SCENESETTER FOR THE 23-26 MARCH VISIT OF CHAIRMAN

1. (C) SUMMARY: Your March 23-26 visit comes at a time when
progress has been made in improving the character of
US-Turkish relations that frayed badly in 2003-2005. Senior
level dialogue, including on the military-to-military side,
has resumed; Turkey has downplayed its whining about the PDD
and Kirkuk in favor of concerted action to support Iraq and
the success of Coalition efforts there; and Ankara hugely
appreciated the US role in securing EU agreement to open
accession negotiations last October. Despite this progress
and an active role in the Global War on Terror ) reflected
in the terrorism conference you will be attending, restoring
mutual trust and a real sense of collaboration is at best a
work in progress. Meetings here with leaders of HAMAS
brought strong private protests from us and enraged both
Israel and long-time supporters of Turkey in Congress and
elsewhere. Despite good Turkish messages on Iran and Syria,
leading officials have made clear they don,t want sanctions,
oppose any military option on Iran and won,t isolate Syria.
In the Black Sea, Turkey comes across more concerned about
its relations with Russia than working with its NATO allies.
Formerly strong defense industry relationships are on the
ropes. Domestically, Turkey is entering a period of
political turmoil in the run-up to CHOD Ozkok,s replacement
in August, selection of a new president in next May, and
parliamentary elections that must occur no later than
November 2007. The struggle for power has many aspects, but
is widely seen here as a contest between Kemalist secularists
and a more Islamist orientation championed by the government
of PM Erdogan. Your visit, simultaneous travel here by CODEL
Warner, and FM Gul,s March 27-29 talks in Washington provide
important opportunities to review key foreign policy issues,
discuss how we can best work together in coming years, and
further rebuild frayed personal relationships, especially
with Turkey,s military. END SUMMARY.

WALKING A MIDDLE EAST TIGHT ROPE


--------------------------





2. (C) Syria and Iran. The GOT insists that it can deliver
tough messages on behalf of the international community. FM
Gul reportedly pressed Bashar Assad during his Nov. 2005
visit to Syria to cooperate with UNIIIC, prevent foreign
fighters from entering Iraq, and cease support to Palestinian
rejectionists. Turkish officials have told us they share our
belief that Iranian development of nuclear weapons presents a
global danger, and their public and private messages
emphasize the need for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to
restore international trust. Turkey supports diplomacy for
dealing with Iran, is deeply suspicious of sanctions, and
very much wants to avoid a confrontation. You should
emphasize the importance of strong public statements,
international consensus, and the need for our militaries to
begin quiet consultations on dealing with an increased
Iranian threat to NATO.



3. (C) Hamas. The GOT's reception of a Hamas delegation on
February 16 was awkward and amateurish. Turkish officials
assured us they impressed on Hamas the need to fulfill
Quartet conditions, but their public statements have been
weak. MFA U/S Tuygan visited Israel March 6-8 to soothe
Israeli concerns over the Hamas visit, and FM Livni has
reportedly accepted an invitation to visit Turkey later this
spring. FM Gul will travel to Washington later this month
for the ATC conference and will meet with Secretary Rice and
NSA Steve Hadley. We have encouraged Gul to mend Turkey,s
fences with Congress and the American Jewish community.

INCREASING COOPERATION WITH IRAQ


--------------------------





4. (SBU) Turkey is well-engaged in promoting inclusive Iraqi

politics. Its ambassador in Baghdad works closely with
Ambassador Khalizad and is pressing for a national unity
government. Their special Envoy for Iraq visited Baghdad
Feb. 23-25 and met with a wide array of Iraqi political
figures, including Kurdish leaders with whom Turkey has had
tense relations. Acting PM Jafari visited Ankara several
days later and had useful discussions on economic
cooperation. Turkey remains concerned about the PKK and
Kirkuk, but now realizes that a successful Iraq is key to
addressing these matters. In this context, the possibility
of civil war in Iraq has both the GOT and the TGS very
concerned. Expect to be asked for your candid opinion on the
situation as well as the coalition plan and US expectations
of Turkey in the months ahead.



5. (SBU) Turkey provides significant logistical support for
the coalition effort in Iraq. The Incirlik cargo hub has
facilitated the movement of over 129 million pounds of
equipment for coalition troops since its initiation in May


2005. The Incirlik air refueling hub has conducted 2800
sorties delivering 192 million pounds of fuel in support of
OIF and OEF since 2003. Twenty-five percent of sustainment
fuel for the coalition crosses through the Habur Gate
connecting Turkey and Iraq as does two-thirds of humanitarian
fuel for the Iraqi people. Habur is a bottleneck that is
being upgraded; talks on opening additional border crossings
have gone nowhere. You may want to emphasize the economic
benefits of opening additional border gate(s), emphasizing
that increased trade will benefit both Iraq and Turkey.


BUT THE PKK PRESENCE IN IRAQ RANKLES


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6. (S) Attacks attributed to the PKK Kurdistan Workers,
Party continue against Turkish soldiers and Jandarma in
Turkey's southeast, in what the GOT presumes are cross-border
operations emanating from Iraq. The media and sensitive
intelligence reporting are predicting a spring escalation of
PKK attacks in Turkish cities coinciding with the March 21st
annual celebration of Nevruz (Kurdish New Year). Terrorist
incidents in Istanbul, Van and elsewhere in February and
March may have been the start of this. TLFC Commander GEN
Buyukanit backpedaled away from his talk in Washington in
December about a Turkish military &spring cleaning8
operation against the PKK in northern Iraq, and all judge
such action unlikely absent large-scale PKK action in
Turkey,s cities.



