ANOTHER LOOK AT TURKEY'S BLACK SEA MARITIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001627 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL NATO MOPS TU US RO SUBJECT: ANOTHER LOOK AT TURKEY'S BLACK SEA MARITIME SECURITY POLICY REF: A. 05 ANKARA 7592 ¶B. ANKARA 273 ¶C. BRUDER-BURGER EMAIL 3/15/06 ¶D. ANKARA 1069 ¶E. 05 ANKARA 5953 ¶F. 05 ANKARA 4013 ¶G. 05 ANKARA 3953 ¶H. 05 ANKARA 3581 ¶I. 05 ANKARA 2060 ¶J. 05 ANKARA 1953 ¶K. 05 ANKARA 802 Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para. 13. Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey welcomes U.S., NATO, EU and others' active involvement in political and economic challenges facing the greater Black Sea region, such as frozen conflicts and energy flows. However, Turkey prefers that the Black Sea's littoral states address maritime security on their own. GOT argues that security risks in the Black Sea are manageable, and that sudden U.S. or NATO participation would scuttle their efforts to draw Russia into a cooperative security architecture with the other littorals. A deliberate, go-slow approach in seeking to assert a U.S./NATO role in Black Sea maritime security is more likely to succeed. We request feedback on the GOT's request to prevail upon Romania and Bulgaria to join Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY. End summary. ¶3. (C) We understand that EUCOM, DoD, and State are all working on various strategies or policies for the Black Sea region. As Turkey is a key littoral, we will be providing some thoughts septel for Washington's consideration. In the meantime, however, we thought it important to clarify Turkey's policy on Black Sea security matters. Refs E, F, H, and I provide further background. The Region Versus the Sea Itself -------------- ¶4. (C) When discussing Black Sea policy, Turkish policymakers make a significant distinction between maritime security issues and broader regional considerations. Turkey welcomes U.S., NATO, EU, and other nations' and organizations' participation in dealing with key Black Sea regional challenges such as frozen conflicts, energy flows, economic development, and democratization (including those challenges inherent in Russia's past domination of large chunks of the region). Turkey does not object to U.S. basing in Romania or U.S. support for Georgia, for example. And certainly Turkey sees gas and oil pipeline and tanker security, resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and interdicting terrorists and WMDs as in its interests. ¶5. (C) It is true, however, that Turkey takes a somewhat more restrictive position when it comes to Black Sea maritime security. It is the GOT's stated preference that the littoral states take the lead in maintaining a safe and secure sea. Part of this, Turkish officials tell us, is because Turkey has worked assiduously since the 1990s to draw the other littorals -- especially Russia -- into cooperative security structures in the Black Sea. It took a number of years during the late 1990s for Ankara to convince Moscow to participate in the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (better known as BLACKSEAFOR),which came into being in 2001 essentially as a confidence-building measure among the littoral navies. While technically BLACKSEAFOR is an "on call" force for OSCE and UN-mandated operations, its chief naval activity has been biannual (formerly annual) "activations," exercises of relatively low complexity or interactivity. However, BLACKSEAFOR has also developed over the years into both a political and military organization. It holds annual naval staff talks and MFA undersecretary-level meetings, as well as numerous meetings of experts and mid-level officials. Risks or Threats? ANKARA 00001627 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (C) In early 2005, BLACKSEAFOR agreed on a rather vague risk assessment (text Ref I). Turkish military and civilian officials often point to this assessment to claim that there are no risks in the Black Sea which the littorals cannot handle themselves (i.e., there is no need for NATO to expand Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE) into the Black Sea). A popular line here is that "there are no threats in the Black Sea, only risks." This rather naive (or disingenuous) assessment has put Bucharest, a vocal champion of a significant NATO presence in the Black Sea, on the defensive, since it agreed to sign onto it. Turkish officials ask why the Romanians are so eager for a greater NATO (read U.S.) presence in the Black Sea if the littorals have all agreed that the risks are not all that significant. ¶7. (C) Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH) is a maritime interdiction operation (MIO) which commenced in March 2004. Turkey carries out this MIO in its Exclusive Economic Zone waters, though the extent and coverage of this operation is not transparent. Turkish officials claim that OBSH is essentially the same as OAE, although the Georgian DCM tells us that the Turkish Navy turns a blind eye to Turkish maritime smuggling into Abkhazia, and Bulgarian officials report that extensive illicit activities continue in the Black Sea. The Turkish Navy provides information obtained in OBSH to NATO. In 2005, Turkey offered all the other littorals to join OBSH. Russia has indicated it will accept; we understand Russian vessels will probably commence operations later this year. Ukraine and Georgia (though the Georgians have no real navy) have expressed some interest, and Romania and Bulgaria have not responded (they tell us they are not interested). Playing Footsie With Moscow? -------------- ¶8. (C) Russia and Turkey, traditional rivals, maintain the only large, capable navies among the littoral states. Historically, Russia values its Black Sea ports and views the Turkish