory, then it will avoid a military approach. Bryza concluded that Georgian behavior had grown more constructive after the EU Presidency's February 21 statement supporting Tbilisi's settlement efforts. -------------- Armenia - No Answer to Turkish Proposal -------------- ¶8. (S) Uman briefed Bryza on the non-paper Turkey presented to Armenian MFA officials in Vienna on March 10, seeking to bridge differences between an earlier Turkish proposal for a Joint Historical Commission to examine Armenian genocide claims and Yerevan's counterproposal for an Intergovernmental Commission to deal with all aspects of bilateral relations (ref c). Uman said Armenian officials had promised a response by late March, but Ankara had heard nothing so far. He asked if the U.S. would be willing to press Yerevan for a reaction to the Turkish paper. Bryza said the U.S. was already doing so. Uman also re-stated the Foreign Ministry's position that Turkey will not take a decision to open the Turkey-Armenian border on the basis of progress on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement alone; this would also depend on progress with bilateral issues. ¶9. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON

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