POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN JORDAN: AN UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008907 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL JO SUBJECT: POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN JORDAN: AN UPDATE REF: A) AMMAN 5945 B) AMMAN 7420 C) AMMAN 4030 D) AMMAN 6335 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. ( C ) SUMMARY: The Islamic Action Front remains the largest organized opposition group. The professional associations also continue to function as ersatz opposition parties. Liberal, leftist, Arab nationalist and other opposition points of view find outlets in the media, but political parties in this part of the spectrum are very weak. Many politically conscious Jordanians who oppose government policies remain reluctant to associate with organized political movements, but they will be a key factor in next year's elections. END SUMMARY. POLITICAL PARTIES -------------- ¶2. ( C ) Jordan once had strong ) sometimes destabilizing, and often foreign-linked -- political parties. They remained important factors even after they were formally banned in 1957, but by the time the GOJ re-legalized parties in 1992, most had withered away. Because the Muslim Brotherhood movement was never banned, in 1992 its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, had a huge advantage over other political forces starting from scratch. Jordan's professional associations, which also helped fill the vacuum during the suppression of political parties, enjoy similar institutional advantages over post-1992 political parties. ¶3. ( C ) Thirty two legal parties are now active in Jordan. None of the new or re-established parties that emerged after 1992 have significant followings. Several of the new parties are organized around a single member of parliament; some (like the two Baath parties or the various socialist parties) are remnants of bygone movements; and others (especially those describing themselves as "moderate Islamists") are widely and accurately viewed as creatures of the security services. With little competition, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front and the professional associations continue to dominate the opposition scene. ¶4. ( C ) Another factor hampering new, centrist political parties is the continuing view among many Jordanians that political activity can, at least potentially, expose one to conflict with the authorities, as it did before 1992. Several centrist parties have attempted to get off the ground in recent years, apparently without GOJ help, but have failed to develop significant followings as of yet. ¶5. ( C ) Jordanian reformers both in and out of government continue efforts aimed at fostering productive political party life. Political reformers among Jordan's leadership often express to us their desire to see Jordan eventually develop a Western-style system of moderate political parties that responsibly alternate terms in government. The reports in 2006 of the National Agenda Commission and of the "We Are All Jordan" commission (ref A) both called for further development of responsible political parties, and for a reformed political parties law, which the current session of parliament is expected to debate over the coming three months. Programs funded by USAID and State help political party activists develop their organizational skills. The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold and Compact programs will also fund programmatic support, and provide incentives, for further political development. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD/ ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT -------------- ¶6. ( C ) In the short term, however, the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm, the Islamic Action Front, remains Jordan's only effective political party. The Front accuses the government of moving too slowly toward political liberalization, of cutting popular subsidies too quickly, and of maintaining too close a relationship with the U.S. and Israel. These last two points in particular seem to resonate strongly with the Jordanian street. ¶7. ( C ) Jordan's legal code prohibits ethnically based political parties, but young Palestinian-Jordanians now form much of the base of the IAF, while the Front has become a leading voice for Palestinian-Jordanian grievances. Some GOJ officials and secularist political observers express concern that the party is drifting away from its historical role as a loyal opposition (ref B). For the moment, however, the movement's traditionally moderate (and mostly East Banker) old guard remains in charge (ref B). AMMAN 00008907 002 OF 002 PROFESSIONAL ASOCIATIONS -------------- ¶8. ( C ) After the Front, the Professional Associations are the most prominent voice of opposition. Led by the doctors', engineers', and lawyers' unions, the associations are very active and maintain a high public profile with frequent statements, gatherings and demonstrations critical of GOJ policy. Originally dominated by leftists and pan-Arab nationalists, the associations' leaderships now include several Islamists as well. The associations, like the IAF, have become champions of Palestinian causes, and criticize the GOJ for its foreign policy and economic reforms. TRIBES -------------- ¶9. ( C ) East Bank tribes, a traditional pillar of Jordan's Hashemite rule, for the most part remain solid supporters of the GOJ and its policies. However, tribal complaints about King Abdullah's economic, political and social reforms, though rarely voiced publicly, now form another source of opposition (ref C). A SILENT MAJORITY? -------------- ¶10. ( C ) As noted above, most politically-aware Jordanians continue to avoid organized politics, though King Abdullah and his reformist inner circle would like to change that. Gripes over economic liberalization and perceptions of corruption metastasized during this summer's Lebanon fighting into a very sour public mood (ref D). ¶11. ( C ) With municipal and parliamentary elections scheduled for some time in 2007, as confirmed by King Abdullah in his November 28 speech opening parliament (septel),the GOJ and the Islamic movement will likely spend the early months of 2007 preparing the ground to compete for these unorganized but unhappy voters. The King,s top aides have briefed post on their plans to expand public work and poverty alleviation projects in advance of elections, in an effort to improve the mood on the street and deprive the Islamists of their most effective talking points. The GOJ's handling of the unorganized opposition could well prove the GOJ's key internal challenge of 2007. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ HALE