Straits as a limiting factor on its ability to project naval power southward. Now these same Straits have taken on enormous political and economic importance for the GOR, namely as the main sea route for oil from the Black Sea to world markets. The average three million barrels of oil that pass through the Straits each day account for 7% of global tanker traffic. This -- along with significant Russian tourist presence in Turkey's southern resorts and other economic ties -- has resulted in a somewhat greater harmony of interests between Moscow and Ankara. This harmony is magnified somewhat by certain elements in the ruling AK Party, such as the PM's adviser Ahmet Davutoglu, who seek to foster stronger ties to Turkey's south, east, and north. ¶9. (C) With us, Turkish officials point to the positive benefits of engaging the Russians. They say Russia is essential to Turkey's desire to build a meaningful security architecture which, ideally for the GOT, would involve all the littoral states on an equal basis (and which would in general remain a "littorals-only" club). Turkish naval brass constantly refer to BLACKSEAFOR activations in which Georgians and Ukrainians (activation commands rotate) got to order their Russian colleagues around. And they refer to the benefits of the mixed nature of the littoral states -- half of whom are NATO Allies -- in building confidence and getting the Russians to engage in cooperative security in the region. They claim that their work to get Russia involved in BLACKSEAFOR built the confidence Moscow needed to participate in OAE in the Mediterranean. Don't Lump Us Together -------------- ¶10. (C) Turkish officials are angered when American academics and others lump Turkey and Russia together as obstructionist elements in the Black Sea region. It is true that they agree that Black Sea maritime security should remain primarily a littoral project, but Turkey is a NATO Ally, Russia isn't. It's also true that Russia has agreed to join Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY, which provides data to NATO. While it remains ANKARA 00001627 003 OF 003 to be seen how much data Russia will share with NATO, not to mention how genuine their patrolling will be when it comes to Russian ships smuggling in the Black Sea, this is still a positive step in drawing Russia into further cooperation with the Alliance. Montreux: Treaty as Holy Writ -------------- ¶11. (C) Turkish officials also consistently emphasize the Montreux Convention of 1936 as the centerpiece of maintaining Black Sea security. The Convention restored Turkish sovereignty and control of the Straits, and places limits on non-littoral navy traffic transiting the Straits and operating in the Black Sea. The U.S. is not a signatory to Montreux, but we abide by the sometimes inconvenient (sometimes onerous) conditions the Convention places on U.S. Navy movements through the Straits. Senior U.S. military officers have in the past chafed publicly at the restrictions Montreux places on our Navy; Turkish officials are very sensitive to such comments. While the prospect of moving more or bigger ships through the Straits for longer stays in the Black Sea is attractive, renegotiating the Convention would open a Pandora's Box, allowing Russia to make mischief and demand an element of control over the Straits, a historical Russian dream (and clearly -- as GOT officials often point out -- against our interests). We understand from our military that we do not currently have the resources available to place a large naval presence in the Black Sea. Steady As She Goes -------------- ¶12. (C) At least in the maritime security arena, these developments argue for maintaining a steady, go-slow approach with regard to the Black Sea. We should continue to send the message that we will engage in the Black Sea, be it unilaterally or mulilaterally. (NOTE: The GOT has agreed to a blateral Black Sea engagement opportunity planne for April 14-17 with USS PORTER, which will lso make a port call in Samsun on the Black Sea coast. END NOTE.). But at the same time we should applaud Turkish leadership in the region and the efforts of the littoral states to maintain security and deal with threats to all our interests (terrorism, smuggling, WMD proliferation, trafficking in persons, etc.). And we should deliberately but consistently push Turkey to include both NATO and American participation in collective security -- be it as guests, observers, or in some other status initially. It would be worth reminding Turkey that if the security structures it has founded in the Black Sea remain opaque to us, we will lack confidence in them. Action Request -------------- ¶13. (C) More immediately, we owe Ankara an answer on a request they have made of us. During the Nov. 9-10 High Level Defense Group meeting (ref a),EUCOM D/CDR Gen. Wald's Jan. 17 visit (ref b),and the Ambassador's Feb. 1 call on Turkish Naval Forces Commander ADM Karahanoglu, the Turkish military has requested us to weigh in with Romania and Bulgaria to persuade them to join Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY. We note that (especially) Romania's reluctance to join OBSH -- or even to communicate with the Turkish Navy about suspicious shipping in its vicinity -- appear to have increased tensions between these NATO Allies. Turkey is beginning to reciprocate with a cautious attitude toward Romanian initiatives in the region. One MFA official even suggested Bucharest's policy toward Black Sea cooperation could factor into the GOT response for CFE entitlements headroom to permit our armor to operate on Romanian bases. Such a development is not good for the region or for the Alliance. We recommend advocating greater cooperation in the region by the region. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ MCELDOWNEY