U. S. EXPERTS MEET WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001421

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CTR MCURRY, ALESTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: AU KNNP PARM RS TU
SUBJECT: U. S. EXPERTS MEET WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS ON
URANIUM SMUGGLING CASE

REF: A. STATE 4610

B. 2005 ANKARA 4841

Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reason 1.4 b/d.


1. (U) Summary: Officials from the Turkish Atomic Energy
Authority (TAEK) and Turkish National Police (TNP) shared
information concerning the August 2005 seizure of uranium
(ref tels) with a US delegation from Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory on March 2-3, 2006. TAEK officials and
the US delegation discussed the tests completed on the
uranium sample; our delegation were also able to view and
photograph the container and packaging, and to take gamma-ray
spectra measurements of the material. TNP officials provided
an overview of cases in which nuclear items were offered for
sale, along with details of the specific operation that led
to this seizure of the uranium. The US delegation provided
information about the international efforts to stop the
illegal movement of nuclear material and encouraged Turkish
participation in the IAEA International Technical Workgroup.
End Summary.


2. (U) Background: During a sting operation in Istanbul on
August 16,2005, Turkish National Police arrested two
individuals (a third individual was apprehended at a later
date) who were attempting to sell 173 grams of uranium, that
appeared to originate in a Cyrillic alphabet-using country.
The material was stored in a glass bottle when seized and
subsequently transferred to the Cekmece Nuclear Research and
Training Center (CNAEM) outside Istanbul. Subsequent tests
by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority indicated that the
material was low enriched uranium with an enrichment in U-235
of 17%. (Ref B) End Background.


3. (U) Dr. David Smith, nuclear chemist and nuclear forensic
scientist, and Dr. Zachary Koenig, a physicist and illicit
nuclear trafficking analyst, both from the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) visited Turkey March 2-3, 2006 to
meet with officials of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority
(TAEK) and Turkish National Police (TNP) to discuss the
August 2005 seizure of uranium. The visit was broken into
two parts; 1) March 2 meeting with TAEK officials at Cekmece;
2) March 3 meeting with TNP officials at the TNP regional HQ
in Istanbul.

CNAEM Meetings


4. (C) The U.S. delegation met with a team of nuclear
scientists led by the Deputy Director of CNAEM, Hakan Anac.
The TAEK scientists explained that only a test consisting of
a single ICP mass spectrometer measurement was completed on
the uranium sample. This test confirmed that the sample was
17% enriched. A copy of the test results were provide to the
U.S. team. CNAEM did not perform any tests to check for
trace elements or impurities within the sample. Additional
analyses were hindered due to the lack of available reference
standards at CNAEM.


5. (U) Dr. Smith presented information on the Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG). This
multinational working group brings together nuclear scientist
and law enforcement officials to share experience and methods
to stop the illegal movement of nuclear materials. The ITWG
also works cooperatively with the IAEA on nuclear trafficking
issues. Dr. Smith noted that Turkey had participated in the
past in this working group and encouraged them to attend the
next meeting which will take place in Germany in September

2006. CNAEM scientists responded that information obtained
during past exercises with ITWG, provided them some of the
information that they were able to utilize to establish the
baseline for the uranium sample.


6. (C) The U.S. delegation was allowed to view the perfume
box and glass bottle inside of which the uranium was and
still is stored. It was noted that it appears the bottle may
have been taken from a research laboratory, due to the
markings and the manner in which the bottle is sealed with
wax and a tamper string. Gamma-ray measurements with a
hand-held radioisotope identification instrument, and
Exploranium GR-135, confirm that it was uranium. Subsequent
analysis of the gamma-ray spectra indicated that it was
consistent with 17% enriched uranium. Anac agreed to allow
pictures to be taken of the package and the bottle.

TNP Meeting


7. (U) The U.S. delegation met with Sahin Ciftci, Chief TNP
Istanbul Financial Crimes Division and Burak Yanar, from the

HQ TNP Organized Crime Division, on March 3. Ciftci said
that the sting operation was carried out by the financial
crimes division because the TNP believed that the attempt to
sell the uranium was only another scam attempt. Over the
past 5 years, there have been 192 operations that have
involved suspects trying to sell some type of supposedly
nuclear material (red mercury, yoranium, cesium, etc.). Of

these 192 cases, only 12 had nuclear material and this case
was the only one that had a significant amount of uranium.
The other 11 cases were very low grade nuclear material which
was not considered dangerous.


8. (C) Ciftci then accompanied the U.S. delegation to a
briefing conducted by the officer which led the sting
operation. This officer outline the events of the operation
as follows:

a. An informant had told him about a group of individuals
that were attempting to sell some uranium. The officer
requested the informant set up a meeting.

b. The officer met with the individual selling the uranium.
The original asking price was USD 7 million; the officer told
the seller that he was interested in buying the material and
would like to meet again in a week.

c. A week later, the officer met again with the seller and
two other individuals. The officer explained that he could
only come up with $200,000 USD. The sellers agreed to the
price and handed the officer a perfume box which contained a
glass bottle. The label on the bottle stated that it
contained uranium 235 - 17.5%. At this point, the officer
attempted to arrest the individuals. Two were arrested
immediately, one escaped but was apprehended at a later date.

d. The material was brought back to TNP HQ to be processed
as evidence. The material was left in Ciftci's office for
safety reasons while awaiting processing. After a couple
hours, it was checked for radioactivity. This test was
positive and TAEK was contacted to take custody of the item.

e. Once the suspects were informed that the material was
really uranium, they stopped talking to TNP personnel.


9. (U) The U.S. delegation reviewed with the TNP officials
other nuclear smuggling cases that have occurred in the
region to further explain the international interest in this
case. Also, an overview of the ITWG was provided emphasizing
its role in promoting international cooperation by allowing
countries to share their experiences in the fight against
nuclear smuggling. Yanar thought this working group would be
good for TNP as terrorism is being added to the
responsibilities of the organized crime division.


10. (U) Comments: The seizure of uranium in August 2005 was
the first significant nuclear material seizure by TNP. While
the amount of significant information shared during this
visit was not large, the openness and willingness of Turkish
officials established a positive baseline for future
cooperation. Turkish officials were open and appeared to
view this exchange as an opportunity share information and
improve future operations. Inclusion of Turkey in future
IAEA ITWG activities will raise the awareness of Turkish
authorities and increase the amount of significant
information that Turkey shares in the future. End Comment.

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WILSON