7. (S) During the September visit of Generals Jones and
Smith, TGS rejected EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance
inside Turkey, but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to continue
aerial overflights of PKK camps on the Iraqi side of border;
CF now carry out flights every two weeks. Turkey accepted
EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO) support, and
interagency discussions have taken place on this. TGS also
welcomed an enhanced intelligence-sharing program on an
intermittent basis tied to specific Turkish operations.
Indications are the intelligence provided has been beneficial
to GOT. CENTCOM offered to expand the list of PKK HVI on the
CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil contacts,
which may include joint border patrols. Discussions on these
offers continue, but will likely not bear fruit in the short
term. The interagency initiative to partner with Turkey and
the Europeans to pursue law enforcement cases against the PKK
presses on. In December, a CIA/DIA/FBI/DOJ/Treasury team
visited Ankara; they and the Turks identified two PKK
operatives in Europe to pursue together. Your interlocutors
may complain about the absence of kinetic action against the
PKK, but we have a good story to tell and we should tell it.


PARTNER IN GWOT



--------------------------





8. (S/NF) Turkey, France and Italy have agreed on an eight
month rotating command of the ISAF Kabul Regional Command
starting in the second half of 2006. Turkey will
simultaneously open a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
neighboring Wardak Province. Turkey is involved in the
reconstruction of schools and is exploring counter-narcotics
training programs for Afghan police and alternative
livelihood options for poppy farmers. Following PM Erdogan's
May 2005 visit to Afghanistan, the GOT boosted its aid to
Afghanistan to $100 million. Turkey continues to provide
significant personnel and assets for Operation Active
Endeavor, KFOR, and Operation Althea. It will host a
Proliferation Security Initiative combined air, land and sea
exercise (ANATOLIAN SUN) in May 2006, with US participation.
You should recognize Turkey's support in the Global War on
Terrorism.



9. (C) Turkey limits cooperation on Black Sea maritime
security outside the context of the BLACKSEAFOR and Operation
BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH) initiatives they originated. The
Turks argue that an active U.S./NATO role would alienate
Russia in an area where its cooperation is needed. However,
last week they agreed to a bilateral Black Sea engagement
opportunity planned for next month with USS PORTER.


MIL TO MIL RELATIONS


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10. (C) At the senior officer level, a steady stream of
visitors (Jones, Wald, Hagee, Hobbins, Buyukanit, Smith) has
started to rebuild mil-mil relations, but real teamwork
remains a goal not a reality. Improvements at the top have
not penetrated the more deep seated resentment held by the
junior and mid-level officers (reflected in the Turkish
Society more broadly) who will become tomorrow,s leaders.
Your speech at the War Academy will help to reach out to
these future leaders.

SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT


--------------------------





11. (S) A casualty of the Iraq war was the relationship
between our Special Forces (SF). The July 4, 2003
Suleymaniyah incident, in which US forces hooded and
handcuffed Turkish SF personnel, remains a sore that may take
a generation to heal. A Turkish Special Forces 19-27 Sep 05
visit to Washington at the Joint Staff,s invitation was
helpful. A Small Unit Exchange visit this month and a
SOCEUR-initiated SF JCET now scheduled for fourth quarter
2006 will be good next steps.

DISAPPOINTMENT DOGS DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION


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12. (SBU) Bilateral defense industry cooperation is at its
nadir. Boeing was the last firm to win a direct sale when
Turkey awarded it a contract for an Airborne Early Warning
and Control (AEW&C) system in 2002. Boeing and Bell Textron
decided not to participate in an attack helicopter tender due
to onerous terms and conditions imposed on bidders. Sikorsky
-- which had considered establishing its International
Blackhawk production facility in Turkey if it won a tender
for 52 utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed Forces and
Forestry Service -- may choose not to bid on that tender.
Raytheon may also opt out of a tender for a propeller
airplane trainer project. General Electric is being squeezed
regarding the Turkish Air Force,s acquisition of parts and
engines, the result of which will cripple the AF,s
abilities. Three US firms -- General Dynamics, Bell Textron
and General Atomics Aviation - have closed their offices in

Turkey. We have raised our concerns about the negative
impact of terms and conditions that are driving our companies
away. You should express disappointment that US military
suppliers are unable to compete in the Turkish market,
emphasize the importance of interoperability, and urge action
to create a more welcoming climate for our firms.



13. (SBU) Turkey is a Level III partner in the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program, with a pledged investment of $175M and
a purchase of 100 planes. However, in return for its
participation in JSF, Turkey is asking for $5-6B in
workshare, including production of a major component.
Lockheed Martin and its partners are working hard to identify
appropriate opportunities for Turkey that will achieve the
government's objective. However, we have
underscored to the Undersecretary of Defense Industries that
to achieve this Turkey will need to invest in new technology
and demonstrate competitive product quality and pricing.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON