TURKEY: EVOLVING VIEWS ON IRANIAN NUKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001463 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2026 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINS IR TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: EVOLVING VIEWS ON IRANIAN NUKES REF: A. ANKARA 000972 ¶B. ANKARA 000622 ¶C. ANKARA 001213 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Turkish Leaders Publicly Pressure Iran -------------- ¶1. (SBU) In recent weeks, AKP officials have gradually been ratcheting up public pressure on Iran, simultaneously sending messages to their domestic constituencies that the situation has reached a more serious level. Over the weekend of March 11, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul reportedly told his fellow Justice and Development Party (AKP) parliamentarians at a private, weekend AKP retreat that, while Turkey sought to continue dialogue with Tehran, it may have to "close its door to Iran" if Tehran proves unable to fulfill its international obligations. ¶2. (U) In a March 10 press release, the Turkish MFA stated, "Turkey has been emphasizing that Iran,s hiding of some aspects of its nuclear program from the International Atomic Energy Agency has been causing (a) loss of confidence with the international community and Iran should have full and more transparent cooperation with the Agency and should take additional confidence building measures in order to compensate (for) this lack of confidence." ¶3. (U) On February 27, Justice Minister Cemil Cicek stated that, "There is a growing concern about Iran,s nuclear studies in the world. Every country can conduct nuclear activities with peaceful goals. However, there should be transparency. We expect our neighbor Iran to be more transparent for the sake of the region and comply with international rules. We try to express our friendly warnings through diplomatic ways." -------------- - Turkish MFA Welcomes U.S.-led Dialogue on Iran -------------- - ¶4. (C) Turkish MFA South Asian Department Head Murat Ulku told us that the GOT welcomes the idea of enhanced U.S.-Turkish dialogue and cooperation. He stated that IAEA Ambassador Schulte's February visit (REF A) was very successful in helping the Turkish authorities understand the USG's perspective on Iran. Ulku supported the notion of the USG drafting a list of ideas to propose to the GOT regarding limited, targeted sanctions that could be employed at some point in the future, in the event that purely diplomatic steps fail to compel Iran to comply with its international obligations, but he was clear that these ideas needed to come from the U.S. -------------- -------------- Many Turks Worry About Iranian Nukes and U.S. Intentions -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) We also discussed the Iranian nuclear weapons program with Turkish parliamentarians, think tankers, journalists, and academics. Many of our Turkish interlocutors are worried about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran and its impact on the strategic balance in the region. One example is Motherland Party (ANAP) MP Emin Sirin, who said that he views Iran as a sufficient threat to regional stability that, if all diplomatic means fail, he would vote in favor of Turkey-based U.S. military action -- an option on which he had voted "no" in the run-up to the Iraq war. ¶6. (C) However, Sirin is an exception, as most Turks believe Iranian weapons are not a threat to Turkey (REF B). Recent nationwide polls show that less than 7 percent of Turks see Iranian nukes as a threat to Turkey. Arif Keskin, an Iran expert at the ASAM think tank, told us that the Iranian regime is not popular, but foreign efforts to pressure the regime, including UN sanctions, are likely to backfire and rally the public around President Ahmedi-Nejad and the mullahs. Semih Idiz, a prominent Turkish journalist with CNN Turk, speculated that Turkey might officially support UN-sponsored sanctions against Iran, but then turn a blind eye to widespread cheating. ¶7. (C) Overall, the Turkish public still views the Iranian issue through the prism of the Iraq war and fears renewed instability and economic disruption. Many tell us that the 1990s sanctions against Iraq seriously hurt the Turkish economy, and they do not want to see a repeat of sanctions. Many claim the U.S. has already decided to attack Iran and is looking for a pretext to invade. According to a poll published March 13 in Yeni Safak, in the event of U.S. intervention in Iran, 62 percent of respondents said Turkey should remain neutral, 19 percent said Turkey should stand by Iran, 3 percent said Turkey should stand by the U.S., and 15 percent had no opinion. -------------- Media Coverage Up -------------- ¶8. (U) Media discussion of Iran has ratcheted up over the past several weeks. Some is factual, based on events in Vienna and New York. Other takes the form of commentary, running the gamut from realistic (the threat the Iranian nuclear program poses to Turkey and the region) to alarmist (the U.S. intends to us the newly renovated airport in Mus, in southeastern Turkey, as a base from which to launch attacks on Iran, an allegation Transport Minister Yildirim termed the figment of someone's imagination). Various media reported an exchange that allegedly took place behind closed doors on March 9 in Vienna between IAEA head Mohammed El-Baradei and FM Gul. El-Baradei reportedly told Gul that the only solution to the crisis was through diplomatic means, that a few countries could carry on the necessary dialogue with Tehran, and that one of those was Turkey. ¶9. (C) Several Turkish papers on March 13 reported that FM Gul criticized Israeli nuclear weapons during the same AKP weekend retreat where Gul made his "we may have to close the door" remarks. Gul is reported to have said that Israel has a nuclear program, that Israel's program is as dangerous as Iran's, and that all countries should be open to UN inspections. Israeli Embassy contacts told us that Turkish FM Spokesman Namik Tan phoned the Israeli Embassy to say that Gul never made these statements. The MFA has not publicly repudiated them. ¶10. (C) The Turkish press has also run numerous stories suggesting that FM Gul was about to travel to Iran or that Iranian President Ahmed-Nejad is coming to Turkey. Turkish officials have told us there are no such plans. Most recently, MFA Deputy Undersecretary Uzumcu explained to us that Ankara will keep a distance from Tehran regarding the exchange of high level visits. A Turkish parliamentary delegation that was planning to go to Iran earlier this year, was canceled when it conflicted with an Iranian parliamentary recess. MFA U/S Tuygan emphasized that Iranian Parliamentary Foreign Policy, National Security and Defense Affairs Committee Chair Alaadin Boroujerdi had heard one consistent message during his March 3 meetings in Ankara: complete transparency and cooperation with the IAEA and the EU-3 is the only way out of the current impasse (REF C). ¶11. (C) Comment: A murky situation is gradually becoming clearer. The GOT is gradually taking a more positive stance and supporting international efforts on Iran, but remains wary of possible sanctions and especially of military action against Iran should diplomacy fail. Continued senior-level U.S. engagement with Turkey on this critical issue will help to advance our interests. End Comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON